Date: Wed, 29 Jan 1997 11:02:46 -0800 (PST)
From: Stephen Chilton <schilton-AT-d.umn.edu>
Subject: Re: Habermas and Emotions


On Wed, 29 Jan 1997, Kenneth MacKendrick wrote:
> may i interject,
> > 
> I'm curious - exactly how would one go about investigating something 
> un-emotionally?  How is truth validated in an un-emotional way?  The idea that 
> "emotion has no part in determining what is true or how we validate truth" is 
> completely counter-intuitive.  To be involved in something is to feel it.  To be 
> involved also means to have a point of view.  Having a point of view entails having 
> a will - a desire.  The search for truth is a passion, an emotion, and a desire.  The 
> perception of truth and untruth is an involvement with it - a feeling.  At evey moment 
> emotions are connected to reasoning - in determinating what is true and what isn't. 
>  Perhaps my comments simply point out a category mistake - that emotions 
> characterize a condition of humanity not a unique factor in determining what is true.

I don't think you read my reply correctly--at least as I meant it. 
By the phrase, "emotion has no part in determining what is true", I
meant that emotion doesn't decide or establish truth;  but the
wording could certainly be read as saying that the whole process
surrounding truth is free of emotion, and I'm sorry for the
ambiguity.  But I still think that my original point was correct: 
the concern about emotion involves a confusion about the criteria of
validity -- the way we decide whether the validity claim has been
redeemed -- with the manner in which we conduct our research. 
Habermas isn't talking about whether one should search for truth
passionately or indifferently, or whether one should feel excited or
sad or anything else once one establishes something.  I think my
earlier post said this. 


> One of the problems with Habermas's idea of rightness is the razor sharp 
> distinction between justice and the good life.  If we take the idea of the concrete 
> other seriously - which we must if we don't want to deliberately reify our relations - 
> then the distinction no longer makes sense.  Justice cannot simply entail 
> recognition of an abstract universal humanity and a substantitive communal being. 
>  That which would be just must also recognize individuality.  Social movements are 
> largely based on this idea - people must be recognized on all three levels: as 
> human beings, members of specific communities, and individuals.  Habermas's 
> distinction fails to do justice to the embedded and embodied condition of people.  
> Moral theory must encompass more than "generalizable interests" if it is to be 
> coherent.
> ps.  i'm not sure that the last comment entialed such a response but it does deal 
> with the issue of emotions...  and my comments may not be at odds with what has 
> been said.
> 
> ken

Your argument seems to be that Habermas's discourse ethics does not
recognize the involvement of judgments of the good life, that
discourse ethics is only about an abstract universal humanity and
a substantive communal being.  (I'm not sure what you mean by the
last;  it sounds like the two parts mean the same thing.)
	As I said in my previous post, I don't see how one could
recognize an individual in any better way than by requiring that
EACH INDIVIDUAL (not some hypothetical univeral human) INDIVIDUALLY
AND SEPARATELY agree to any proposed norm. It is true that HABERMAS
does not discuss or specify the situation of the person, and
HABERMAS does not tell people what considerations they ought to take
into account before giving their assent (except for each person
recognizing that all others must also give theirs).  But I would
think you would approve of this as allowing free play of individual
views of the good life.  I'm really mystified what your objection
is. 



In both these paragraphs I find myself repeating what I said in the
earlier post, because you don't seem to have recognized it.  It
would be helpful to me and would motivate me to continue the
discussion, if you would acknowledge my argument in your own words
before rejecting it.  That way we can engage each other's points
directly and clearly, and each of us can see where the other -- or
we ourselves -- went off the track.  You will see I have tried to do
that in my own reply. 

Sincerely,

Steve Chilton

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| Stephen Chilton, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science |
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