Date: Sun, 21 Jan 1996 22:51:19 +1100 From: bpalmer-AT-pcug.org.au (Bryan Palmer) Subject: Poststructualism, ethics and values The debate continues . . . I have just finished reading: _Principled Positions: Postmodernism and the Rediscovery of Value_, edited by Judith Squires (1993), Lawrence and Wishart, London. In all I thought it a good book, and found it answered some of my questions - or at least it provided me with a left-of-centre framework in which I can at least feel moderately comfortable. (I must say that in this thread I have been wondering if there has been a tension between the more "purist" philosophers/theorists and those of us on the "applied" social science side of the fence. As my interest is policy studies, and as I work as a policy hack in the public sector, my interest is on the "ought/doing/solutions" side of things rather than the "is/being/critique" side of things). The contributors to _Principled Positions_ want to reassert "value" without relinquishing the critical gains of postmodernism; "A post-Enlightenment defence of principled positions, without the transcendental illusions of Enlightenment thought". (p2). They are concerned that the relativism of postmodernism means there is no absolute truth, and therefore no action or outcome which is essentially better or worse than another. If all beliefs/outcomes are equally valid/invalid, then no action(s) can be argued for (other than self interest?). Thus postmodernism can lead to political paralysis. Arguing against absolute realitivity, and avoiding the slippery slope of nihilism, the contributors share the desire to retain both the critical strengths of postmodernism and the strength of a "principled position". However, their approaches to this probelm are varied. I will discuss a couple which interested me, there are half a dozen others in the book. A number of the contributors make a distinction between strong and week forms of postmodernism, noting that only the strong form undermines the possibility of normative criticism. A distinction between the tool of deconstruction and postmodernism is also drawn. Deconstruction can be used as tool to expose contradictions and assumptions within existing discourses without paralysing the possibility of response. The rejection of absolutism and essentialism, and an acceptance of relativeism does not have to lead to moral or ethical paralysis. "When faced with famine, war poverty and oppression we need not forsake a morally grounded response and simply engage in ironic discursive games". (p4) One contibutor argues that if we adopt the weak form of postmodernism, we can argue without contradiction for social justice, democratic pluralism, and a qualified humanism. While these values have a history, they are not argued for on the basis of that history, but because of the desirable ends that they might achieve: the enhancement of life chances and the maximisation of human freedom. Another approach is to look to the communities in which, and the processes by which, values are socially constructed. While values are not absolute, within a community there is the possiblity of a vocabulary of values in which we can all share. "The extent to which these vocabularies are shared, the degree of inclusion and commonality, thus becomes crusical in the construction of ethical, aesthetic and epistemological criteria"(p7). Within a community, "The creation of radical pluralism will involve embracing solidarity and difference, a shift away from the concern with equality and sameness towards justice and difference. We can accept that cohesive communities are impossible ideals, abondon hope of a perfect consensus and accept that dissent is inevitable, and yet also demand a grammar of conduct - a minimum shared sense of belonging as a basis for political co-existence"(p8). _______________________________________________________________ Bryan Palmer bpalmer-AT-pcug.org.au Canberra - Australia's National Capital ------------------
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