File spoon-archives/foucault.archive/foucault_1995/f_Aug.95, message 16


Date: Fri Aug  4 08:29:11 1995
From: Tom Blancato <tblancato-AT-envirolink.org>
Subject: Arendt on power, etc.


I thought this might be of interest.

>From "On Violence", Hannah Arendt. In 
collection Crises of the Republic: Lying in 
Politics, Civil Disobedience, On Violence, 
Thoughts on Politics and Revolution. New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 1972 (pp 142-145)
 
 
It is, I think, a rather sad reflection on the 
present state of political science that our 
terminology does not distinguish among such key 
words as "power," "strength," force," 
"authority," and, finally, "violence"--all of 
which refer to distinct, different phenomena 
and would hardly exist unless they did. (In the 
words of d'Entreves, "might, power, authority: 
these are all words to whose exact implications 
no great weight  is attached in current speech; 
even the greatest thinkers sometimes use them 
at random. Yet it is fair to presume that they  
refer to different properties, and their 
meaning should therefore be carefully assessed 
and examined....The correct use of these words 
is a question not only of logical grammar, but 
of historical perspective.") To use them as 
synonyms not only indicates a certain deafness 
to linguistic meanings, which would be serious 
enough, but it has also resulted in a kind of 
blindness to the realities they correspond to. 
In such a situation it is always tempting to 
introduce new definitions, but--though I shall 
briefly yield to temptation what is involved is 
not simply a matter of careless speech. Behind 
the apparent confusion is a firm conviction in 
whose light all distinctions would be, at best, 
of minor importance: the conviction that the 
most crucial political is, and always has been, 
the question of Who rules Whom? Power, 
strength, force, authority, violence--these are 
but words to indicate the means by which man 
rules over man; they are held to be synonyms 
because they have the same function. It is only 
after one ceases to reduce public affairs to 
the business of dominion that the original data 
in the realm of human affairs will appear, or, 
rather, reappear, in their authentic diversity.
 
These data, in our context, may be enumerated 
as follows:
 
*Power corresponds to the human ability not 
just to act but to act in concert. Power is 
never the property of an individual; it belongs 
to a group and remains in existence only so 
long as the group keeps together. When we say 
of somebody that he is "in power" we actually 
refer to his being empowered by a certain 
number of people to act in their name. The 
moment the group, from which the power 
originated to begin with (*potestas in populo*, 
without a people or group there is no power), 
disappears, "his power" also vanishes. In 
current usage, when we speak of a "powerful 
man" or a "powerful personality," we already 
use the word "power" metaphorically; what we 
refer to without metaphor is "strength,"
 
*Strength* unequivocally designates something 
in the singular, an individual entity; it is 
the property inherent in an object or person 
and belongs to its character, which may prove 
itself in relation to other things or persons, 
but is essentially independent of them. The 
strength of even the strongest individual can 
always be overpowered by the many, who often 
will combine for no other purpose than to ruin 
strength precisely because of its peculiar 
independence. This almost instinctive hostility 
of the many toward the one has always, from 
Plato to Nietzsche, been ascribed to 
resentment, to the envy of the weak for the 
strong, but this psychological interpretation 
misses the point. It is in the nature of a 
group and its power to turn against 
independence, the property of individual 
strength.
 
*Force*, which we often use in daily speech as 
a synonym for violence, especially if violence 
serves as a means of coercion, should be 
reserved, in terminological language, for the 
"forces of nature" or the "force of 
circumstances" (*la force de choses*), that is, 
to indicate the energy released by physical or 
social movements.
 
*Authority*, relating to the most elusive of 
these phenomena and therefore, as a term, most 
frequently abused, can be vested in persons--
there is such a thing as personal authority, 
as, for instance, in the relation between 
parent and child, between teacher and pupil--or 
it can be vested in offices, as, for instance, 
in the Roman sense (*auctoritas in senatu*) or 
in the hierarchical offices of the Church (a 
priest can grant valid absolution even though 
he is drunk). Its hallmark is unquestioning 
recognition by those who are asked to obey; 
neither coercion nor persuasion is needed. (A 
father can lose his authority either by beating 
his  child or starting to argue with him, that 
is, either by behaving to him like a tyrant or 
treating him as an equal.) To remain in 
authority requires respect for the person or 
the office. The greatest enemy of authority, 
therefore, is contempt, and the surest way to 
undermine it is laughter.
 
*Violence*, finally, as I have said, is 
distinguished by its instrumental character. 
Phenomenologically, it is close to strength, 
since the implements of violence, like all 
other tools, are designed and used for the 
purpose of multiplying natural strength until, 
in the last stage of their development, they 
can substitute for it.

---
There is no path to peace. Peace is the path.

Tom Blancato
tblancato-AT-envirolink.org
Eyes on Violence (nonviolence and human rights monitoring in Haiti)
Thoughtaction Collective (reparative justice project)



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