Date: Tue, 07 Nov 2000 15:23:09 -0500
From: Dr Herbert FJ Muller <hmller-AT-po-box.mcgill.ca>
Subject: PKF: Conquest of Abundance
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Commentaries are invited on the attached text,
which is at present posted in the Karl Jaspers Forum.
Please send to
hmller-AT-po-box.mcgill.ca
Herbert FJ Muller
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KARL JASPERS FORUM
TA31 (van Fraassen / Feyerabend)
Commentary 3
FEYERABEND, REALITY, AND CONCEPT-DYNAMICS
by Herbert FJ Müller
September/October 2000, posted 7 November 2000
<0>
ABSTRACT
In "Conquest of Abundance" Paul Feyerabend has presented
an astute and colorful analysis of the history of thought
about reality, from Homer to quantum theory. His aim was
to show the relation between life and abstraction, or as I
would put it, between given experience and the mental tools
which are our creations.
It seems PF was considered a gadfly by more conservative
philosophers of various schools (he clearly was a non-dys-
anti-establishmentarian with several professorships and
international acclaim.) But he has made a needed and
important break-through in his study of empiricism, starting
from within that tradition. My impression, subject to
correction, is that he nevertheless still considered himself an
ambiguous realist. He should probably have been even
more critical about some traditional opinions, especially
static metaphysics, including ontologies such as realism. We
can know only about knowing. As Parmenides said among
other things, knowing and being are the same. But secondly
Vico emphasized that we know our own mental structures,
not nature. Fictitious mind-independent Beings (including
the one used by Parmenides himself) are auxiliary structures
rather than fixed (or even ambiguous) ontological entities.
My difficulty with PF^Òs view is mainly his ambiguous position
about belief in mind-independent reality; he even wrote that
such ambiguity is desirable. But the ambiguity stems, in my
opinion, from our positing positive truths (they are tools we
need), which are later unfortunately mostly seen as
(impossible) mind-independent ontological entities. This
positing also causes the circularity and self-reference of
reasoning which others have emphasized : one will fall back
on the mental structures which one uses as bootstraps.
Working metaphysics can in principle deal with these points.
----------------------------------
ABBREVIATIONS:
AM = ^ÓAgainst Method^Ô, by Feyerabend
As-if-MIR = working metaphysics, as-if ontology = 0-D, etc
BD = ^ÓBegriffs-Dynamik ^Å ^Ô, by Müller
CoA = ^ÓConquest of Abundance^Ô, by Feyerabend
FRA = ^ÓThe Sham Victory of Abstraction^Ô by van Fraassen
KT = ^ÓKilling Time^Ô, by Feyerabend
MIR = mind-independent reality, static metaphysics
PF = Paul Feyerabend
S/O = subject/object (split)
0-D = Zero-Derivation = as-if-MIR = working metaphysics
-----------------------------------
<1>
The first half (pp.3-128) of Paul Feyerabend^Òs book
"Conquest of Abundance" (centered on the question of
reality) is a manuscript, unfinished due his death in 1994.
The main question he posed : "what is reality ?", is only in
part developed in this text, and thus the editor has added, in
the second half (pp.131-273), essays on the manuscript^Òs
theme, from various earlier (in part overlapping)
publications. This results in some uncertainty concerning
the intended conclusions; one has to infer his view from
what is available. But the author is well informed in widely
differing areas of knowledge, and this work offers much
stimulating material.
<2>
In the manuscript PF develops his concept of reality with a
discussion of Achilles^Ò thought in the Iliad; this is followed
by chapters on Xenophanes, Parmenides, and reality in art.
The added chapters are on realism and reality, scientific as
compared to other knowledge, quantum theory, Aristotle,
nature as art, ethics and scientific truth, the role of
universals, intellectuals and the facts of life, and concerning
an appeal for philosophy.
In the following I discuss a few of his thoughts which are of
particular interest in relation to my own view (as described
in TA1, TA11, TA24, and re-formulated in R17 of TA24) and
to other questions which have recently been discussed in the
Karl Jaspers Forum. My aim here is thus not so much to
review PF's book, which has been ably done by others who
are much better qualified for this than I am, but to compare
his view with my own, and I hope for a discussion in this
context.
---------------------------------
Quotations are in ^Óquotation marks^Ô.
My comments are in [brackets].
---------------------------------
<3>
To start with the title.
ABUNDANCE VERSUS MONOLITHIC BEING
Richness, Chaos and Unity
Thinking And Being
^Ó ^Å the God of Xenophanes ^Å is inhuman not in the sense
that anthropomorphism has been left behind but in the
entirely different sense that certain human properties, such
as thought, or vision, or hearing, or planning, are
monstrously increased while other, balancing features, such
as tolerance, or sympathy, or pain, have been removed. ^Å
What we have here is not a being that transcends humanity
(and should therefore be admired?) but a monster
considerably more terrible than the slightly immoral Homeric
Gods could ever aspire to be. These one could still try to
understand; one could speak to them, one could even cheat
them here and there, one could prevent undesirable actions
on their part by means of prayers, offerings, arguments. ^Å
There is no word for ^ÓGod fearing^Ô in the Iliad.^Ô (CoA p.54)
<4>
[One may perhaps understand the development of the idea
of greater remoteness and power of one God in the context
of a movement from naïve shamanism and polytheism
toward the idealism of Plato, and also toward monotheism
(cf. Bowersock). Related to this is the development of the
notion of an unstructured origin and kernel of experience :]
<5>
^Ó ^Å According to Parmenides the most basic entity
underlying everything there is, including Gods, fleas, dogs,
and any hypothetical substance one might propose, is Being.
This was in a sense a very trivial but also a rather shrewd
suggestion, for Being is the place where logic and existence
meet : every statement involving the word "is" is also a
statement about the essence of things." (CoA p.60-61)
<6>
[This observation deals with the point of contact between
experience and mental structures (see also <14-18> below).
But I would want to modify PF's wording to : "Being is the
place where "given" unstructured experience meets our not-
given but instead created-by-us structures (concepts
especially, which are chracterized by the addition of words
to pre-verbal formations); the structures may be accepted,
via belief, as "being" real and true, in either ontological or
operational (as-if-ontological) meaning." A problem with
using the word "logic" is that it refers to a method of dealing
with mental structures which would have to be there first.
"Existence" (ie, "Being") is also secondary, since it is a result
of investing reality-belief in the created structures (see
<41> below).]
<7>
"Having made Being his basic substance, Parmenides
considered the consequences. They are that Being is (estin)
and that not-being is not. What happens on the basic level?
Nothing. The only possible change of Being is into not-
Being, not-Being does not exist, hence there is no change.
What is the nature of Being ? It is full, continuous, without
subdivisions. But is it not true that we traditionally assume
and personally experience change and difference ? Yes, we
do. Which shows, according to Parmenides, that neither
tradition nor experience provides reliable knowledge. ^Å "
(CoA p.61)
[Here is an early example of the danger which can result
from the fascination with the power and transcendence of
concepts <see 15-16 below>. Because he decided that the
"concept Being" is not only real but also the essence of
things, Parmenides brushed aside experience. This is an
instance of explicit MIR-belief, which comes to replace the
gods, and in modern times also God.]
<8>
[But PF does not mention an early key sentence in
Parmenides^Ò poem : ^Óthe same is thinking (or knowing) and
being^Ô (to gar auto noein estin te kai einai), fragm. B1.3.
This I think might throw a different light on this discussion.
It is an early (pre-Platonic) version of the formulation by
Bohr and Heisenberg, also adopted in part in Stapp's theory
(TA24-C7), that one can only talk about (and analyze) one's
experience ("knowings"). PF too follows Bohr (CoA p.144
note 28).]
[Only in a self-contradictory way can one talk about a
persistent all-or-nothing Being, in the sense of Parmenides
(who took a wrong turn after B1.3, into a dead-end road,
one might say) and his follower Zeno. They tried to
maintain the unity of subjective experience, but as ascribed
to an external (mind-independent) source of certainty. This
resulted in a monolithic form of unchangeable static Being.
The situation is similar for an equally fictitious though less
extreme Platonic, Kantian, empiricist-positivist - or naïve -
unreachable mind-independent reality.]
[In the interval from Parmenides to quantum physics, one
has often tried to cleave the metaphysical monolith into
parts, or to dissolve it entirely. But similar derailments after
a promising start still occur, for instance with some QM-
theorizing, such as Stapp's (see TA24 C7 and R4). A
solution to the paradoxical situation (structural need for MIR
versus impossibility of MIR) is available in the form of
working, or as-if, metaphysics, in which it is understood that
conceptual tools are tools, not mind-independent entities
(see TA24 and below).]
<9>
^Ô ^Å we may describe Parmenides ^Å in analogy with the
cosmological stories that surrounded him. In the stories we
have not a premise, but a beginning (chaos in Hesiod and
his Near Eastern predecessors, the apeiron in Anaximander,
which is both a beginning and a lasting foundation for
everything), not an argument but a pattern of development
^Å not conclusions but stages of development. ^Å There is a
beginning. It is sanctioned by a Goddess and it is as devoid
of overt content as are chaos and the apeiron.^Ô (CoA p.87)
<10>
[The main content of these concepts is the lack of content.
(The word "chaos" has unfortunately recently been used in a
quite different sense, as meaning complex order with self-
organization, and this can cause difficulties in discussion.)
Another well-known term for the origin is the biblical "tohu-
va-bohu", a mainly unpleasant variety of abundance, namely
of experience without structures - which is then remedied
by the (posited, or premised) word of God. The remoteness
of God (or of Being) <3-4 above> makes it furthermore
necessary to reconnect Him to humans, for instance through
messengers of some type (human, divine, or both), which
evidently produces new problems of understanding. Or else
through mysticism and meditation, which may be easier to
accommodate once the role of mysticism in relation to
thinking is understood; see for instance TA24 [58-59].]
[Although the content differs, this healing (or rather overall
structuring) procedure in monotheism has similarities with
the use of the word of the Goddess Dike by Parmenides.
^ÓThe encompassing^Ô (Jaspers), the term which I have used
in formulating my view, covers I think both the positive and
the negative meanings of "abundance", by being neutral and
somewhat ^Ótechnical^Ô. Among other things, concepts serve
as tools for defining and isolating parts of the ongoing and
remembered individual and collective experience. And they
can serve as social-power tools, where various doctrinal
structures are accepted and promoted, by the ruling
authorities at least, as (more or less) "absolutely" true.]
<11>
ABSTRACTION = TOOLS
[PF's term ^Óconquest^Ô refers to making this abundance, or
confusion, available to human thinking and initiative. The
only way to deal with chaos, or unstructured experience, is
to structure it. Mental self-and-world structures are tools,
created inside ongoing experience (those accepted from
others have originally been made this way as well). ^Ó ^Å how
can scientists immersed in distinct ^Óparadigms^Ô (in Thomas
Kuhn^Òs terms) even communicate, let alone pass from one
paradigm to another ?^Ô (FRA[3]).]
<12>
[The word ^Óabstraction^Ô is of central importance for PF^Òs
view. But I did not find a comprehensive definition of this
term. In the preface (taken from KT, in which he described
the plan for CoA) PF writes that CoA :]
^Óis mainly a study of the role of abstractions - mathematical
and physical notions especially - and of the stability and
^Óobjectivity^Ô they seem to carry with them. It deals with the
ways in which such abstractions arise, are supported by
common ways of speaking and living, and change as a result
of argumentation and/or practical pressure. In the book I
also try to emphasize the essential ambiguity of all concepts,
images, and notions that presuppose change. Without
ambiguity, no change ever. The quantum theory, as
interpreted by Niels Bohr, is a perfect example of that.^Ô (CoA
p.viii)
[In my view, the ambiguity (as this concept is used by PF) is
less desirable per se than as a possible way of making static
ontology functional. But his can be done better with the
help of working metaphysics. One might perhaps contend
that the latter in effect makes the ambiguity thematic, or
official. Ambiguity would then become, so to speak, an
aspect of concept use, or concept-dynamics (namely in the
form of as-if ontology), and thereby more available to
deliberate handling <40>. In this case, the uncontrolled
flip-flop of ambiguity might be replaced by a deliberate
change between two states of thinking (MIR versus as-if-
MIR), or perhaps more practically, to MIR-thinking with a
back-up by as-if-MIR.]
<13>
^ÓAccording to M Baxandall (1971), ^Ó[A]ny language ^Å is a
conspiracy against experience in the sense of being a
collective attempt to simplify and arrange experience into
manageable parcels ^Å [it] overlays the field after a time
with a certain structure; the structure is that implied by the
categories, the lexical and grammatical components of the
language.^Ô These are correct and very pertinent
observations. What has to be added is that language is not
the only ^Óconspiracy^Ô ^Å a conspiracy-free ^Óexperience^Ô that
can be arranged ^Óinto manageable parcels^Ô does not exist.^Ô
(CoA p.27-28)
<14>
[But the word ^Óabstraction^Ô can be misleading. Structuration
does not mean taking something away from ^Óobjects^Ô, as
one might infer from the word ^Óabs-trahere^Ô. On the
contrary : we are dealing here with an aspect of the
dynamics of the concept-tools that are constructed and
added by us, chiefly of the transcendence of their words
<15-16>. For instance, numbers are not taken away by us
from objects, they are tools, applied (added) by us for
dealing with experience. Abstractness comes up chiefly
when these tools are considered in isolation, apart from their
use in ongoing experience-structuring activity. Examples are
mathematics, logic, and concepts as pure concepts (such as
Platonic ideas) (BD [24]). And this tool-nature fits with
what PF says in the preface of CoA <see 12 above>. - I
will mainly use the word ^Ótools^Ô, rather than ^Óabstraction^Ô, in
this discussion.]
[The task which PF set for himself, in other words, was to
study the relation of mental tools to experience - which we
have to structure by means of such tools : Experience is
otherwise not structured and cannot be handled, but it also
becomes restricted by them. In this context it helps to note
Giambattista Vico^Òs (regrettably neglected) insight (1710)
that ^Óverum est factum^Ô : we know well what we make
ourselves, like mathematics, but we cannot know ^Ónature^Ô in
itself. Vico proposed the 'anti-modern' thesis that 'scire est
facere, verum est factum', meaning that we can know for
certain only what we construct ourselves, such as mathematics,
but not nature (this in contrast to Descartes' subject-God-
object-certainty proposition and the views of his realistic
modern followers). And that absolute knowledge of nature is
God's only, which I assume is a theistic equivalent to Plato's
notion that reality-in-itself escapes us. This distinction deals
indirectly with the question of MIR, since Vico denies the
possibility of MIR knowledge (BD [40]).]
<15>
CONCEPT-DYNAMICS
Concepts Transcend Experience
Experience Encompasses The Concepts
[The word ^Óconcepts^Ó means in the following mental
structures which are characterized by the attachment of
words to earlier structures, and thus refers to human mental
structures only. Concepts have dynamics of their own, due
to built-in properties. For instance, words (are components
of concepts which) transcend any ongoing experience, more
clearly and to a greater degree than earlier non-verbalized
mental structures do. The word and the concept ^Óstone^Ó
mean not only a stone which I hold in my hand, but all
possible stones, anywhere and at any time. This is probably
connected with the prominent communication function of
words, because I can only convey something to others if it
goes beyond my own momentary experience, ie, if it is also
valid for them. This results in a certain general validity of
concepts. ^ÓObjects^Ó are therefore more easily communicable
than ^Óqualia^Ó, for which the subjective aspect tends to be
more prominent. And furthermore, the word ^Óstone^Ó
includes in principle all aspects of the stone, whether or not
I examine it now further (cf. also Merleau-Ponty, p.381).]
<16>
[Because words are used only by humans, this transcending
of ongoing experience by the meaning of the word-concepts
is mainly evident in human experience, and it is inevitable
whenever concepts are used. It has an asymptotic quality in
that increasing the number and refinement of experiences
may approach a single intended word-content but cannot
capture it completely. - Here also a remark about
^Ópossibilities^Ó and ^Ópre-dispositions^Ó : what is possible, or
not possible, is decided on the basis of earlier experience.
Possibilities are not ^Ógiven^Ó in pre-fabricated ontological
fashion. (BD [19-21])]
<17>
[Furthermore, some other aspects of the same experience
are not grasped by the same concepts. The word ^Óstone^Ô
does not cover the color of a stone-experience; for this, one
needs a further concept, such as ^Óblack^Ô. In every
conceptualization much is left over of experience which is
always wider than any used concept or combination of
concepts, and thus the experience encompasses the
concepts. Encompassment is thus a constitutive aspect of
conceptualization, or more specifically the result of the
relation of ongoing experience to the used concepts, and
therefore inevitable. This relation is also asymptotic (similar
to the one of the transcendence effect, see <16>), because
increasing the number and refinement of concepts and
rational thought can capture a single experience to
increasing degree but not completely (BD[36-38]).]
<18>
[In either direction, experiences and word-concepts thus
have asymptotic one-to-many relationships, in the form of
transcendence and encompassment respectively. This is the
reason why no structural (tool) system can ever capture
experience completely, and no experience can fulfill all
possibilities suggested by the complete meaning of concepts.
Experiences and mental tools only touch in some points,
which then form a skeleton, or grid, of private or official
understanding or ^Óreality^Ô, but experiences, tools, and grid
are not the same. But then what about Parmenides^Ò idea
that knowing and being are the same ? It means that we
can only know our structures (Vico), and that they constitute
what we call reality. It does not mean that the structures,
or the accepted understandings, are identical with
experience (nor with "reality", as Parmenides and others
suggested); such a view leads into the blind alley of MIR
(this can be avoided by using working-MIR). Reality and
truth are based on mind-nature-structures which (since
concepts structure experiences) combine experiences and
concepts, and become invested with belief in their reality
and truth (to varying degree and for various reasons, see
<41>).]
REALITY (The Main Topic of ^ÓConquest of Abundance^Ô)
<19>
REALITY AND MIND-BODY
" ^Å the fact that science dominates certain areas of
knowledge does not by itself eliminate alternate ideas.
Neurophysiology provides detailed models for mental
processes; yet the mind-body problem is being kept alive,
both by scientists and scientifically inclined philosophers.
Some scientists even demand that we "put[] mind and
consciousness in the driver's seat" [Sperry], i.e., that we
return to them the power they had before the rise of a
materialistic psychology. ^Å
<20>
Second, a reference to basic time-independent laws works
only if the modern accounts of divinely caused events such
as thunderstorms, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, etc., can
be reduced to them. But there exist no acceptable
reductions of the required kind. ^Å Third, we are far from
possessing a single consistent set of fundamental laws. ^Å
"Nature likes to be compartmentalized" [Dyson] ^Å
"Subjective" elements such as feelings and sensations, which
form a further "compartment", are excluded from the natural
sciences, though they play a role in their acquisition and
control.^Ô [This statement could be interpreted as meaning
that subjectivity is a compartment like the others - though
this may not express PF^Òs own opinion. But this type of
opinion is the reason for the present conceptual deadlock on
the objectivist or naturalist side of the mind-brain
discussion.] ^ÓThis means that the (unsolved) mind- body
problem affects the very foundations of scientific research.
^Å ^Ó (CoA p. 140-141)
[This last point I think is very true. Indeed a successful
approach to the notorious mind-brain or mind-matter
question is a conditio sine qua non for understanding the
conceptual basis of reality, and others have emphasized this
point as well; but PF does not develop it further. It may
relate to his call for ^Ónew terminology^Ô, see <23>. The
unsolved status of this question may in part explain his
attitude about ambiguity. Trying to derive experience from
brain activity is futile. It is the wrong question to ask
because it implies an erroneous assumption of a primary
subject/ object split, followed by belief in MIR-objects or -
functions as primary reality, and experience as secondary.
(But it continues to be proposed as the chief question to be
answered, cf. Beloff, Searle, Singer, and many others). The
relationship is the opposite : thinking does not come from
the brain; the brain, like all objects, comes from within
thinking (BD [50]). A solution of this question requires
complete renouncement of MIR.]
<21>
REALITY AND PARTICLE PHYSICS
^ÓFinally, as the most fundamental and most highly confirmed
theory of present-day physics, the quantum theory rejects
unconditional projections and makes existence depend on
special historically determined circumstances. ^Å Gods
cannot be captured by experiment, matter can. ^Å The great
success of Cartesian method and the Cartesian view of
nature is in part a result of a historical path of least
resistance. Those problems that yield to the attack are
pursued most vigorously, precisely because the method
works there. ^Å The harder problems are not tackled, if for
no other reason than that brilliant scientific careers are not
built on persistent failure." [Levine and Lewontin, 1985]"
(CoA p.141)
[The described situation is like the one of someone, having
lost his key at night, looks for it under a street light - not
because he lost the key there, but because there is light.
Much of the recent "scientific study of consciousness" fits
this pattern.]
<22>
"There exist various ways of dealing with this situation. One
is to disregard it and to continue describing the world in
accordance with one's own pet metaphysics ^Å [which is] a
sensible attitude ^Å Instrumentalists react by dropping the
second assumption [ie, that events can be reduced to time-
independent laws]. They do not drop it absolutely ("nothing
exists"), however, but only with respect to certain entities
[eg, Duhem, 1969, ^Ówho described a certain stage of the
debate between realism and instrumentalism in astronomy
as a battle ^Óbetween two realist positions^Ô.^Ô]. ^Å (CoA p.143)
["Instrumentalism" as characterized here seems to be yet
another attempt to do away with MIR while retaining a part
of it for reasons of comfort (certainty).]
<23>
Relativists accept the first assumption but relativize the
second : atoms exist given the conceptual framework that
projects them. The trouble here is that traditions not only
have no well-founded boundaries, but contain ambiguities
and methods of change which enable their members to think
and act as if no boundaries existed : potentially every
tradition is all traditions. Relativizing existence to a single
"conceptual system" that is then closed off from the rest and
presented in unambiguous detail mutilates real traditions
and creates a chimera [PF, "Farewell to Reason", 1987]. ^Å
[Bohr suggested that quantum events are] phenomena that
transcend the dichotomy subjective/objective (which
underlies the second assumption). They are "subjective",
for they could not exist without the idiosyncratic conceptual
and perceptual guidance of some point of view ^Å , but they
are also "objective": not all ways of thinking have results
and not all perceptions are trustworthy. New terminology is
needed to adapt our problem to this situation.
<24>
WORLD-MAKING EFFORTS
^Å our ways of thinking and speaking are products of
idiosyncratic developments. Common sense and science
both conceal this development. For example, they say ^Å
that atoms existed long before they were found. ^Å A better
way of telling the story would be the following. Scientists ^Å
used ideas and actions ^Å to manufacture, first, metaphysical
atoms, then crude physical atoms, and, finally, complex
systems of elementary particles out of material that did not
contain these elements but could be shaped into them.
Scientists, according to this account, are sculptors of reality -
but sculptors in a special sense. They not merely act
causally upon the world (though they do that, too, and they
have to if they want to "discover" new entities); they also
create semantic conditions engendering strong inferences
from known effects to novel projections and, conversely,
from the projections to testable effects. We have here the
same dichotomy of descriptions which Bohr introduced in his
analysis of the case of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen." (CoA
p.144)
<25>
[It may be helpful here to take a "constructivist" stand (see
TA17 by Ernst von Glasersfeld). It should be a view which
explicitly and unconditionally renounces a traditional static
MIR-metaphysics backup, because otherwise a relapse into
MIR-belief is too difficult to avoid. "The world" (including
^Óthe environment^Ô) is then a part of our mind-nature
structures, created within experience from no pre-fabricated
mind-independent structures (zero-derivation, 0-D), and
fixed by individual and collective belief. The subject/object
split is then explicitly secondary (pragmatic) rather than
primary (ontological; see <43-46>). Everybody (not only
scientists, and also not only humans) builds his mind-and-
world including all "entities" and "theories". This might
contribute to the development of a "new terminology" which
PF mentions <23> as being needed.]
[PF does not mention constructivism - perhaps because its
conceptual basis has not been sufficiently developed ? (see
Watzlawik, who points out, as others have also done, that
the conceptual basis of constructivism needs clarification).
But PF also does not mention Vico, Bentham, or Vaihinger,
who might have been of help. Nor does he mention
existentialism, maybe he found it too nebulous, too
unscientific, too pretentious, or all of these, plus perhaps
other things; he declined an invitation to meet Heidegger
but does not say why (KT p.137). He did not like Derrida
because he saw him as an obfuscator (KT p.180).]
<26>
^ÓPermanent uniqueness [of science] ^Å is not a fact. It is an
ideal, or a metaphysical hypothesis. ^Å Now ^Å science is
impossible without [metaphysical hypotheses]. ^Å [a]
problem [arises only when] a metaphysical principle is
presented as a well-established fact and ^Å people are
invited to follow a science so distorted. For example, they
are invited to ^Óabsorb^Ô an allegedly unique Western science
and to abolish other forms of knowledge. ^Å ^Ó (CoA p.244)
<27>
[One might add that all mental (mind-and-world) structures,
including for instance all "percepts", not only hypotheses,
are posited (asserted), and thus in a sense they are all
working-metaphysical (as-if-MIR) instruments, even in the
absence of words, and including not only humans but
animals as well (see also <40>). Hans Vaihinger wrote a
^ÓPhilosophy of the As-If^Ô (1911), but admitted MIR-belief
simultaneously, thus his proposal remained incomplete, as
were many other earlier and later attempts to deal with
static metaphysics and ontology.]
<28>
REALITY AND AMBIGUITY
^ÓWhat evidence tells us is that having approached the world
or, to use a more general term, Being, with concepts,
instruments, interpretations which were often the highly
accidental outcome of complex, idiosyncratic, and rather
opaque historical developments, Western scientists and their
philosophical, political, and financial supporters got a finely
structured response containing quarks, leptons, space-time
frames, and so on. The evidence leaves it open if the
response is the way in which Being reacted to the approach,
so that it reflects both Being and the approach, or of it
belongs to Being independently of any approach. Realism
assumes the latter; it assumes that a particular phenomenon
- the modern scientific universe and the evidence for it - can
be cut from the development that led up to it and can be
presented as the true and history-independent nature of
Being. The assumption is very implausible, to say the least.^Ô
(CoA p.245-6)
<29>
[PF implies MIR in both instances although he does not quite
say so. MIR should be replaced by as-if-MIR, which offers
an explicit access to the question of ambiguity, to which PF
assigns importance in his preface. His struggle for and
against MIR is also evident in the following quotations.]
<30>
^Ó ^Å quantum theory suggests that the ^Å properties of
elementary particles are not inherent in them but emerge as
the result of special interactions.^Ô [The word ^Óinteraction^Ô is
unclear here, it seems that PF assumes, in both of the
mentioned alternatives, a primary (ie, ontological or MIR)
S/O split, which is then secondarily to be bridged by
"interaction".] ^ÓYet, many scientific realists remain
unconvinced. Those of them who pay attention to the
results of anthropologists and classical scholars may admit
that immaterial entities did appear and that Gods did make
themselves felt; they may admit that there are divine
phenomena. But, they add, such phenomena are not what
they seem to be. They are ^Óillusions^Ô and, therefore, do not
count as indicators of reality. (Democritus long ago, Galileo
more recently, and many modern scientists say the same
about sensations and feelings.)^Ô (CoA p.246) [An explicit
inclusion of encompassment <17> can provide an access to
this part of ^Óreality^Ô.]
<31>
^Ó The notion of reality behind this account again transcends
any set of existing (or even possible) scientific data; it is a
metaphysical notion. It also contains a normative
component : behavior should center around what is real
and must avoid being influenced by illusions. ^Å Even
Parmenides, who tried to argue his case, received his basic
truth from a Goddess. The religious fervor with which some
scientists defend their vision of reality suggests that the
connection is rather close. ^Å ^Ó (CoA p.247) [All structures,
not only the notion of reality, are posited and transcend
experience (see <15-16> above); they should be
understood in a working-metaphysical way.]
<32>
REALITY ASSERTION, BOOTSTRAPPING, CIRCULARITY
^Ó The predicate ^Óreal^Ô ^Å is only apparently descriptive.
Reflecting a preference for forms of coherence that can be
managed without too much effort, it contains evaluations,
though implicit ones. ^Å For example, we may emphasize
human freedom over easy manageability. This means, of
course, that ethics (in the general sense of a discipline that
guides our choices between forms of life) affects ontology.
It already affected it, in connection with the sciences, but
surreptitiously, and without debate. ^Å ethics, having once
been a secret measure of scientific truth, can now become
its overt judge. ^Ó (CoA p.247)
<33>
^Ó ^Å ^Óreal^Ô is what plays an important role in the kind of life
one wants to live. (CoA p.248) ^Å Physicists ^Å took it for
granted that macroscopic objects exist and have the
properties classical physics ascribes to them. They therefore
tried various tricks to make quantum mechanics compatible
with the existence of such objects. ^Å ^ÓEverything which is
practically real,^Ô writes Hans Primas ^Å ^Óshould appear as
objectively real in the theory^Ô. ^Å a prevalent form of life,
the practical attitude of physicists, is taken as a measure of
reality. ^Ó (CoA p.249)
<34>
^Ó ^Å I suggest that we argue the other way round, from the
^Ósubjective^Ô, ^Óirrational^Ô, idiosyncratic kind of life we are in
sympathy with, to what is to be regarded as real. This
inversion has many advantages. It is in agreement with
human rights. ^Å ^Óreality^Ô is the result of choice and can be
modified: we are not stuck with ^Óprogress^Ô and
^Óuniversality^Ô. It is plausible because already at the
quantum level Being is more ambiguous than the supporters
of a realist metaphysics seem to assume. A flea can live in it
- but so can a professor and the ontology of a flea will
certainly be different from that of the professor. The
inversion is not motivated by a contempt for science but by
the wish to subject it, this product of relatively free agents,
to the judgment of other free agents instead of being
frightened by a petrified version of it. ^Å ^Ô (CoA p.251)
[This agrees with the idea that reality is the result of
investment of belief in our structures, if ontology becomes
working ontology (see <41>). But actually PF^Òs formulation
is an understatement. Reality can not only be modified but
its structures are our individual and collective products
(though much of its experiential basis is not). They are
enforced by our belief, and become our assertions and
bootstraps. If we de-construct this conceptualized world, we
end up with our initial assertions, in a circular way, or if we
are more thorough, with nothing.]
<35>
" So far a unitarian realism claiming to possess positive
knowledge about ultimate reality has succeeded only by
excluding large areas of phenomena or by declaring, without
proof, that they could be reduced to basic theory, which, in
this connection, means elementary particle physics. An
ontological (epistemological) pluralism seems closer to the
facts and to human nature." (CoA p.215)
[This is so because ultimate reality is identical with the
unstructured encompassing, within which structures emerge
spontaneously or more deliberately <46>. The various
ontological formulations are bound to be dead-end
developments, unless they are only working or operational
(as-if) in type. We posit realities and truths, fortify them
with belief, and use them ("the word") as bootstraps. This
can result in circularity or self-reference (Habermas,
Luhmann, see Kenneth Bausch, TA29) because in case of
difficulty we will fall back on them.]
<36>
REALITY FINDING VERSUS REALITY BUILDING
^Ó ^Å ^Óreal^Ô is what plays an important role in the kind of life
one wants to live.^Ô (CoA p.71, p.248) " ^Å we have evidence
how Being reacts when approached in different ways, but
Being itself and the conditions of its acting in a certain way
remain forever shrouded in darkness." (CoA p.213) "Ultimate
reality, if such an entity can be postulated, is ineffable.
What we do know are the various forms of manifest reality,
i.e., the complex ways in which Ultimate Reality acts in the
domain (the "ontological niche") of human life. Many
scientists identify the particular manifest reality they have
developed with Ultimate Reality. This is simply a mistake."
(CoA p.214)
<37>
" ^Å real is what plays a central role in the kind of life we
identify with ^Å [= ARISTOTLE'S PRINCIPLE] ^Å
consequences ^Å first ^Å the boundary between reality and
appearance cannot be established by scientific research; it
contains a normative or, if you will, an "existential"
component. ^Å second ^Å many different processes (visions,
immediate experience, dreams, and religious fantasies) have
been declared to be real ^Å [which is why] discussions about
reality produce ^Å much heat ^Å Third ^Å If the world,
whether divine or material, is as described by Ockham [ie,
depending on the unfathomable will of God] then there are
no objective laws and instrumentalism is correct. ^Å fourth,
science contains different traditions ^Å and ^Å it is not the
only source of knowledge. Applying Aristotle's principle to
[various] cultures, we arrive at a form of relativism ^Å
However ^Å Aristotle's principle invites us to add success [to
the mere existence of social norms]. ^Å fifth, ^Å sciences are
incomplete and fragmentary." (CoA p.201)
<38>
" ^Å quantum theory ^Å properties once regarded as objective
depend on the way in which the world is being approached.
^Å I conclude that nature as described by our scientists is ^Å
an artifact built in collaboration with a Being sufficiently
complex to mock and, perhaps, punish materialists by
responding to them in a crudely materialistic way. (CoA
p.240)
<39>
Now at this point it is important not to fall into the trap of
relativism ^Å there is not only one successful culture, there
are many ^Å their success is a matter of empirical record, not
of philosophical definitions ^Å . Relativism, on the other
hand, believes that it can deal with cultures on the basis of
philosophical fiat ^Å"
"^Å the world is much more slippery than assumed by our
rationalists ^Å" (CoA p.241)
<40>
[I agree with most of PF^Òs points, which illustrate the present
conceptual climate. But the word ^ÓBeing^Ô plays a mysterious
and somewhat ambiguous or paradoxical role here, as do
also ^Óultimate reality^Ô, ^Óthe good^Ô, ^Óuniversal mind^Ô, ^ÓGod^Ô
(they resemble Heidegger^Òs ^ÓSeyn^Ô, which one might
translate as ^ÓBeyng^Ô, to make things perfectly clear).
Concepts and words of this type are used, and have to be
used, all the time, despite being ^Óineffable^Ô, and despite
Wittgenstein^Òs advice to the contrary. I don't think that
ambiguity is desirable per se, as PF proposes (see <12>).
What one needs, rather, is a conceptual tool which makes
the underlying difficulty (MIR-need despite MIR-
impossibility) more directly and unequivocally accessible.
This can be done by changing from traditional fixed to
working metaphysics in which MIR functions as a conceptual
(deliberately as-if) instrument. Despite his statement about
the "ineffability of ultimate reality", I get the impression (so
far) that PF considered himself a realist (^Ówe do know ^Å
manifest reality^Ô). He would then presumably have said that
we find, not build, reality - this is a sort of test question.]
<41>
THE NEED FOR STABILITY
[Belief is important for the definition of truth and reality (cf.
Jaspers, Vol. II, p.434), but this point is only implied, not
discussed, by PF. Investment of reality- and truth-beliefs in
mind-and-world constructs makes them real and true. (And
this for various reasons, of which their viability, as von
Glasersfeld puts it, is a prominent one). Wide concepts do
encompass narrow ones, but attempts to have an all-
encompassing concept must fail (in theory but not
necessarily in practice) due to the nature of concepts, which
are defined as defining. In other words, such a concept
would have to be so wide as to include everything, but then
the concept is no longer a concept, and the definition no
longer a definition.]
<42>
[The conceptualized would then become identical with all-
encompassing unstructured experience. This would have to
include also for instance mystical experience, which can
however evidently not be captured by means of structures
offered by various systems of thought, including science.
This is the reason why all-encompassing concepts are
ineffable: the widest experience is wider than any possible
concepts and concept-systems (BD[49]). In effect, the
mentioned concepts stand for mind-independent reality (MIR
or Being) in general, which is also inaccessible (ineffable)
but nevertheless is, and has to be, in constant use as an
extrapolated structural fiction. A suitable way of dealing
with this difficulty, in my opinion, is working metaphysics.
This is similar to what PF calls "instrumentalism" <22,37>,
except that it will have to be more complete.
The chief problem here is that of sufficient stability of
individual and social function in the absence of absolutes.
This is a big question of course, but perhaps it is less
forbidding if one considers that : this has been a problem all
along, and the solution was usually to invent abolutes to
function as skeleton, or scaffolding, or asymptotic structures.
If we have always done it, why should we not be able to do
it now, even though we realize that the structures are ours?]
<43>
SUBJECT AND OBJECT, APPEARANCE AND REALITY
"The separation of subject and object or, more generally, of
appearance and reality arose (in the West), between 900
and 600 B.C. as part of a general movement toward
abstractness and monotony. Money replaced gift giving and
an exchange of goods, local gods merged, gained in power
but lost in concreteness and humanity, abstract laws, not
family relations, defined the role of citizens in a democracy,
wars were increasingly fought by professional soldiers, and
so on." (CoA p.198)
<44>
^Ó ^Å the dichotomy subjective/objective and the
corresponding dichotomies between descriptions and
constructions are much too naïve to guide our ideas about
the nature and the implications of knowledge claims. ^Å ^Ô
(CoA p.144)
[The subject / object split is one of the earliest structuring
effects within experience and a belief that it is primary (ie,
that it is ontological in nature) is the main reason for the
erroneous MIR-belief (BD[54], etc.), but PF does not quite
say this.]
<45>
^Ó ^Å If reality is identified with perceptible physical events
which are sharply separated from the perceiving subjects,
then a coherent account of reality is impossible and Bohr is
correct. If, on the other hand, we regard reality as hidden
and coherent and its manifestations as [its] fragments, then
interpretations such as those of Bohm (explication of an
implicit order) will sound eminently reasonable. Bohm^Òs
views do not clash with facts - they clash with a certain view
about the role of facts, namely, that facts are parts, not
manifestations, of what there is. According to Pauli, the
objects of quantum mechanics are too tied to special
circumstances - the very rigid conditions of individual
experimentation and large-scale projects - to permit an
inference about all there is (there are also fear, pity, and the
unconscious, and nobody knows if these can be cut off from
matter without repercussions). They are not elementary
building stones of the world. But they can serve as hints, or
analogies. ^Å Being can send scientists on a wild-goose
chase - for centuries. ^Å Being as it is, independently of
any kind of approach, can never be known, which means
that really fundamental theories don^Òt exist.^Ó (CoA p.204-5)
<46>
[Really fundamental theories would have to include,
paradoxically, the encompassing although of course it can
itself not be structured (BD[44]). ^ÓBohm^Òs views do not
clash with facts^Ô should read ^Ówith observations^Ô or ^Ówith
knowledge^Ô, because ^Ófacts^Ô imply pre-fabricated MIR. But
Bohm^Òs opinion pre-supposes MIR-belief because an
assumption of ^Óimplicit order^Ô is identical with MIR-belief as
for instance expressed in Plato^Òs cave parable. Such a view
leads to impossible consequences, because mind-
independent means mind-inaccessible. This inaccessibility
cannot be overcome by subsequent logical or mathematical
considerations. The sequence is crucial : the conceptual
clarification has to come first, logical and mathematical
analyses pre-suppose them, not vice versa.]
[In AM (p.26) PF proposed an "autonomy principle for facts":
" ^Å it is asserted that the facts which belong to the empirical
content of some theory are available whether or not one
considers alternatives to THIS theory". But he does not
discuss that all facts are constructs, as they are in the 0-D
view, as are all mental structures, instead of being ^Óparts of
what there is^Ô. This is to say that in talking about "facts"
some beliefs are implied, for instance concerning a primary
S/O split, and MIR-objects, which are earlier than specific
theories. PF^Òs view appears to imply MIR in spite of his
declared distance from Parmenides, Einstein, and Bohm.
One needs to be explicitly aware that subjective experience
is the only available entrance to any knowledge or other
belief (BD[14-15], TA24[62]).]
<47>
MATTER
^ÓThe material humans (and, for that matter, also dogs and
monkeys) face must be approached in the right way. It
offers resistance; some constructions (some incipient
cultures - cargo cults, for example) find no point of attack in
it and simply collapse. On the other hand, this material is
more pliable than is commonly assumed. ^Å (CoA p.145-6)
It is important to read these statements in the right way.
They are not the sketch of a new theory of knowledge which
explains the relation between humans and the world ^Å We
can tell many interesting stories. We cannot explain,
however, how the chosen approach is related to the world
and why it is successful, in terms of the world. ^Å
<48>
And yet we cannot do without scientific know-how. ^Å Still ^Å
this world is not a static world populated by thinking (and
publishing) ants who ^Å gradually discover its features
without affecting them in any way. ^Å It was once full of
Gods; it then became a drab material world; and it can be
changed again, if its inhabitants have the determination, the
intelligence, and the heart to take the necessary steps.^Ô
["The world" is a somewhat undefined entity here. Is it
understood to "be there", mind-independently ? To what
extent do we create it ? How do the Gods relate to us, to
our experience ? The solidity of matter has misled not only
materialists but also Hume, Kant, and many others into
believing that it is ^Ógiven^Ô in pre-assembled form.]
<49>
OBJECTIVITY
"There is no "scientific worldview" just as there is no uniform
enterprise "science" - except in the minds of metaphysicians,
schoolmasters, and scientists blinded by the achievements of
their own particular niche. ^Å There is no objective principle
that could direct us away from the supermarket "religion" or
the supermarket "art" toward the more modern, and much
more expensive, supermarket "science". Besides, the search
for such guidance would be in conflict with the idea of
individual responsibility which allegedly is an important
ingredient of a "rational" or scientific age. ^Å a uniform
"scientific view of the world" may be useful for people doing
science - it gives them motivation without tying them down.
It is like a flag. Though presenting a single pattern it makes
people do many different things. However, it is a disaster
for outsiders (philosophers, fly-by-night mystics, prophets of
a New Age, the "educated public"), who, being undisturbed
by the complexities of research, are liable to fall for the most
simpleminded and most vapid tale." (CoA p.159-160)
<50>
"^Å I shall define a world view as a collection of beliefs,
attitudes, and assumptions that involves the whole person,
not only the intellect, has some kind of coherence and
universality, and imposes itself with a power far greater than
the power of facts and fact-related theories. ^Å They prevail
despite the most obvious contrary evidence ^Å For
enlightened people this apparent irrationality is one of the
strongest arguments against all forms of religion. What they
fail to realize is that the rise of science depended on a
blindness, or obstinacy, of exactly the same kind." (CoA
p.164-5)
<51>
"Being firmly convinced that the world was uniform and
subjected to "inexorable and immutable laws" leading
scientists interpreted [in the 19th century] the collection [of
heterogeneous scientific subjects] as an appearance
concealing a uniform material reality. With the notion of
reality I come to the main topic of this essay, which is the
relation of human achievements to a world whose features
are independent of thought and perception or, to express it
more dramatically, the idea that human are aliens, not
natural inhabitants of the universe." (CoA p.167) [Perhaps
one ought to say ^Ówe live in the world which we build.^Ô]
<52>
"Physical objects ^Å present themselves as ingredients of a
coherent objective world. For classical physics and the parts
of common sense dependent on it this was also their nature.
Now, however, they only indicate what happens under
particular and precisely restricted circumstances. ^Å "one can
clearly understand a state of affairs and yet know that one
can describe it only in images and similes." [Heisenberg]"
(CoA p.175)
"Science is neither a single tradition, nor the best tradition
there is, except for people who have been accustomed to its
presence, its benefits and its disadvantages. In a
democracy it should be separated from the state just as
churches are now separated from the state." (AM p.238)
[Objectivity deals with objects, on the erroneous assumption
(for instance by Hume, Kant, or Einstein) that objects are
^Ógiven^Ô in pre-assembled form. The decisive point is that
one can only know knowledge, as constituted by belief in the
created structures, not objects-in-themselves or a state-of-
affairs-in-itself. It would therefore appear that, if one wants
to deal effectively with the question of reality, one has to
change from MIR to as-if-MIR completely and permanently.
The as-if-MIR offers a way to continue using MIR, but with
the advantage that one is not locked into self-defeating
assumptions. This cannot be done temporarily or partly, for
instance with a traditional metaphysical back-up of some
type, because this appears always to lead to MIR-relapse.]
-------------------------------
REFERENCES
Beloff John, The Mind-Brain Problem. The Journal of
Scientific Exploration 8, No.4, 1994. Available at
http://members.aol.com/Mszlazak/Dualism.html
Bowersock Glen, A Small Part of God. Review of :
Athanassiadi P and Frede M, Pagan Monotheism in Late
Antiquity. Times Literary Supplement, 1 September 2000,
p.29.
Feyerabend Paul, Against Method, 3rd Edition. London, New
York, Verso, 1975-2000.
Feyerabend Paul, Conquest of Abundance. A tale of
Abstraction versus the Richness of Being. Edited by Bert
Terpstra. Chicago and London : The University of Chicago
Press, 1999. (CoA)
Feyerabend Paul, Killing Time. Autobiography. University of
Chicago Press, 1995. (KT)
Fraassen Bas C van, The Sham Victory of Abstraction.
Review of Feyerabend^Òs Conquest of Abundance. The Times
Literary Supplement, 5073 : 23 June 2000. Posted in KJF
as TA31.
Glasersfeld Ernst von, Knowing without Metaphysics :
Aspects of the Radical Constructivist Position (1991). Karl
Jaspers Forum, TA24 (1999).
Jaspers Karl, 'Philosophie', Berlin, Springer, 1932-73.
Kranz W, Vorsokratische Denker, Griechisch und Deutsch.
Berlin, Frankfurt : Weidmann, 1949.
Merleau-Ponty Maurice, Phénoménologie de la perception.
Paris: Gallimard, 1945.
Müller Herbert FJ, ^ÓBegriffs-Dynamik und die Denk-Gehirn
Frage^Ô, printed in the journal ^ÓAufklärung und Kritik^Ô
(Nürnberg), October 2000. Available with minor
modifications from KJF as TA24-R17. This is an updated
summary, in German, of TA24. An English translation will be
available shortly in KJF.
Searle John R, The Problem of Consciousness. Available at:
http://cogsci.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Py104/searle.prob
.html
Singer Wolf, Ignorabimus? ^Ö Ignoramus. Wie Bewusstsein in
die Welt gekommen sein koennte und warum technische
Systeme bewusstlos sind. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 23
September 2000 p.52
Vico Giambattista, De antiquissima Italorum Sapientia. Indici
e ristampa anastatica. (ed. Giovanni Adamo). Firenze : Leo S.
Olschki, 1998.
Watzlawick Paul, Ed. Die erfundene Wirklichkeit. Wie wissen
wir, was wir zu wissen glauben ? Beiträge zum
Konstruktivismus. München/Zürich, Piper 1985-98,Vorwort.
(PW writes that he would have preferred a word like
^ÓWirklichkeitsforschung^Ó (reality research) to the title
^Óconstructivism^Ó, which had already been used for other fields
of enquiry, but which was in effect adopted in the English
language literature for these studies.)
----------------------------
Herbert FJ Müller
e-mail <hmller-AT-po-box.mcgill.ca>
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