Date: Tue, 28 Jan 1997 23:23:07 -0600 (CST) From: Kerry <macdonak-AT-Meena.CC.URegina.CA> Subject: Re: General Question On Tue, 28 Jan 1997, J.L. Nicholas wrote: > I think you really miss answering my question here. You write that > "Language is a medium for understandning - understanding is an action > coordinating event." But my whole question is just about this basic, > fundamental proposition: how do I know that language is a medium for > understanding rather than a medium for control. What I think is the > penultimate criticism of the theory of communicative action is that > Habermas needs langauge to be essentially about understanding, and there is > no reason evolutionarily or otherwise why one should argue that it is > ESSENTIALLY about understanding. It could be about understanding, but it Excuse me for interjecting into your debate, but Habermas does deal with that question in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (the only book of his that I have read, so I presume there are other places as well.) Deception can only exist if communication is essentially about understanding. This is because deception which is strategic can only work if language is communicative action because regardless of the motive the goal is still to CONVINCE the other person. This can only occur if the basis of language is to establish understanding. The particpants have to provide reasons or grounds which "have a special property: they force us into yes or no positions" (19). One is involved in justifing one's position. Even if one is using deception the goal is still to reach agreement, the deceiver would have still been required to establish grounds for the position taken and those grounds are open to challenge. If the reverse was true, that communication was essentially deceptive, then how would it work. It can't. The person may be deceptive but only if language is essentially about coming to an agreement. Habermas does not reify language but rather locates it the "shared sociocultural form of life ... a web of communicative action (100, though in section, 99-102, from which this taken he is specifically dealing with the skeptic viz. communicative action.) He acknowledges that people will act strategically but because those same people will need to justify their actions the grounds which are the foundation are open to debate. One needs to keep in mind the goals that Habermas has for his work, which is twofold: 1) to establish a foundation which allows for critique and does not become transendent, and: 2) to legitmate social resistance and thus to continue the spirit of the earliar Frankfurt writers. Anyways that is my understanding of what Habermas is attempting to accomplish. Warmest regards, Kerry
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