Date: Tue, 28 Jan 1997 00:03:15 -0500
From: jlnich1-AT-service1.uky.edu (J.L. Nicholas)
Subject: Re: General Question


Kenneth writes:

>benhabib's critique of rawl's in _feminism as critique_ is correct, i
>think.  rawl's
>articulates a "generalized other" instead of a "concrete other."  as for
>emotions - i
>follow agnes heller - _a theory of feelings_.  feelings are inexorably
>(speling?) tied
>with reason.  They are not and cannot be separated.  it is a reified
>dualism.  we are
>passionate with reason and reasonable with passion.
>as for communication conveying truth - i guess habermans's appropriation of
>gadamer makes sense.  language is oriented toward understanding (with the
>exception of functional language systems which convey nothing).    linguistic
>statements only potentially convey truth.  words, or validity claims, are
>propositional in factivcity only.  they invite people to response and ask for
>justification - which the speaker can then give in the form of good reasons.
>language is a coordinating element of human beings.  even if it is
>interpreted as
>sheer will to power it still functions to coordinate actions (ie. directed
>toward
>understanding).  fascists and democrats alike use language in the same
>way.  as
>georgia warnke notes "there isn't anything else."  i suppose a case could
>be made
>for a functional language being substituted for ordinary language - the
>result being
>the total reification of human relations.... but i'm unsure about how to
>think about
>such a thing.... (how would one know?).
>ken

1. How is HJabermas any different from Ralws in positing the general other
rather than the concrete other?

2. As I said in my initial post, Habermas appears tome to lack any
reference to emotion or passion in his discussion of reason (I am primarily
referring to The Theory of Communicative Action).  Again, Habermas, and as
far as I can tell, Benhabib also, wants us to be logicians- Vulcans - and
not human beings who are [passionate in their reason.  As Aristotle holds,
reason is some form of desire.  Habermass negates any emption by claiming
that the force of the better argument must be free ofg emotional tugs, etc.
This is one problem I have with teaching logic- particularly informal
logic.  We teach that appeals to pity are not reasons to accept an
argument.  But why not and according to whom?  Sometimes, as I think Hume
would argue, only emption will drive us to accept what reason demands.

3. How is "functions to coordinate actions" = "leads to understanding"?
There is no understanding in the dsance of the bee, only a coordination of
action.  I can tell you a lie to coordinate our actions in defending me
against a person who is legitimately hunting me for murder, simply to
coordinate your actionsd with mine in the goal of protecting me from being
caught.  I nned not and probably do nmot want you to understand anything at
that point- I am simply using you.  The big thing is that language need not
be geared toward understandiing, and I doubt that evolutionarily it
developed this way.  BUt Habermas must claim that it is essentially geared
toward increasing understanding.  A good Nietzschean would argue instead
that language is geared toward control.  I use langauge to get my way, to
dominate.

Jeffery