Date: Mon, 19 Aug 1996 13:23:08 -0500
From: "Thomas E. Bedwell" <spirit-AT-mail.cdmnet.com>
Subject: Re: The Nature of Power.


At 08:35 AM 8/19/96 +0000, you wrote:
>Hi folks. Thomas wrote:
>
>> Benjamin - 
>> 
>> You bring up an excellent point here regarding what might be called the
>> "co-constitution" of the subject (agent) and the object (structure).
>>

Actually, Benjamin wrote this: 

>> "But - did he really, in philosophical means, analyse *social* formation,
>> not rather formations which are constitutive for what we call social?
>
>There's an interesting ambiguity in the word "formation" I think. 
>Take the term "discursive formation" for example. On the one hand, 
>this term is a noun, designating a "thing" - a methodological unity, 
>a kind of shorthand or a "title". On the other hand, the word is a 
>nominalization, designating not a thing but a process, as in a verb, 
>as in "the formation of discourse = the process of its production" 
>(although I realize here that the line between noun and verb is 
>somewhat blurry - but then, that's exactly the ambiguity). I'm not 
>sure what all can be made of this, but I'm quite sure that Foucault 
>deploys this ambiguity "consciously", so to speak.
>
>I guess my point is that it's perhaps not necessary to choose between 
>one and the other - i.e. whether Foucault analyses social formations 
>or formations of the social. 

>Approaching Foucault from one 
>perspective permits observations not possible from the other, and 
>vice versa. So perhaps it's more a question of "both/and" rather than 
>"either/or".
>
>Hmm. Any thoughts?

Malcolm - 

My thoughts are that you are absolutely correct to distinguish the
difference in "permission" which results when one chooses one
epistemological or methodological position or approach over another.  I used
the term "privilege" because I identify the term with the distribution of
value that results from rule construction and maintenance, but "permission"
is equally acceptable.  

So it is definitely a question of "both/and" when we speak
metatheoretically, but when an epistemological position is chosen and a
method is exacted, the permission of observation is given to either the
social formation (agency) or the formation of the social (structure), one is
ontologically privileged over the other.

I cannot accept your description of the term "discursive formation" because
I am not certain you GROUND "methodological unity."  Unity of method is not
a "title" exactly, but it is much like a "shorthand."  More concretely,
unity of method is grounded in the rules of discourse.  The formation of
discourse is a process structured by rules, and its product is the structure
of rules and norms which (in)form discourse. 

Tom