Date: Tue, 28 Jan 1997 21:14:13 -0500
From: jlnich1-AT-service1.uky.edu (J.L. Nicholas)
Subject: Re: General Question


Ken writes:

>Habermas distinguishes between "good arguments" (arguments that have the
>potential to be redeemed) and "emotional tugs" because he doesn't want
>something like the holocaust to occur ever again (and because an analysis of
>language gives him "good reason" to think about "good arguments" in this
>way).
>For Habermas, and Benhabib, reason (which is inclusive of passions - in
>the form
>of context and tradition) is the medium for communication and ultimately
>the only
>arbitrator for moral questions.  "What ought I do?" can no longer be
>answered in a
>pluralistic society, reasonably, by appeals to authority, religion, magic,
>etc.  The
>idea of passion aside from reason is akin to the probelm of the veil of
>ignorance
>(autonomous mushrooms).  Passion does not exist on its own - it is
>connected to
>our sensousness - our suffering being.  Our passionate beings are also
>reasonable
>beings (Aristotle).  However - the question does passion precede reason or
>reason
>precede passion is incoherent - since they cannot really be methodologically
>separated.  Passions don't exist in a vaccuum - they are completely
>entwined with
>thought - and a focus on the concrete other verifies this.
>          I sense what you concerned with is the distinction between
>reason/passsion because you think it cuts off your humanity from a moral
>conversation (is this correct?) and because a Nietzschean argument follows the
>will to power not the will to understanding (is THAT and awkward
>statement).  So, to
>cut to the chase - the idea of passions (will to power) aside from reason is
>encompassed by Habermas's theory in the idea of strategic actions.  Freedom is
>measured by the options that a strategic person has.  If freedom is too
>limited -
>then only through communicative means can the problem be resolved (other than
>just trying to kill everyone - which hardly constitutes freedom by any
>measure).  As
>Gadamer notes, even "criminals" (whatever that means) coordinate their actions
>communicatively.  However - if one wants to figure out how to increase freedom
>(which is always carried out strategically then this can only be done in
>conversation with others - a communicative attempt to resolve a problem.
>Chapter
>1 of Habermas's _Between Facts and Norms_ has an excellent discussion of this
>problem.  Sorry if this is garbled - i'm a bit garbled myself.

IO don't follow thyis, but I doubt it is because it is garbled; I am just
not as up on Habermas as I should be for engaging in this
debate/discussion.  However, you gave me some thigns to think about.


>
>> 3. How is "functions to coordinate actions" = "leads to understanding"?

>Habermas's distinguishes between deception (actually he has quite a few
>distinctions, alas another chart though) and communicative action.  For
>Habermas
>communicative action entails what Gadamer understands as openness (Habermas
>identifies 4 elements of coomunicative action - eg. sincerity,
>understandability,
>consistency etc.).  Deception is a strategic action - with a goal in mind.
>Communicative action is much more of an openness - with the conclusion not yet
>decided on.  For example - If i'm wondering want to make for dinner i
>could consult
>my partner.  The dialogue could consist of a variety of pasta dishes, a
>curry etc.
>The decision would be reached on the basis of what we both agreed on -
>presumably not on deception (lying to someone about dinner is fairly
>silly) but on
>the basis of what we both want.  Note here - communicative action is a
>process that
>is unavoidable for resolving controversy on the way to strategic ends.
>ie. in moral
>discourse -say "we" want to live in a world with less suffering.
>Strategically this
>means eliminating poverty etc.  However - in order to figure out how this
>is to be
>done only a communicative process is adequate.  This process can be broken any
>time that someone decides to act strategically instead - however the
>presuppositions of language contradict the intent to act strategically.
>Language is
>a medium for understanding - understanding is an action-coordinating
>event.  when
>one understands how poverty is created, reproduces itself, etc. then one also
>would know how to abolish it.  Understanding does not exist in a vacuum -
>it is
>always understanding about something.  I'm not sure this anwers your point
>so you
>may have to ask the question again.
>

I think you really miss answering my question here.  You write that
"Language is a medium for understandning - understanding is an action
coordinating event."  But my whole question is just about this basic,
fundamental proposition: how do I know that language is a medium for
understanding rather than a medium for control.  What I think is the
penultimate criticism of the theory of communicative action is that
Habermas needs langauge to be essentially about understanding, and there is
no reason evolutionarily or otherwise why one should argue that it is
ESSENTIALLY about understanding.  It could be about understanding, but it
could as much be about decpetion.  The whole discussion you have at the
begginning of your reply here does not face that criticism.

Jeffery