Date: Mon, 17 Nov 1997 02:31:58 +0200 (EET)
From: j laari <jlaari-AT-cc.jyu.fi>
Subject: Re: Habermas & Adorno


Thanks, Noelle - 

I will check these ones (I truly forgot that one by Habermas):

> -- one place to start would be Habermas' book, _Postmetaphysical Thinking_
> and especially the essay in it on George Herbert Mead's theory of
> individuation through socialization. (...)  see Richard
> Bernstein's introduction to the collection of essays, _Habermas and
> Modernity_ (MIT, 1985).

The point with "Henrich versus Habermas" concerns exactly Habermas'
use of Mead's social psychology. Henrich argues that there's a genuine
problem with concept of - not with individuation but -
self-consciousness in Habermas (and Dews reminds that Mead actually
was aware of that problem). Habermas follows hegelian insight (by
denying any self prior the other) concerning the crucial role played
by intersubjectivity in development of self-consciousness (as well as
indentity): Henrich reminds that in order to be able to recognise the
other as other one has to be acquainted with oneself as a self in a
way that is supposed to be the result of recognition of the other. He
also provides an argument in the framework of 'linguistic turn' in
order to show that a reference to a 'third person perspective' doesn't
wipe out the priority of 'first person perspective' in language use -
once again some sense of self is needed in order to be able to
distinguish oneself from a third person as a 'target' of some speech
act (sorry, I've forgot the exact technical term...).  Therefore, to
put it bluntly, Henrich thinks that Habermas makes a major error in
sticking to 'purely intersubjectivist' (if I may say so) view into
subjectivity, and that therefore his philosophy has a serious problem
in the very kernel of it. Henrich's point is not to deny the
importance of viewpoint provided by intersubjectivist philosophizing
but to remind that - though the other is a necessary - it's not a
sufficient reason for central concepts of self-consciousness,
subjectivity, and identity. 

Sorry for hastiness - it's quite late here...

Yours, Jukka L