Date: Thu, 5 Nov 1998 15:56:55 +1100 (EST)
Subject: Re: PKF: phil of sci


At 01:35 PM 11/4/98 -0500, you wrote:
>hi everyone,
>
>i've been 'listening in' on some of the discussion going on in this group
>for a while now, and suppose that i have something to contribute -- or
>rather, hope to hear some replies and further contributions from other
>members of this group.
>
>feyerabend claimed that the sciences are 'a complex medium containing
>surprising and unforeseen developments demanding complex procedures and
>defies analysis on the basis of rules which have been set up in advance
>and without regard to the ever-changing conditions of history.'
>
>as far as i know, this is about as succinct as feyerabend got in his
>criticism of 'rationalists', and as far as it goes, i think he is correct.
>i imagine that part of feyerabend's dislike for philosophy of science in
>general is that he thought it impossible to say anything beyond relatively
>trivial and obvious things about progress in the sciences.  the history,
>procedures, technologies, culture etc of science are too complex to get
>beyond diffuse comments that are actually very obvious and known to all.
>if you transgress the trivialities and commit yourself to a 'vision' of
>scientific progress or rationality, those procedures, technologies,
>history etc of the sciences will quickly contradict you.
>
>if this sort of argument is correct, then in order for philosophy of
>science to make some kind of interesting contribution to our intellectual
>culture, it ought to study all those procedures, technologies, history
>etc.  but i don't know if there are many philosophers doing this.  as far
>as i know, no one is really considering, for example, the contributions
>made by applied science or of Big Science to scientific progress (ian
>hacking has done some nice work, however, and some sociologists of
>scientific knowledge might be doing this too -- though i suspect there
>are other problems with their program.)
>
>anyway, i haven't really asked a question which needs answering.  but i
>wonder, in general, what others might think of how i've characterised the
>matter.  in particular, what do students and professors studying the
>philosophy of science think about it?
>
>thanks,
>scott.
>
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>

Scott's characterisation of the philosophy of science, if i interpret
him correctly, is one which agrees with Feyerabend's disdain for scientific 
rationalism. He suggests that in order to locate 'progress',
the proper place of philosophy in science (and i see
he throws history in as well), should be somewhere near the practical and 
instrumental domains of science.
Of course, this is not an uncommon view held by scientists themselves.
It is position Weinberg has championed for years. And some of the great
sociologists of science, like Steven Woolgar, and philosophers like
Bruno Latour, have been important in
analysing science at this grass roots level as it were. But critics of
the uselessness of the history and philosophy of science like Weinberg
make their arguments from positions solidly within philosophy, and 
contractorily manufacture the argument from material gathered hither
and yonder from past philosophical investigations of science. I find advocates
of such views a bit ignorant of what philosophy (and history) actually do 
for science. Surely, focussing on the procedural minutae of scientific 
activity is enhanced by research of more general questions. For example,
(and this is a case which Woolgar & Latour had to face all the time in their
work),
in order to straightforwardly examine how a certain laboratory decided
to focus on one group of data and not another, was an investigation not only
into the social/contractual determinations of what constitutes 'proof', but
is a decisive factor in our constructions on notions of 'scientific
objectivity'.
Weinberg confuses this as a philosophical 'attack' on scientific objectivity 
rather than for what it is - a philosophical inquiry into
science-as-it-is-today.
I do not think that we should look at philosophy as an infallible guide 
to tell scientists where to take their research, but as a tool to help
us understand the mode of change in science.  
Finally, We should not speak of the analysis of actual scientific procedure
and philosophical inquiry of science as if they are two different
forms of intellectual research. 
What does the list think?
cheers
pierre

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