From: darcy-AT-chass.utoronto.ca (Stephen D'Arcy) Subject: How to "choose boundaries" (5 easy steps) Date: Fri, 11 Apr 1997 03:05:52 -0400 (EDT) > >The question I'm trying to ask, and apparently not doing it well, is how > >one chooses what boundaries are worth transgressing (e.g., various > >restrictive sexual moralities, rules I'm happy to see broken) and those > >which aren't (e.g. random enucleation). > > First of all, Foucault distinguishes morality from ethics. When he talks about (something like) "experimenting on oneself" he is talking about the latter (rapport a soi), not the former. He does not say, "experiment on others." More importantly, the idea of "experiment" in Foucault is explicitly (and repeatedly) characterized by him as an alternative to ethical (or political) projects which are "global" or "total." If he is to be criticized here, it is from the opposite point of view from the one underlying the above-quoted 'question.' In a way, the idea of "experimentation" in Foucault is a critique of radicalism, not moralism or conformism. In any case, the question of "how one chooses what boundaries are worth transgressing" is not a difficult one for Foucault. One examines the situation, possibly deliberates, weighs the pros and cons of one course of action or another, perhaps discusses it with others, and finally makes a choice (or delays, and chooses later). Having done so, one checks to see whether the outcome of the choice was desirable or undesirable, or a little of both. Presumably one thereafter takes the experience into account. (I assume that one is taking the trouble to choose, whereas usually one acts according to habit). Nothing innovative here. Foucault's innovation in ethics, if there is one (which there isn't), is to say: there is no piece of information about human beings (their purpose, their genes, what is normal among them, what aids their survival, what makes them happy, what they desire deep down) that can settle the ethical -- or moral, or political -- questions that arise in their lives. This is because, he says, "the self is not given," which Foucault calls "Sartre's theoretical insight." From this premise, he concludes: we must create our selves "as works of art." What do artists do? They make judgements, of course. One hopes that their important ones are made after studying "the masters" (on some _judgement_ of who these are), and after considerable practice (experiment?), and in light of an appreciation of the accomplishments embodied in certain provisionally authoritative exemplars. In the best cases, their judgements are informed by exceptional imagination and sensitivity. Either way, artists must make judgements. But, then, others also judge. Critics or art historians or visitors to a museum all make judgements. There are good artists and bad artists, according to these judgements. Likewise, there are people who live in ways that, on consideration, I take to be cases of good living. And there are those who live in ways that, on reflection (or before it), I judge to be repugnant or, more often, mediocre. If I (or Foucault) tell you that for any judge there will be other judges who disagree, will you be surprised?! But that doesn't mean that I'm going to buy a black velvet Elvis painting! On the contrary, it means that I will aspire to judge well. Steve D'Arcy University of Toronto Department of Philosophy
Display software: ArchTracker © Malgosia Askanas, 2000-2005