Date: Sat, 9 Aug 2003 20:58:36 +0300 (EEST)
From: j laari <jlaari-AT-cc.jyu.fi>
Subject: [FRA:] Re: Adorno and...


Greetings

Just a few snappies right - I have still things to do this weekend.
Good, so 'truth claim' is different concept. For me it's good news
though I surely didn't had Habermasian discourse in my mind.

I wasn't saying that Adorno was a positivist. The use of statistical
methods has nothing to do with one being an empiricist or a
positivist. It obviously was a bad judgement to use the word
'probabilism' in the context i used it. I try to explain shortly what
I had in mind.: I don't have time to check the terms so let's hope I
get it right with first effort. mathematical knowledge is necessary
but statistical is probabilistic, was my background idea. Mathematics
can't be used in human/social sciences. There's no such mathematics
that could master such a complex world as social world. So we have
statistical analysis. So one either thinks that his or her knowledge
concerning social world is probable (because it's gained by using
statistical methods besides "qualitative" ones), or he somehow
believes his knowledge is certain ("absolute") in unconditional sense.
The latter thinks like pre-modern thinker, to putr it bluntly, who
deduces from some "metaphysical" (philosophical) principle that if X,
then Y... Like I said, it was bad judgement to drag all that baggage
in...

Claus thinks that Adorno won't accept that Kant's transcendental
philosophy somehow overcame the old metaphysics. I said I think it's a
commonplace to think so. OK, A. don't accept so. He finds something
metaphysical in it. Sure, but what is his concept of metaphysics? My
point was quite simply that transcendetal philosophy is the new,
post-metaphysical viewpoint. Whether it's "technically"
(terminologically) a success in it's different "actualizations" is
always a question of specific appraisal and judgment.

Yes, the title is Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie... I have an
English translation so I usually forget the original name. I bought
the book in 1984 from local bookstore and hoped I could use it with
some course of study. The teacher I asked told that I must first
manage Husserls philosophy properly ("you have to scrutinize
Husserl"), because Adorno's book ain't gonna teach me a thing about
phenomenological philosophy. That wasn't a political judgement - in
those days at least our teachers were mostly marxians. And they
scrutinized phenom. phil. The decision was based simply on "scientific
evaluation" of the book.

Claus wrote that Adornos "Zur Metakritik" is "widely appraised as
being quite robust". It sounded a bit odd statement because I couldn't
remember references to it. I had to check books at hand. Firstly, what
about the phenomenological "old gang" (who studied and worked with
Husserl), the likes like Eugen Fink, Ludwig Landgrebe and Arnold
Metzger? Not a single mention, and their works include such basic
texts on phen.phil. as Landgrebes "Der Weg der Phaenomenologie" and
"Faktizitaet und Individuation. Studien zu den Grundfragen der
Phaenomenologie" or Metzgers "Phaenomenologie und Metaphysik". Then
what about the next bunch, authors like Derrida ("Speech and
Phenomena"), Ricoeur ("Husserl") or Robert Sokolowski ("Formation of
Husserl's concept of constitution")? Same answer. Well, sure some
introductory texts will throw all the possible into their
bibliographies? Recent introductory texts like: Rudolf Bernet, Iso
Kern & Eduard Marbach's "Edmund Husserl. Darstellung seines Denkens",
Dieter Lohmar's, "Edmund Husserls 'Formale und transzendentale
Logik'", and Ernst Wolfgang Orth's, "Edmund Husserls 'Krisis der
europaeischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phaenomenologie'"? No such luck. My conclusion is that experts of
phenomenology and especially of Husserl don't much value Adorno's
work. Remember, all these are "heavyweights" of phenomenological
philosophy. They don't mention Adorno's book, then it's not on a right
track and that's it. On the other hand, Adorno doesn't refer to any
expert of phenomenology. His discourse connects neither to
Husserl-research nor to phenomenological research in general. It's a
thing of its own. So that might partly explain my "results".

Adorno indeed does have fabulous metaphors and figures of speech (I
had to take a glance at the book), but he doesn't go into the very
thing, the phenomenological philosophy painstakingly formulated in the
books also Adorno mentions. (I should have probably used the word
'drafted' or 'outlined', instead of 'formulated', because Husserl
began right from the start again and again.) Phenomenologists have
tried to periodize Husserl's thinking into several phases. In teaching
certain changes in the interests and perspectives of phenomenology
have been emphasized in order to everyone to realise that when Husserl
speaks of 'x' in early 1920s or mid-1930s he is not discussing exactly
the same problem or theme. I don't pretend to be in a possession of
"deep" understanding of the turns and twists of Husserlian
phenomenology. I'm basically interested only in Lebenswelt thematics.
But even I can't fail to see that when not respecting the interests
and aims of Husserl it's easy to make an interpretation where the
'object' is transformed into something unrecognizable.

There are few odd things Adorno makes in the book. Therefore he
probably isn't parcularly popular among Husserl-specialists.

1. A. marks out of his examination those late texts that would
demonstrate the incorrectness of A's view of Husserl and
interpretation;

2. Landgrebe's interpretations and observations concerning concepts
'Lebenswelt' and 'ego' (their dynamic relation) remind that picture
Adorno has created is mainly parody or travesty of H. as pre-Hegelian
substantialist in search of "absolute metaphysical foundations", it
couldn't be more mistaken;

3. particularly baffling is that A. refuses to accept the fundamental
difference between ontology and transcendental philosophy (that
difference is in certain sense one of the basic things in modern
philosophy) - and yet e.g. with "Lebenswelt" there are dimensions
ontological, natural and transcendental (ie. three concepts of L.),
and without respect for these the thinking will quite soon end up in
confusion.

I'd wonder how immanent critique of phenomenology would possibly
succeed.

Husserl is a man of straw created by Adorno - such a figure is easy to
critique, but no one is obliged to esteem such a mocking jargon.

It's also interesting that while there has been for decades a
discussion going on between phenomenology and marxism, Adorno haven't
been a major figure in those discussions. I have in mind the Croatian
meetings from the 1970s (Suhrkamp publisher a series of book based on
those discussions).

I think that interfaces between phenomenological and marxian
philosophies are very interesting. Though not so popular today that
they once was, I must accept. One of the central issues concerns the
relations of the concepts Lebenswelt and praxis. And if you remember
that the late Husserl don't swear in the name of "subject" but
subjectivity, then things are getting a lot more interesting.
(Transcendental ego and transcendental lifeworld are in a dynamic
relation, there is not a single instance that would "explain the
rest", and while Lebenswelt introduces also historicity into
fundamental philosophy we have very challenging parallel to Marxian
philosophy of practice.) However, Adorno commits himself to the
interpreation that H. is a strong "subject-theoretical" philosopher.
That's also a bit odd view, but he can defend his choice because he
had left the "late Husserl" out of the picture and concentrates only
on earlier texts (that Husserl himself had much more earlier accepted
to be problematical). However, the philosophical significance of the
difference between subject and subjectivity passes unnoticed, when the
study is resticted to only certain earlier texts...

Adorno finds from Husserl epistemology and ontology, but don't notice
that H. subordinates these to unconditional transendental philosophy.

Sorry, I got so excited that time is up before my remarks are
finished...

Sincerely, Jukka L