Date: Sun, 21 May 1995 19:53:40 -0600 (CST)
From: KERRY <MACDONAK-AT-Meena.CC.URegina.CA>
Subject: Re: HAB: Working Class and Habermas


Lenny;

:To say that norms are (all or partly) innate, and to mean innate in such a
:fashion as to not be able to differentiate between any possible sense of
:the word innnate, is not helpful.  Habermas would certainly not say that
:norms are innate.  He does make strong statements about the universality of
:certain formal presuppositions of communicative interaction, but these are
:not the substantive norms characteristic of particular cultures.  If he is
:right then there is a basis for an ethics of discourse and thus rational
:argumentation about normative issues (not to be taken for granted). But
:that is not to say that our norms are first of all derived from rational
:argumentation or that the proper resolution of any dispute is predetermined
:by some set of universal norms specified by discourse ethics, other than
:those that provide for the very possibility of discourse.

 I was replying that norms were innate, but rather the motives which underpin
the drive for normative formation are innate (or actually I was arguing that
that is what Habermas argues.)   Though he argues that these motives arise as
a priori to communication, it reduces to a mere point of semantics as to the
actual "location" of those motives.

Granted norms are not innate and if my statements were ambiguous in that regard
I do apologize.   However, the ongoing struggle to constantly reconcile reality
with certain normative concepts is what Habermas argues is the basis for
historical change (broadly speaking.) 

However, I find your final sentence a bit awkward and I'm not truly clear as to
the point you are trying to make.  Could you please restate it.  I will attempt
a pre-emptive response insofar as to what I think you are saying :).

I differentiate between norms, which are socially derived and relative viz.
cultures and the underlying motives for the creation of norms (which Habermas
is concerned with in discourse ethics.)  My reading of Habermas implies that
these motives are universal though their actualization in reality is
particular.  Though he focuses upon communicative action he acknowledges that
he is interested in looking at the intersubjective aspect of being human as
opposed to the subjective aspect which can be found in purposive-rational
action (whose rationality as it colonizes the life-world becomes abnormal
discourse.)  Norms are not necessarily created by normal discourse or
argumentation, and it is our experiential life that provides a basis for
evaluation of either the norms or the reality viz. our normative motives.

I think you would agree in general, though we may disagree on certain points,
if I have interpreted your post correctly.  And then again I could be 
whistling in the wind :).