Subject: Re: Explaining why he was a philosopher. From: Stuart Elden <stuart.elden-AT-clara.co.uk> Date: Wed, 18 Jul 2001 18:37:21 +0100 Ali This is my second attempt at a reply. I wrote a very detailed and careful response which I lost due to a computer error. I hope I can recapture the main thrust of my response this second time. First of all, thank you for some interesting and difficult questions. My book sets out to do a number of things, but very early on I suggest that the affinities - and one could add the divergences - between Heidegger and Foucault cannot be treated exhaustively. My aim was not a 'compare and contrast' between the two thinkers, but rather to investigate how a reading of Heidegger could illuminate certain aspects of Foucault's work. The introduction to that book, which I posted to another, much smaller list, rather than this one, necessarily is even briefer and schematic in its outline of the project. But that said, I don't spend much time discussing differences between the thinkers - i mention a few in passing - because it's not especially my concern or interest. Just as Foucault rarely mentions Heidegger positively, he rarely mentions Heidegger negatively, that is, not explicitly. There are coded critiques of Heidegger in, for instance, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' and The Order of Things. So, therefore, though I think that the question of truth is certainly a concern for both thinkers, it's not something i treat in the book, other than briefly and in passing. I appreciate the Veyne quotation, and if you could provide a citation i'd be grateful. On that point there's a comment in the L'hermeneutique du sujet lecture course where Foucault is asked about the influence of Lacan. He replies that one can hardly avoid Lacan when concerned with the issues of truth and subjectivity, but that Heidegger is the key person for him in this inquiry. Alone of course that means little, but it might point the way for an enquiry. That said, i would take issue with you suggestion that >After all Heidegger's question is not just about >being it is primarily about Being of beings. To my mind that's only sustainable, barely, on a reading of the divisions of Being and Time that were published. Heidegger's question is always to get to being _as_ being. He investigates the being of a being in Division 1 as a way into the question, as a mode of access. To think otherwise is to read Being and Time as an anthropology. Elsewhere - in the lecture courses prior to Being and Time, and those that follow he investigates the question of being historically, through a de- struction of the tradition. (Though I think there are changes in Heidegger's thought I don't see the notion of the turn [Kehre] as chronological) That's again a much longer argument than I have time for here. You're right of course that the relationship between Heidegger and Neo- Kantianism is much more complex and ambivalent than the previous post suggested, and that between Foucault and Kant(ianism) too. There's a section in my first chapter called 'Reading Kant Phenomenologically', which discusses Heidegger's Kant reading in some detail, and relates it to the dispute with Cassirer and the Marburg school. I'm not trying to suggest Foucault had no affinity to Kant - far from it. I discuss Foucault and Kant, largely around the issues of the present and Enlightenment. But the distinction as I see it between Heidegger's historicisation of the Kantian problematic and the neo- Kantian's is around the reading of the Critique as a work of ontology, and not as it was for the neo-Kantians, a work of epistemology. I don't discuss Foucault and the neo-Kantians at all, other than to use Heidegger's strategy of reading Kant in my reading of Foucault - in the previous post that was just a shorthand way of making a point about historical ontology. I hope this goes someway to answering your questions. Again, thanks Stuart --
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