From: LeoCasey-AT-aol.com
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 1999 14:26:31 EDT
Subject: Kosova


The Nation, April 26, 1999

    The Case Against Inaction

    Sadly, some on the left are angrier about NATO's bombing
    than they are about the Serbian forces' atrocities, even though
    Milosevic's men have killed more in one Kosovan village than
    have all the airstrikes. Those who want an immediate NATO
    cease-fire owe the world an explanation of how they propose
    to stop and reverse the massive ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, in
    light of Milosevic's history as a serial ethnic cleanser and
    promise-breaker. Arguments that the NATO action diminishes
    the stature of the United Nations are, to say the least, highly
    questionable. What could diminish the UN's stature more than
    Milosevic's successful defiance of more than fifty Security
    Council resolutions? Only last September, Resolution 1199,
    invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, ordered Belgrade to
    "cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian
    population and order the withdrawal of security units used for
    civilian repression" in Kosovo. Only last October, Milosevic
    promised to reduce troop numbers in Kosovo, and his pledge
    was endorsed and given the force of international law by
    Security Council Resolution 1203. By the time the
    Rambouillet negotiations had started, he had more troops in
    Kosovo than ever before, and they had already begun their
    well-prepared campaign of ethnic cleansing.

    Real internationalists can hardly use the dubious rights of
    "national sovereignty" to oppose action to stop massacres.
    Opposition to US military intervention is an understandable
    rule of thumb, but it shouldn't become obsessive dogma. After
    all, most Europeans were happy with US intervention in
    World War II. The British court decisions on Gen. Augusto
    Pinochet show that, at last, politicians who murder cannot
    expect amnesty afterwards. Why should Slobodan Milosevic
    expect impunity as he carries out crimes against humanity?

    Ideally, there should have been a UN Security Council vote
    endorsing military action, but China and Russia had made it
    plain that no matter what barbarities Milosevic committed
    they would veto any such resolution. Happily, most of the
    Council agreed that ethnic cleansing was not something that
    could be shielded behind a dubious claim of national
    sovereignty and soundly defeated, 12 votes to 3, a Russian
    draft resolution condemning the bombing. Only Namibia
    joined Beijing and Moscow. NATO, most of whose
    governments are members of the Socialist International,
    agreed on a military response.

    In short, the court of international public opinion has
    implicitly, resoundingly, endorsed military action. Milosevic
    is clearly counting on past experience that the international
    community will compromise, accept the results of ethnic
    cleansing and leave him in power. We hope that this time he
    has miscalculated. Three of the major European
    players--Britain, France and Germany--under like-minded
    left-of-center governments have united in their determination
    to stop him, and they have popular majorities for doing so.

    Soon NATO will be faced with two alternatives: stop the
    bombing and "negotiate," or commit ground troops. The
    bombing should stop only when Belgrade agrees to pull out or
    is pushed out of Kosovo, if necessary by ground troops. For
    most of this decade Milosevic has used negotiations as a cover
    to consolidate the gains of ethnic cleansing.

    The precondition for a cease-fire must be the withdrawal of
    Serbian troops and police from Kosovo and their replacement
    by an international force, mostly NATO but including
    Russians if they want to become involved--and can afford to.
    (No one who saw the UN in inaction in Bosnia could wish UN
    forces on the long-suffering Kosovars.) Of course, the present
    campaign carries risks. To exorcise its frustration and put off
    the inevitable involvement on the ground, the White House
    will be increasingly tempted to escalate attacks on civilian and
    economic targets. The sooner ground troops are committed to
    clear Kosovo of Serbian forces and allow the refugees to
    return, the less temptation there will be, and the more likely
    that Milosevic will withdraw. Successful military action
    would also strengthen the prospects for democracy in Serbia.
    Much of the Serbian opposition argues that airstrikes weaken
    their position. In fact, it would be impossible to weaken their
    position on Kosovo: Even fewer of them explicitly oppose the
    repression there than resisted the war in Bosnia. In reality,
    Serbia cannot have democracy and Kosovo.

    There will be casualties, but the Serbian army and police,
    although fearsome against unarmed civilians, will be far from
    home, in hostile territory without air cover. The alternative is
    a terminal weakening of all the precarious advances in
    international humanitarian law that have been achieved over
    the past decade--not to mention the deaths and exile of
    hundreds of thousands of Kosovars.

    Bogdan Denitch and Ian Williams

    Bogdan Denitch, director of the Institute for Transitions to
    Democracy, which operates in Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia, is
    the author of Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of
    Yugoslavia (Minnesota). Ian Williams is The Nation's
    United Nations correspondent.