Date: Fri, 31 Jan 1997 07:57:45 -0800 (PST)
From: Stephen Chilton <schilton-AT-d.umn.edu>
Subject: Re: Habermas and Emotions


On Thu, 30 Jan 1997, Kenneth MacKendrick wrote:

> > I don't think you read my reply correctly--at least as I meant it. 
> > By the phrase, "emotion has no part in determining what is true", I
> > meant that emotion doesn't decide or establish truth;  but the
> > wording could certainly be read as saying that the whole process
> > surrounding truth is free of emotion, and I'm sorry for the
> > ambiguity.  But I still think that my original point was correct: 
> > the concern about emotion involves a confusion about the criteria of
> > validity -- the way we decide whether the validity claim has been
> > redeemed -- with the manner in which we conduct our research. 
> > Habermas isn't talking about whether one should search for truth
> > passionately or indifferently, or whether one should feel excited or
> > sad or anything else once one establishes something.  I think my
> > earlier post said this. 
> > 
> I think I understand what your talking about - that emotion is not sufficient  or 
> relevant or acceptable criteria for determining what might be truth.  I guess i'm 
> confused about how you think truth is determined.  By distinguishing between 
> reason/emotion i'm wondering how truth is determined.  I don't think you are saying 
> that truth is determined by pure methodology - without human contact.  However - if 
> emotions are understood as feelings and feelings as involement our sheer 
> involvement is precisely what generates propositional truth claims (which, in 
> theory, can never really be redeemed in any ultimate way - since the conversation 
> is always open and the principle of fallibility is always to be considered).

Perhaps our difficulties lie in the ambiguity of the word, "how", as
in "how truth is determined".  It appears to me that you mean this
question to involve a description of the process by which people
pursue truth, which I agree cannot be answered without reference to
emotion and other subjective understanding.  The other meaning of
this question would be the simple criteria by which we persuade each
other or, more accurately, come to a justified agreement, that
such-and-such is true--being careful, of course, to recognize that
this refers to a claim about something outside the moral and
intra-personal domain.  In that case, we have lots of criteria, it
seems to me, none of which involve emotion.  That there is empirical
evidence for the claim.  That the concepts employed are observable
in principle.  And so on.  This is not to say that the theory of
scientific justification is or will be finished in any final way, or
that satisfaction of the afore-mentioned criteria guarantees that
the claim is "really" right--whatever that means.

>  Back to 
> your point - that emotion itself does not constitute a criteria for truth.  I guess what 
> i'm concerned with is the idea that truth exists in a vacuum along with human 
> reasoning.  I do not think that reasons/emotions can be separated procedurally.  
> Our arguments contain sensuous edges because we are sensuous beings.  The 
> faculty of reason itself is an emotion - as much as we try to make it amenible to a 
> "gods' eye view."  As embedded and embodied individuals - our arguments, our 
> reasons, that seek to determine the truth are emotionally constituted.  Any 
> judgement that is made about a propositional truth will also be constituted by this 
> entwinement.  Feelings and perceptions are elements of what and how we argue.  
> They also make the search for truth possible.  I cannot accept that they are cut off 
> in the "final judgement."  The bottom line - i think the idea of truth is tainted with a 
> problematic objectivism.  If truth is conceived of in a metaphysical manner then 
> this is fine.  However - if truth, as an ultimate idea, is fragmented and temporal, 
> then our perceptions and feelings and reason become very important in 
> understanding what might be true (which may only last as being true for a moment). 
>  This is why i think the process of the conversation is more important, from an 
> ethical perspective, than the conclusion. In the words of Leonard Cohen - "I don't 
> give a damn about the truth, except maybe the naked truth."

Your argument seems to be that since we are emotional beings, then
our judgments must be emotional in nature.  Sure.  But in no wise do
we say, "My feeling that this is true is evidence that it IS true
and in particular that you should believe it."  We may say, of
course, something that is close to that but distinct in an important
way:  "We've reached a point at which, at least temporarily, our
differing criteria seem to have brought us to different conclusions
about some claim, and our emotions are probably involved in that
difference, and an examination of our emotions might even lead us to
a better understanding of how we look at the data, but the ultimate
test, the means by which I seek to persuade you, will still be based
on evidence and not our individual emotions."
	It seems to me that by including emotions among (or embedded in)
the criteria of truth, you can no longer make claims that command
agreement.  You can't even claim that you actually exist, despite your
assumption of something called "I", if I don't feel you exist. No, I take
that back:  you can certainly claim that you exist, but you have no way to
command agreement from me.  "Yes, I see that you move the scales when you
step on them, and that the air moves around you rather than through you,
and [etc.], but I just don't FEEL you exist."  And you now find yourself
having to grant that to me, at least, you DON'T exist.  Anyway, the bottom
line is that in speaking to me in terms that take a physical existence for
granted, you are implicitly asserting that you can redeem your claim for
this physical existence.  But if the truth of that claim depends on MY
feelings, over which you have no control, then you are in the position of
confessing from the outset your inability to back up your claim in any way
that brings agreement. 
	Note that I'm not claiming that any set of criteria WILL
inevitably bring agreement.  But I'm at least claiming that in
making a statement, I'm claiming that they will do that.


> > Your argument seems to be that Habermas's discourse ethics does not
> > recognize the involvement of judgments of the good life, that
> > discourse ethics is only about an abstract universal humanity and
> > a substantive communal being.  (I'm not sure what you mean by the
> > last;  it sounds like the two parts mean the same thing.)
> 
> 	Axel Honneth identifies three moments in recognition - a universal 
> humanity (esteem), a basic trust in self (love), and a substantitive communal being 
> (rights and respect).

This doesn't resonate for me yet, but thanks for the explanation.  I'll
have to read Honneth to get a better sense.

> > 	As I said in my previous post, I don't see how one could
> > recognize an individual in any better way than by requiring that
> > EACH INDIVIDUAL (not some hypothetical univeral human) INDIVIDUALLY
> > AND SEPARATELY agree to any proposed norm. It is true that HABERMAS
> > does not discuss or specify the situation of the person, and
> > HABERMAS does not tell people what considerations they ought to take
> > into account before giving their assent (except for each person
> > recognizing that all others must also give theirs).  But I would
> > think you would approve of this as allowing free play of individual
> > views of the good life.  I'm really mystified what your objection
> > is. 
> 
> Habermas's theory does, as you have pointed out, require actual participation.  
> However - this participation is limited a priori, in moral discourse, to questions of 
> justice and generalizable interests.  In my reading of habermas - issues of the 
> good life can come into the debate only to be tossed out systematically and 
> procedurally.  In my understanding of habermas - what is moral is only determined 
> within the realm of justice.  notions of the good life simply have nothing to do with 
> moral or ethical theory or experience.  the moral domain is pure justice.  insofar as 
> justice is an essential element of the good life this idea supports a minimal ("thin") 
> conception of the good within its framework.  My point is that our conceptions of the 
> good life and our ideas of justice 1. are both moral expeiences and 2. cannot be 
> separated procedurally.  Again - the idea of the ongoing connversation comes up - 
> where no ideas are tossed out a priori but rather those in the conversation itself 
> decide what they want to constitute moral phenomenon.  who knows - the idea of 
> justice, the good, reason etc. may all disappear.  for now they work as helpful 
> guideposts for the conversation but eventually they might not.

I agree that Habermas does not regard issues of the good life as moral
issues, in the sense that X can claim directly that Y "ought to" conduct
his life in accordance with X's view of the good life.  (I agree with that
also.)  H. brings ideas of the good life into play only as motivating
agreement or disagreement with proposed norms.  But I think we have to
recognize that when acting in accordance with (U), people's consideration
of the proposed norm has to take into account the necessity of all other
affected people having to agree as well.  I think many theorists take (U) 
as just meaning that "my moral commitments can veto your moral
commitments", which of course does bring people's differing views of the
good life directly into the moral discussion:  in order to get you all to
agree to my norm, I have to persuade you all that you too "should" hold
the vision of the good life that motivates my agreement.  (Of course, I
might be fortunate enough to get agreement even without such persuasion,
but this is unlikely.)  My understanding of (U), however, is that people
condition their agreement / disagreement with proposed norms taking into
account as given the fact that others with different visions of the good
life also have to agree.  This is complicated -- hard to express clearly
-- let me give an example from a narrower domain:  marriage.  When Kate
and I need to make a decision, we do so jointly, taking the other's
sensibilities as given and honoring them.  We may discuss each other's
sensibilities at some length, trying to clarify them to each other (and to
ourselves) and to persuade the other to adopt ours, but ultimately, we
have to make our decision taking the other's sensibilities as given and
honoring them as we do our own.  The outcome of this final decision-making
process can't be predicted in advance by some formula or algorithm -- the
decision method is not a mere straightforward compromise but rather a
creative attempt to satisfy all the considerations advanced, this attempt
taking every advantage of the specific, rich situation in which we have to
make this decision.  (The same process goes on intra-personally, I
believe, when we have to make a decision and are unable to resolve our own
mixed feelings about the situation.)  My point is that when we decide, we
each consider and finally make the decision with the commitment that the
other's agreement is as necessary as our own.  Since we BOTH hold this
view, and hold it simultaneously, and are committed to being together in
this way, we neither of us rest defiantly on our own sensibility but
rather have to admit the other as a full partner.  (By the way, I'm not
saying that Kate and I actually live up to this all the time, but it's
certainly what we strive for.)
	Now take this situation and extend it to more than two people, and
I think you have what Habermas intends by (U):  a situation in which all
of us are simultaneously and mutually committed to recognition of the
others as full partners, and where our decisions to agree or disagree with
a norm are made not just resting on our own sensibilities but rather in
recognition that we, as all others, have to agree or disagree with the
understanding that we make this decision in full recognition that all
others are taking our sensibilities into account as fully as we are
theirs. 
	Now back to the original question of how Habermas takes the good
life into account.  The way I see it, (U) is talking about a situation in
which our differing views of the good life have already been discussed,
aired, examined, compared, understood, so that people find themselves
having to make a decision (commit to a norm) in the face of differing and
not-at-this-point-resolvable understandings.  In that situation, everyone
has to simply accept the others' understandings as being as important to
the agreement as their own, and all propose norms and/or decide on their
agreement holding, and recognizing that all others hold, all those diverse
perspectives as equal voices.  And out of that complexity comes some
agreement.  (Maybe.  God willing.)  So I don't think we should get hung up
on issues of whether this is all of morality, or only a part of it: 
remember that Habermas's orientation is not toward defining the term,
"morality", but rather toward coordinating action.  (U) does so in the way
I have described.
	There is certainly room in Habermas's world for discussions of the
good life.  People are free to advance their reasons for their particular
views and can even call them reasons of "morality".  But in the end, we
have to coordinate our actions even in the face of differing views of the
good life, and that's where (U) comes in.  My personal sense is that it is
a mistake, or at least badly misleading, to call these discussions of the
good life "moral" discussions.  Yes, they are about what has meaning to
us, what is important to us, and thus will ultimately determine what we
throw into the mix of perspectives when final coordination of action takes
place, but this sense of meaning is not one that is usefully communicated
by (or seen in terms of) moral injunctions.  I find certain forms of
politeness meaningful and want to preserve them, and I can try to explain
to you why they are meaningful to me, and you might even come to see them
as meaningful yourself -- but there's no way I can make you find them
meaningful by some sort of moral pressure.  I think we confuse the sense
of meaningfulness with the sense that others MUST give up their own
meanings and defer to ours.  It is most useful, I believe, that we see
discussions over the good life as belonging to the realm of intra-psychic
validity claims, of "therapeutic discourse".

I've gone on longer than I intended, but I'm happy to have at last put
down on "paper" what I've been wanting to express for many months or years
now. 

Best regards to all,

Steve


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| Stephen Chilton, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science |
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