File spoon-archives/foucault.archive/foucault_2001/foucault.0108, message 18


From: "Ali Rizvi" <ali_m_rizvi-AT-hotmail.com>
Subject: re: Augenblick and event
Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2001 19:09:24 


<html><div style='background-color:'><DIV>Stuart</DIV>
<DIV>I hope you are back by now. Foucault list has been dead since then. I have been try my fortunes on Habermas list instead.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>The purpose of my last mail was to enquire about the precise sense in which the Heideggerian 'ideas' like 'moment' or 'event' or the 'present' are related to Foucauldian interest. Generally I share your sense of parallels in Foucault and Heidegger. There is no doubt about Heidegger's influence on Foucualt. It is all pervasive. Also Heidegger's concerns about Being, Temporality, Present, Presence, Truth, moment, Event etc are central for Foucault. No doubt about that. Also that we are not talking about their being same thinkers, we are only saying that certain concepts in one can be useful in understanding the other. I think that much we agree.</DIV>
<DIV>Having said that, I have real problem understanding the exact nature of Heidegger's influence on Foucualt except for generalities we all know. The reason behind this perplexity is that I think despite all similarities, all influence of Heidegger on Foucault, at the depth, they are very  different thinkers. </DIV>
<DIV>Just to take the things we are discussing. Heidegger's conception fo Being which is closely related to his concept of turth as alethia (revealation or openness or disclosure), now how is it related to Foucault's conception of truth as being produced within discourse? Similarly Heidegger's notion of Being is closely related to his conception of present and presence or presentness (parousia), how we are to relate this to Foucault'c ocneption of present? (i am assuming here close connection between present and presense). Sure Foucault's background in phenomenology makes these concepts also very central to him but in what way, and in what way he is different from Heidegger? How is ontology of present which consist in the "work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free being" to be differentiated from the ontology of present that is essentially a wait for Being, not that this waiting is passivity in the normal sense but still very different from Foucaults 'hyperactivism'. This conception of waiting is very important for Heidegger, as far as I understand him, and it is related to Heidegger's cocneption of Being, Truth and Presentness and even to his concept of moment or Augenblick. And as your quotation from St. Paul shows (and Heidegger was well aware of it) the notion of 'moment' is somehow closely related to the Christian notion of 'event' as coming of Lord and in this context Heidegger's comments on p. 98 of his Nietzsche to which you have been referring to is important. Also important in this context is the notion of preparing ourselves for the 'moment', making ourselves (and perhaps our surroundings too) worthy of the 'moment' [and this is also related to Christian conception of preparing ourselves for the coming of lord, being awake and vigilant (wachasam sein)]: "When resolute, Dasein has brought itself  back from falling, and has done so precisely in order to be more authentically 'there' in the 'moment of vision' as regards the Situation which has been disclosed" (Being and Time p. 376 of english translation). Sure the concept of making oneself worthy also occurs in Foucault in the context of care of self but his use although certainly dervived from Heidegger is used in the context of his own (to me very un Heideggerian enterprise). </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Now to take your following comments</DIV>
<DIV> "but it is worth reading Being and Time and looking at the way<BR>Anwesenheit and Gegenwart relation.<BR>and Angewiesenheit too, which is again related to wait.</DIV>
<DIV> Present is both temporal and spatial. It<BR>is for Foucault and Heidegger".</DIV>
<DIV>Sure. But what it exactly amounts to? I think as far as Foucault is concerned we should cosider them in relational terms, as relations. Spatiality and temporaltiy are related to each other, and thus constitute each other but irreducible to each other. Agamben's following remarks are also relevant here. Differentiating Foucault's positon from that of historical materialism he writes, that According to Foucault 'man is not a historical being because he falls into time, but precisely the opposite; it is only because he is a historical being that he can fall into time, temporalising himself (Infancy and History p. 99). How is this conception to be related to Heidegger's conception of 'fallenness' whcih is obviously an ambigous notion. So overal yes Heidegger's and Foucault's conception of temporatlity and spatiality have parallels, but what is their speficity? and what to make of huge differences?</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Again I would say something regarding the following comment:</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>"Foucault and structuralism is an interesting question. On the one hand are<BR>the explicit 'i am not a structuralist' type comments, but in 1964 he gave<BR>an interview in Tunisia where he explained how he saw himself using its<BR>tools and how it functioned in his work". </DIV>
<DIV>As far as I can recall Foucault's rejection of the term structuralism is based on his understanding that it was a precise method being used by linguists, anthropologis and he was certainly not using it in that manner. Also as far as I can remeber Foucault's sees the common ground with structuralism in their common interest in purging subject from analysis [in fact i just found the exact quote: ". . . but having one point in common: the need to oppose that set of philosophical elaborations, considerations, and analyses centered essentially on the theoretical affirmation of the "primacy  of the subject" Remarx on Marx p. 87]</DIV>
<DIV>Also interesting are these remarks:</DIV>
<DIV>". . . what was at stake was this: to what extent is it possible to constitute forms of thought and analysis that are not irratic, that are not coming from the right, and that moreover are not reducible to Marxist dogmatism? These are the complex problems, with all the developements they have had, that are contained in the vague and confused term of 'structuralism'" (pp. 94-95).</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>"He also - somewhere - denies that<BR>structuralism is ahistorical, and thinks it is rather an approach to<BR>history. But i would suggest that the historical element sets Foucault apart<BR>from other so-called structuralists, and also suggest his analysis of space,<BR>rather than just the use of spatial metaphors also sets him apart".</DIV>
<DIV>As I said in the earlier post Foucault is separated from structuralists via the notion of event, and also via the notion of originarie expereience (whcih is also related to the notion of event). History is both a structured process and exceptional event (rarirty). </DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>"I can't answer some of those other questions now, but the question of<BR>Augenblick and present is a topic of considerable interest to me. I tried to<BR>say something about it in the book".</DIV>
<DIV>me too and i am looking to read your book which i am expacting to receive in early september, hopefuly.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>I hope to reply to your other mail tomorrow.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>regards</DIV>
<DIV>ali<BR></DIV></div><br clear=all><hr>Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at <a href='http://go.msn.com/bql/hmtag_itl_EN.asp'>http://explorer.msn.com</a><br></html>

   

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