Date: 	Thu, 30 Jan 1997 13:42:46 -0500
From: Kenneth MacKendrick <kenneth.mackendrick-AT-utoronto.ca>
Subject: Re: Habermas and Emotions




> On Wed, 29 Jan 1997, Kenneth MacKendrick wrote:
> > may i interject,
> > > 
> > I'm curious - exactly how would one go about investigating something 
> > un-emotionally?  How is truth validated in an un-emotional way?  The idea that 
> > "emotion has no part in determining what is true or how we validate truth" is 
> > completely counter-intuitive.  To be involved in something is to feel it.  To be 
> > involved also means to have a point of view.  Having a point of view entails 
> >having a will - a desire.  The search for truth is a passion, an emotion, and a 
> >desire.  The perception of truth and untruth is an involvement with it - a feeling.  
> >At evey moment emotions are connected to reasoning - in determinating what is 
> >true and what isn't.  Perhaps my comments simply point out a category mistake 
> >- that emotions characterize a condition of humanity not a unique factor in 
> >determining what is true.
> 
> I don't think you read my reply correctly--at least as I meant it. 
> By the phrase, "emotion has no part in determining what is true", I
> meant that emotion doesn't decide or establish truth;  but the
> wording could certainly be read as saying that the whole process
> surrounding truth is free of emotion, and I'm sorry for the
> ambiguity.  But I still think that my original point was correct: 
> the concern about emotion involves a confusion about the criteria of
> validity -- the way we decide whether the validity claim has been
> redeemed -- with the manner in which we conduct our research. 
> Habermas isn't talking about whether one should search for truth
> passionately or indifferently, or whether one should feel excited or
> sad or anything else once one establishes something.  I think my
> earlier post said this. 
> 
I think I understand what your talking about - that emotion is not sufficient  or 
relevant or acceptable criteria for determining what might be truth.  I guess i'm 
confused about how you think truth is determined.  By distinguishing between 
reason/emotion i'm wondering how truth is determined.  I don't think you are saying 
that truth is determined by pure methodology - without human contact.  However - if 
emotions are understood as feelings and feelings as involement our sheer 
involvement is precisely what generates propositional truth claims (which, in 
theory, can never really be redeemed in any ultimate way - since the conversation 
is always open and the principle of fallibility is always to be considered).  Back to 
your point - that emotion itself does not constitute a criteria for truth.  I guess what 
i'm concerned with is the idea that truth exists in a vacuum along with human 
reasoning.  I do not think that reasons/emotions can be separated procedurally.  
Our arguments contain sensuous edges because be are sensuous beings.  The 
faculty of reason itself is an emotion - as much as we try to make it amendable to a 
"gods' eye view."  As embedded and embodied individuals - our arguments, our 
reasons, that seek to determine the truth are emotionally constituted.  Any 
judgement that is made about a propositional truth will also be constituted by this 
entwinement.  Feelings and perceptions are elements of what and how we argue.  
They also make the search for truth possible.  I cannot accept that they are cut off 
in the "final judgement."  The bottom line - i think the idea of truth is tainted with a 
problematic objectivism.  If truth is conceived of in a metaphysical manner then 
this is fine.  However - if truth, as an ultimate idea, is fragmented and temporal, 
then our perceptions and feelings and reason become very important in 
understanding what might be true (which may only last as being true for a moment). 
 This is why i think the process of the conversation is more important, from an 
ethical perspective, than the conclusion. In the words of Leonard Cohen - "I don't 
give a damn about the truth, except maybe the naked truth."


> > One of the problems with Habermas's idea of rightness is the razor sharp 
> > distinction between justice and the good life.  If we take the idea of the concrete 
> > other seriously - which we must if we don't want to deliberately reify our 
relations - 
> > then the distinction no longer makes sense.  Justice cannot simply entail 
> > recognition of an abstract universal humanity and a substantitive communal 
being. 
> >  That which would be just must also recognize individuality.  Social movements 
are 
> > largely based on this idea - people must be recognized on all three levels: as 
> > human beings, members of specific communities, and individuals.  
Habermas's 
> > distinction fails to do justice to the embedded and embodied condition of 
people.  
> > Moral theory must encompass more than "generalizable interests" if it is to be 
> > coherent.
> > ps.  i'm not sure that the last comment entialed such a response but it does 
deal 
> > with the issue of emotions...  and my comments may not be at odds with what 
has 
> > been said.
> > 
> > ken
> 
> Your argument seems to be that Habermas's discourse ethics does not
> recognize the involvement of judgments of the good life, that
> discourse ethics is only about an abstract universal humanity and
> a substantive communal being.  (I'm not sure what you mean by the
> last;  it sounds like the two parts mean the same thing.)

	Axel Honneth identifies three moments in recognition - a universal 
humanity (esteem), a basic trust in self (love), and a substantitive communal being 
(rights and respect).

> 	As I said in my previous post, I don't see how one could
> recognize an individual in any better way than by requiring that
> EACH INDIVIDUAL (not some hypothetical univeral human) INDIVIDUALLY
> AND SEPARATELY agree to any proposed norm. It is true that HABERMAS
> does not discuss or specify the situation of the person, and
> HABERMAS does not tell people what considerations they ought to take
> into account before giving their assent (except for each person
> recognizing that all others must also give theirs).  But I would
> think you would approve of this as allowing free play of individual
> views of the good life.  I'm really mystified what your objection
> is. 

Habermas's theory does, as you have pointed out, require actual participation.  
However - this participation is limited a priori, in moral discourse, to questions of 
justice and generalizable interests.  In my reading of habermas - issues of the 
good life can come into the debate only to be tossed out systematically and 
procedurally.  In my understanding of habermas - what is moral is only determined 
within the realm of justice.  notions of the good life simply have nothing to do with 
moral or ethical theory or experience.  the moral domain is pure justice.  insofar as 
justice is an essential element of the good life this idea supports a minimal ("thin") 
conception of the good within its framework.  My point is that our conceptions of the 
good life and our ideas of justice 1. are both moral expeiences and 2. cannot be 
separated procedurally.  Again - the idea of the ongoing connversation comes up - 
where no ideas are tossed out a priori but rather those in the conversation itself 
decide what they want to constitute moral phenomenon.  who knows - the idea of 
justice, the good, reason etc. may all disappear.  for now they work as helpful 
guideposts for the conversation but eventually they might not.
> 
> In both these paragraphs I find myself repeating what I said in the
> earlier post, because you don't seem to have recognized it.  It
> would be helpful to me and would motivate me to continue the
> discussion, if you would acknowledge my argument in your own words
> before rejecting it.  That way we can engage each other's points
> directly and clearly, and each of us can see where the other -- or
> we ourselves -- went off the track.  You will see I have tried to do
> that in my own reply. 

i think i was garbbled because i was laughing at the great sig file. :)
ken 

> 
> | "After finding no qualified candidates for the position of principal, |
> | the school board is extremely pleased to announce the appointment of  |
> | David Steele to the post."                                            |
> |      -- Philip Streifer, Superintendant of Schools, Barrington, Rhode |
> |         Island                                                        |
>