From: "Alexander Patterson" <nou-AT-clnet.cz>
Subject: PKF: File feyerabend.archive/feyerabend.9911, message 27
Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2000 12:02:50 +0100


This is a multi-part message in MIME format.



File feyerabend.archive/feyerabend.9911, message 27
__________________________

This posting by Terry Bristol is too insightful for me not to try tosee
go more discussed:I hope the formatting does not make problems
for anyone. If it does it is in the archive shown above.


Since "anything goes" is making a comment about "methodology", the answer
to the question as to whether it has ethical or moral implications depends
on whether one considers methodology to have moral implications.  If
methodology - of science or any other aspect of life - can be expressed by
some sort of algorithm (formula or rule), with universal applicability
(viz. time and space invariant), then methodology is value neutral.

  ---  BUT this would be value neutral in a very limited and somewhat
strange sense.  For instance, one might imagine that the method is to
always make choices for socialistic values rather than individualistic
values.  On the one hand this sounds definite and algorithmic - and so
value neutral (viz. any rational person must, by definition, choose this).
On the other hand, there is no rational choice - there are no value
options.  What I choose tells us only whether I have a healthy or unhealthy
mind (viz. rational or irrational).  This is a very common position of any
ideology, of any position that thinks it has the answer (viz. at this level
of analysis).

If there were a "correct or best" method, there would no choice for the
rational individual; except perhaps to be irrational (which by definition
could not be a rational choice).

PKF's "anything goes" was clearly designed to oppose the idea that there
was a "rational value system" in this above sense.  His historical
observation was that no methodology was able to claim that all new value
entering the world (viz. scientific knowledge or otherwise) came from the
application (deliberate or not) of that methodology.  Virtually every
conceivable methodology has, historically, shown itself able to bring forth
something, some result, of generally agreed value.

So if you ask the question as follows:  Is there one rational way to
proceed (in any or all situations)?   PKF's answer must be that there is
not.

(((After Note:  This might also - more subtly - be represented ONLY as
suggesting that no individual is ever in a position to give "rational
advice" to another person.  However I think that PKF is proposing that the
situation is not simply that I can't fully know your situation.  For
instance, perhaps if I could (or God could) then I could give you rational
advice.  Rather, I think he moves us more radically toward a world in which
the qualitative uniqueness of each of our lives is such that - in some
irreducible aspect or sense - there is no meaning to the notion that I
could give you rational advice (viz. if I could we wouldn't be different
people/intellects).  This is consistent with the proverbs that none of us
are really in a position to judge anyone else's behavior in an ultimate or
universal sense.  Indeed, perhaps God is equally unable to judge us.  Yet,
the real life situation is that we must judge each other - and ourselves
(see below about the paradox); cf. Arjune's dilemma before the battle in
the Hindu text Bhagavat Gita.)))

This does not make it immediately clear just how we are to proceed.  That
is the problem that PKF's philosophy provokes.

Note one important overall clarification:  PKF's treatment of "methodology"
originally begins in the hard sciences.  But the conclusion, consistent
with Kuhn and Lakatos, is that "scientific method" is not an autonomous
system of reasoning.  All attempts to provide a theory of "scientific
method" have failed.  These theories have all been unable to account for
the actual history of science.  This was the great weirdness that, in part,
led Lakatos to his image:  "Scientists don't need a theory of science in
order to do science anymore than fish need a theory of hydrodynamics in
order to swim."  This was very disturbing to us science-types.

First of all if science isn't autonomous then it must be embedded in the
larger intellectual enterprise - inquiry.  But we lack any articulation
(hypothesis) as to the nature and goal of that larger enterprise.  The most
common mistake was to assume that scientific decisions were "simply
embedded in the value context".  Theory choice become political or
artisitic value choice.  This erroneous interpretation is an error however
only in that it fails to recognize that the the "value context" or "value
inquiry" (viz. problem solving) is also not autonomous - equally incomplete
- and thus apparently embedded in the fact finding context (science).  So
the real situation is that we have two incommensurable intellectual
frameworks - science and values - that are both incomplete when we try to
reprersent them separately, yet apparently inseparately interlinked.

This revelation is only helpful in that it bails us our of the earlier
error of thinking that PKF/Kuhn meant that scientific choices were "really"
value choices.  They are in some essential sense, but not in any
"algorithmic" sense.  PKF started embracing dadaist art and so forth, I
believe, the emphasize that his position could not be understood as
advocating any political ideology.  His dadaist stand is rather like the
eternal antitheticalist: whatever is the current fad, my position is the
opposite.  And yet if that were to become too popular he would oppose that
as well.

(((After Note:  I think this is a clue to the noton that "meaningful
choices" cannot be "rational" in any sense that could ever be articulated
by any worldview or ideology.  Such a position could only be reasonable in
a world where "objectivist" claims are inherently incomplete - a universe
in which qualitative characteristics develop (an "emergent" universe).
Notice that this is where Popper seems to end up - in a qualitatively open
universe. PKF's oppositional dadaism could also be seen as thematically
similar to Popper's strange conclusion that one should try to confirm, what
is, in the current mainstream understanding, the least likely hypothesis.
This for Popper is the avenue to the greatly possible advance.  We
"normally" pursue what appears, according to the mainstream view, to be the
research/development program that is most likely to return an advance in
the shortest time with the least expenditure of resources.  (The only world
in which this would not work is one in which any given methodology that has
been successful will naturally tend eventually to a path of diminishing
returns.  This is reminiscent of the eastern worldview about the yiin and
yang;  also consistent with Gerald Holten (cf. his The Scientific
Imagination).  (Deep point:  In an emergent universe, the pursuit of the
long-term goal must be incommensurable with the pursuit of the short-term
goal; the reasoning that might lead one to pursue what is qualitatively new
- opposite (in some sense) to the currently "normal and successful"
research program - can not be "rationally justified from within the
currently "normal and successful" research program.)  (Notice further than
a research program defines, or is defined by, one's methodology; a rational
pairing.  So an advance in knowledge/understanding entails an advance in
how we reason; "An advance in science is an advance in logic" stated John
Dewey in "Essays in Experimental Logic".
This is equivalent to a denial of a universally best or preferred -
time/space invariant - methodology/logic/way of life.))))

What does it all mean?  First of all when we move to abandon the notion
that there is a separate and autonomous "scientific method" then we
inevitably move into - what I like to think of as - the Socratic tradition
where the core question is "How should we live?"  This is then the broader
methodological question.  This is the attempt to establish the fundamental
framework from which we can approach all problems - scientific or otherwise.

(((After Note:  In order for this question (How should we live?) to be
meaningful there cannot be any universal (time/space invariant) rational
answer.)))

I want to emphasize that PKF's philosophy did not really provide us with an
articulation of the implications of his observations and insights except
insofar as he warns us against the common misconceptions.  He leaves us in
situation that reminds me a little of Socrates (viz. no position can
justify its knowledge (or method) claims - in some sense. -  And Socrates
is reluctant to suggest what this means.  Only after clarifying the
meta-level, self-reflexive nature of his perspective is he willing to tell
us his view - in the Gorgias.  Unfortumately we never got this positive
view from Paul.)

As I have written here before, I think the best way to represent the place
that PKF, Kuhn and Lakatos left us is as a self-reference paradox.
Anything goes is self-inclusively paradoxical:  at first it seems to
advocate, or at least endorse, anarchy and radical individualism, and yet
through his interplay with Lakatos, PKF made it quite clear that "his
[PKF's] anarchy" is so inclusive so as to allow for the opposite position
to be equally "rational" and/or acceptable.  This was often represented as
Lakatos's fascism (Note: Perhaps Lakaotos's most important "epiphany" was
to realize that "bias is good" in science and life. Without it every
scientist would have abandoned every theory, even before they were
publically put forth.  This is of course precisely the opposite of what we
teach student.)

Although I am sure that it is well beyond most of the academics that
populate this listserv to appreciate the work of someone without the proper
"union credentials", I think that the work of British science journalist
James Burke is the best academic exploration or how PKF's philosophy helps
us understand the history of Western Civilization.  Look at his university
course "Science and Western Civilization", based on his BBC/PBS series "The
Day the Universe Changed".  His earlier work, "Connections", was equally
inspired by PKF, Kuhn and Lakatos.

Burke's work is an important positive step - beyond saving us from the
positivist models - in moving us toward an understanding of the universe
and our - meaningful - place in it.

One hope I might suggest here is that our post-PKF models of science and
society allow for our individual human actions to be meaningful.  This
would take us beyond mechanism and beyond randomness (chaos) to something
that actually makes sense.  Good luck.

Terry Bristol
bristol-AT-isepp.org


Alexander Patterson :
SAP Logistics SCM and Business Intelligence Consultant :
Advanced Planning Systems (SAP APO), Datawarehousing (SAP BW), OLAP Heuristics, Robotics AI
voice/fax: +42 0425 22627
mob/gsm: +42 0602 610 663
email: nou-AT-clnet.cz
webmail: bms-apatt-AT-universalmail.com
voice/fax:  from US: 011 42 0425 22627
mob/gsm: from US: 011 42 0602 610 663

HTML VERSION:

__________________________

This posting by Terry Bristol is too insightful for me not to try tosee 

go more discussed:I hope the formatting does not make problems

for anyone. If it does it is in the archive shown above.

Since "anything goes" is making a comment about "methodology", the answer
to the question as to whether it has ethical or moral implications depends
on whether one considers methodology to have moral implications.  If
methodology - of science or any other aspect of life - can be expressed by
some sort of algorithm (formula or rule), with universal applicability
(viz. time and space invariant), then methodology is value neutral.

  ---  BUT this would be value neutral in a very limited and somewhat
strange sense.  For instance, one might imagine that the method is to
always make choices for socialistic values rather than individualistic
values.  On the one hand this sounds definite and algorithmic - and so
value neutral (viz. any rational person must, by definition, choose this).
On the other hand, there is no rational choice - there are no value
options.  What I choose tells us only whether I have a healthy or unhealthy
mind (viz. rational or irrational).  This is a very common position of any
ideology, of any position that thinks it has the answer (viz. at this level
of analysis).

If there were a "correct or best" method, there would no choice for the
rational individual; except perhaps to be irrational (which by definition
could not be a rational choice).

PKF's "anything goes" was clearly designed to oppose the idea that there
was a "rational value system" in this above sense.  His historical
observation was that no methodology was able to claim that all new value
entering the world (viz. scientific knowledge or otherwise) came from the
application (deliberate or not) of that methodology.  Virtually every
conceivable methodology has, historically, shown itself able to bring forth
something, some result, of generally agreed value.

So if you ask the question as follows:  Is there one rational way to
proceed (in any or all situations)?   PKF's answer must be that there is
not.

(((After Note:  This might also - more subtly - be represented ONLY as
suggesting that no individual is ever in a position to give "rational
advice" to another person.  However I think that PKF is proposing that the
situation is not simply that I can't fully know your situation.  For
instance, perhaps if I could (or God could) then I could give you rational
advice.  Rather, I think he moves us more radically toward a world in which
the qualitative uniqueness of each of our lives is such that - in some
irreducible aspect or sense - there is no meaning to the notion that I
could give you rational advice (viz. if I could we wouldn't be different
people/intellects).  This is consistent with the proverbs that none of us
are really in a position to judge anyone else's behavior in an ultimate or
universal sense.  Indeed, perhaps God is equally unable to judge us.  Yet,
the real life situation is that we must judge each other - and ourselves
(see below about the paradox); cf. Arjune's dilemma before the battle in
the Hindu text Bhagavat Gita.)))

This does not make it immediately clear just how we are to proceed.  That
is the problem that PKF's philosophy provokes.

Note one important overall clarification:  PKF's treatment of "methodology"
originally begins in the hard sciences.  But the conclusion, consistent
with Kuhn and Lakatos, is that "scientific method" is not an autonomous
system of reasoning.  All attempts to provide a theory of "scientific
method" have failed.  These theories have all been unable to account for
the actual history of science.  This was the great weirdness that, in part,
led Lakatos to his image:  "Scientists don't need a theory of science in
order to do science anymore than fish need a theory of hydrodynamics in
order to swim."  This was very disturbing to us science-types.

First of all if science isn't autonomous then it must be embedded in the
larger intellectual enterprise - inquiry.  But we lack any articulation
(hypothesis) as to the nature and goal of that larger enterprise.  The most
common mistake was to assume that scientific decisions were "simply
embedded in the value context".  Theory choice become political or
artisitic value choice.  This erroneous interpretation is an error however
only in that it fails to recognize that the the "value context" or "value
inquiry" (viz. problem solving) is also not autonomous - equally incomplete
- and thus apparently embedded in the fact finding context (science).  So
the real situation is that we have two incommensurable intellectual
frameworks - science and values - that are both incomplete when we try to
reprersent them separately, yet apparently inseparately interlinked.

This revelation is only helpful in that it bails us our of the earlier
error of thinking that PKF/Kuhn meant that scientific choices were "really"
value choices.  They are in some essential sense, but not in any
"algorithmic" sense.  PKF started embracing dadaist art and so forth, I
believe, the emphasize that his position could not be understood as
advocating any political ideology.  His dadaist stand is rather like the
eternal antitheticalist: whatever is the current fad, my position is the
opposite.  And yet if that were to become too popular he would oppose that
as well.

(((After Note:  I think this is a clue to the noton that "meaningful
choices" cannot be "rational" in any sense that could ever be articulated
by any worldview or ideology.  Such a position could only be reasonable in
a world where "objectivist" claims are inherently incomplete - a universe
in which qualitative characteristics develop (an "emergent" universe).
Notice that this is where Popper seems to end up - in a qualitatively open
universe. PKF's oppositional dadaism could also be seen as thematically
similar to Popper's strange conclusion that one should try to confirm, what
is, in the current mainstream understanding, the least likely hypothesis.
This for Popper is the avenue to the greatly possible advance.  We
"normally" pursue what appears, according to the mainstream view, to be the
research/development program that is most likely to return an advance in
the shortest time with the least expenditure of resources.  (The only world
in which this would not work is one in which any given methodology that has
been successful will naturally tend eventually to a path of diminishing
returns.  This is reminiscent of the eastern worldview about the yiin and
yang;  also consistent with Gerald Holten (cf. his The Scientific
Imagination).  (Deep point:  In an emergent universe, the pursuit of the
long-term goal must be incommensurable with the pursuit of the short-term
goal; the reasoning that might lead one to pursue what is qualitatively new
- opposite (in some sense) to the currently "normal and successful"
research program - can not be "rationally justified from within the
currently "normal and successful" research program.)  (Notice further than
a research program defines, or is defined by, one's methodology; a rational
pairing.  So an advance in knowledge/understanding entails an advance in
how we reason; "An advance in science is an advance in logic" stated John
Dewey in "Essays in Experimental Logic".
This is equivalent to a denial of a universally best or preferred -
time/space invariant - methodology/logic/way of life.))))

What does it all mean?  First of all when we move to abandon the notion
that there is a separate and autonomous "scientific method" then we
inevitably move into - what I like to think of as - the Socratic tradition
where the core question is "How should we live?"  This is then the broader
methodological question.  This is the attempt to establish the fundamental
framework from which we can approach all problems - scientific or otherwise.

(((After Note:  In order for this question (How should we live?) to be
meaningful there cannot be any universal (time/space invariant) rational
answer.)))

I want to emphasize that PKF's philosophy did not really provide us with an
articulation of the implications of his observations and insights except
insofar as he warns us against the common misconceptions.  He leaves us in
situation that reminds me a little of Socrates (viz. no position can
justify its knowledge (or method) claims - in some sense. -  And Socrates
is reluctant to suggest what this means.  Only after clarifying the
meta-level, self-reflexive nature of his perspective is he willing to tell
us his view - in the Gorgias.  Unfortumately we never got this positive
view from Paul.)

As I have written here before, I think the best way to represent the place
that PKF, Kuhn and Lakatos left us is as a self-reference paradox.
Anything goes is self-inclusively paradoxical:  at first it seems to
advocate, or at least endorse, anarchy and radical individualism, and yet
through his interplay with Lakatos, PKF made it quite clear that "his
[PKF's] anarchy" is so inclusive so as to allow for the opposite position
to be equally "rational" and/or acceptable.  This was often represented as
Lakatos's fascism (Note: Perhaps Lakaotos's most important "epiphany" was
to realize that "bias is good" in science and life. Without it every
scientist would have abandoned every theory, even before they were
publically put forth.  This is of course precisely the opposite of what we
teach student.)

Although I am sure that it is well beyond most of the academics that
populate this listserv to appreciate the work of someone without the proper
"union credentials", I think that the work of British science journalist
James Burke is the best academic exploration or how PKF's philosophy helps
us understand the history of Western Civilization.  Look at his university
course "Science and Western Civilization", based on his BBC/PBS series "The
Day the Universe Changed".  His earlier work, "Connections", was equally
inspired by PKF, Kuhn and Lakatos.

Burke's work is an important positive step - beyond saving us from the
positivist models - in moving us toward an understanding of the universe
and our - meaningful - place in it.

One hope I might suggest here is that our post-PKF models of science and
society allow for our individual human actions to be meaningful.  This
would take us beyond mechanism and beyond randomness (chaos) to something
that actually makes sense.  Good luck.

Terry Bristol
bristol-AT-isepp.org