Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2000 12:36:32 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: PKF: Would Feyerabend have defended Wittgenstein and



Thanks for the response.

> What I mean is that in a narrative a story, a method of understanding, is
> given to a series of events. When events happen on the ground, before
> a narrative on them takes place, they are largely truth-functional, i.e.
> it is judgeable just what has taken place prior to a narrative explanation,
> i.e
> a meaning, given to them. Did Soldier A kill Soldier B: Yes or No,
> exclusively. That is perhaps the only place where tuth-functions
> are wholly valid (something I have learned from trying to get a grip on
> "relativism" only recently).

If I understand correctly, events possess truth-values intrisically --
they are not provided by the narrative.  The narrative doesn't have a
truth-value -- does it erase the truth-value intrisic to the event once it
has been imposed?  In other words, do you think the initial truth-value is
irrecoverable once narratives are imposed upon an event?

Also -- what is the relationship between truth-value and the meanings we
supply to experiences?  I don't intend to be pedantic, but does the term
'narrative' mean more-or-less the same as 'interpretation'?  If there is a
relation between the truth-value intrinsic to events and the meanings we
supply them, does it make sense to talk about one narrative being 'better'
(or 'more closely representative of the subject event's actual truth
value')?

> As human beings we need meaning however, so we narrate
> what we have experienced, i.e. those truth functions. The same happens in
> wars,
> so governments and the media begin to form narrations presumably for our
> consumption, if they did not and we heard of the fact that Soldier A killed
> Soldier B (and B was American!), we would want meaning, a narrartive,
> and we would make one for ourselves if we didnt get one from outside.

> This happened all throughout the NATO action. When I post something
> like the first posting where the first sentence was "Chomsky has called
> Wittgenstein
> a language-parasite. Perhaps he is talking about himself?" the stage is
> already
> set for an emotional spin of narration. I try to make them as close to the
> way I
> can group disparate but nonetheless related entities (people, events, ideas,
> processes),
> and I want them to logically and aesthetically reflect my belief system
> through an experimental form, a story

> I believe Wittgenstein did much thing, remember
> that von Wright considered him one of the great German writers in
> competition
> with Goethe especially in von Wrights views. I think there is credence to
> this.
> (I claim no such thing for myself, but find the method of explication
> extremely
> enjoyable and satisfying). I think it is a matter of a certain style and
> historical
> outlook, I emphasise history - look at all of the human-imposed epistemes
> we place on actual events, and we come up with narratives, or history.
> 
> I believe it is a good thing to write from this view, because what it will
> do is this: when
> people like Daedalus see that the narrative is not wholly accurate, they
> will try
> to get closer to those things which are really true. That is presumably why
> he
> insisted on it for the benefit ALL members of the list. When NATO narrates
> its war, it provokes the same reactions.

With all due respect, provided your 'narrative' means nothing more than
'interpretation', I'm not sure what distinguishes your 'experimental'
approach from any other approach, other than that you don't seem to care
whether what you say (about Chomsky, in the present case) is
correct.  Instead, you appear to use intentional misrepresentation as a
rhetorical device, excusing its use with a tired refrain: "when
people see that the narrative is not wholly accurate, they will try to get
closer to those things which are really true."

So:  I suppose that my trouble understanding your approach is merely that
I don't think your style is particularly interesting -- your motto
allows anyone to excuse any nonsense they might happen to spout.  You may
or may not cause people to 'get closer to the truth,' but when you
succeed, your success is only trivial, and not completely dissimilar to
causing any reader of this posting to think about elephants, lions and 
walruses simply by mentioning elephants, lions and walruses (ie. saying
that Chomsky, or anyone else for that matter, spouts 'insipid tripe' or
'irresponsible tripe' -- I forget how you described it in a previous
posting -- certainly gets people's attention, as you've rightly said.)

Apologies if I've badly misunderstood you,
Scott.

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