Date: 	Tue, 28 Jan 1997 14:52:37 -0500
From: Kenneth MacKendrick <kenneth.mackendrick-AT-utoronto.ca>
Subject: Re: General Question




> Kenneth writes:
> 
> >benhabib's critique of rawl's in _feminism as critique_ is correct, i
> >think.  rawl's
> >articulates a "generalized other" instead of a "concrete other."  as for
> >emotions - i
> >follow agnes heller - _a theory of feelings_.  feelings are inexorably
> >(speling?) tied
> >with reason.  They are not and cannot be separated.  it is a reified
> >dualism.  we are
> >passionate with reason and reasonable with passion.
> >as for communication conveying truth - i guess habermans's appropriation of
> >gadamer makes sense.  language is oriented toward understanding (with the
> >exception of functional language systems which convey nothing).    linguistic
> >statements only potentially convey truth.  words, or validity claims, are
> >propositional in factivcity only.  they invite people to response and ask for
> >justification - which the speaker can then give in the form of good reasons.
> >language is a coordinating element of human beings.  even if it is
> >interpreted as
> >sheer will to power it still functions to coordinate actions (ie. directed
> >toward
> >understanding).  fascists and democrats alike use language in the same
> >way.  as
> >georgia warnke notes "there isn't anything else."  i suppose a case could
> >be made
> >for a functional language being substituted for ordinary language - the
> >result being
> >the total reification of human relations.... but i'm unsure about how to
> >think about
> >such a thing.... (how would one know?).
> >ken
> 
> 1. How is HJabermas any different from Ralws in positing the general other
> rather than the concrete other?
> 

I don't think Habermas's position is all that different from Rawl's.  I think that 
Benhabib provides and interesting corrective to Habermas's approach by focusing 
on the concrete other.  However - the notion of the concrete other has not yet been 
fleshed out very well in terms of its' relation to a model of deliberative democracy. 
 In my understanding - the focus upon a concrete other 1. negates the razor sharp 
distinction between the good life and justice (a conclusion that can also be reached 
via Gadamer)  2. negates the difference betweeen justification and application (ie. 
understanding justification entails understanding application) and 3. it negates the 
radical distniction between the public and private sphere.

> 2. As I said in my initial post, Habermas appears tome to lack any
> reference to emotion or passion in his discussion of reason (I am primarily
> referring to The Theory of Communicative Action).  Again, Habermas, and as
> far as I can tell, Benhabib also, wants us to be logicians- Vulcans - and
> not human beings who are [passionate in their reason.  As Aristotle holds,
> reason is some form of desire.  Habermass negates any emption by claiming
> that the force of the better argument must be free ofg emotional tugs, etc.
> This is one problem I have with teaching logic- particularly informal
> logic.  We teach that appeals to pity are not reasons to accept an
> argument.  But why not and according to whom?  Sometimes, as I think Hume
> would argue, only emption will drive us to accept what reason demands.

Habermas distinguishes between "good arguments" (arguments that have the 
potential to be redeemed) and "emotional tugs" because he doesn't want 
something like the holocaust to occur ever again (and because an analysis of 
language gives him "good reason" to think about "good arguments" in this way).  
For Habermas, and Benhabib, reason (which is inclusive of passions - in the form 
of context and tradition) is the medium for communication and ultimately the only 
arbitrator for moral questions.  "What ought I do?" can no longer be answered in a 
pluralistic society, reasonably, by appeals to authority, religion, magic, etc.  The 
idea of passion aside from reason is akin to the probelm of the veil of ignorance 
(autonomous mushrooms).  Passion does not exist on its own - it is connected to 
our sensousness - our suffering being.  Our passionate beings are also reasonable 
beings (Aristotle).  However - the question does passion precede reason or reason 
precede passion is incoherent - since they cannot really be methodologically 
separated.  Passions don't exist in a vaccuum - they are completely entwined with 
thought - and a focus on the concrete other verifies this.
	  I sense what you concerned with is the distinction between 
reason/passsion because you think it cuts off your humanity from a moral 
conversation (is this correct?) and because a Nietzschean argument follows the 
will to power not the will to understanding (is THAT and awkward statement).  So, to 
cut to the chase - the idea of passions (will to power) aside from reason is 
encompassed by Habermas's theory in the idea of strategic actions.  Freedom is 
measured by the options that a strategic person has.  If freedom is too limited - 
then only through communicative means can the problem be resolved (other than 
just trying to kill everyone - which hardly constitutes freedom by any measure).  As 
Gadamer notes, even "criminals" (whatever that means) coordinate their actions 
communicatively.  However - if one wants to figure out how to increase freedom 
(which is always carried out strategically then this can only be done in 
conversation with others - a communicative attempt to resolve a problem.  Chapter 
1 of Habermas's _Between Facts and Norms_ has an excellent discussion of this 
problem.  Sorry if this is garbled - i'm a bit garbled myself.
 
> 3. How is "functions to coordinate actions" = "leads to understanding"?
> There is no understanding in the dsance of the bee, only a coordination of
> action.  I can tell you a lie to coordinate our actions in defending me
> against a person who is legitimately hunting me for murder, simply to
> coordinate your actionsd with mine in the goal of protecting me from being
> caught.  I nned not and probably do nmot want you to understand anything at
> that point- I am simply using you.  The big thing is that language need not
> be geared toward understandiing, and I doubt that evolutionarily it
> developed this way.  BUt Habermas must claim that it is essentially geared
> toward increasing understanding.  A good Nietzschean would argue instead
> that language is geared toward control.  I use langauge to get my way, to
> dominate.

Habermas's distinguishes between deception (actually he has quite a few 
distinctions, alas another chart though) and communicative action.  For Habermas 
communicative action entails what Gadamer understands as openness (Habermas 
identifies 4 elements of coomunicative action - eg. sincerity, understandability, 
consistency etc.).  Deception is a strategic action - with a goal in mind.  
Communicative action is much more of an openness - with the conclusion not yet 
decided on.  For example - If i'm wondering want to make for dinner i could consult 
my partner.  The dialogue could consist of a variety of pasta dishes, a curry etc.  
The decision would be reached on the basis of what we both agreed on - 
presumably not on deception (lying to someone about dinner is fairly silly) but on 
the basis of what we both want.  Note here - communicative action is a process that 
is unavoidable for resolving controversy on the way to strategic ends.  ie. in moral 
discourse -say "we" want to live in a world with less suffering.  Strategically this 
means eliminating poverty etc.  However - in order to figure out how this is to be 
done only a communicative process is adequate.  This process can be broken any 
time that someone decides to act strategically instead - however the 
presuppositions of language contradict the intent to act strategically.  Language is 
a medium for understanding - understanding is an action-coordinating event.  when 
one understands how poverty is created, reproduces itself, etc. then one also 
would know how to abolish it.  Understanding does not exist in a vacuum - it is 
always understanding about something.  I'm not sure this anwers your point so you 
may have to ask the question again.

ken "i still read adorno" mackendrick
centre for the study of religion
toronto, ontario