Date: Sun, 14 May 1995 18:08:19 +0800
From: rgeeland-AT-cc.curtin.edu.au (David Geelan)
Subject: Re: HAB: Working Class and Habermas


I was very taken with Kerry's discussion and account: I think it's one of
the most useful contributions we've had on this issue. Thought I'd respond
to one or two points:

>My understanding of Habermas's critique of Marxism [is that it is] grounded in
>two basic
>"mistakes" which are interrelated:  (1)  that Marx failed to appreciate that
>there
>are two basic types of action (communicative and purposive-rational) and (b)
>that
>he collapsed philosophy with science.

The two types of action are, of course, a construct of Habermas. They are
intended to draw attention to some spheres of action that, in his opinion,
Marxism missed, but like all theories they are just a  convenient way of
dividing up the complexity of the world so that we can understand it. I
think the scheme does this (re-focussing our attention) well, but hadn't
had the language to describe what was going on.

>The first critique arises out [the fact that] of the each of the
>action-systems have different
>rationalities.  In this Habermas borrows from Horkheimer's "objective" and
>"subjective" reason.  As with most 19thC theorists Marx valourized science
>which is grounded in purposive-rational action.  This action type has a
>rationality that is means-ends orientattion or empiricist focused.  It is
>devoid of any normative element.  IOW, Marxism fails by focusing on how humans
>do things rather than why we do them.  Marx's overall goal, human emancipation,
>was laudable but by remaining at only the subjective reason level (focusing on
>the purposive-rational) he was left with the problematic of "consciousness."

This, of course, is where Habermas' earlier work on 'Knowledge and Human
Interests' both sprang from and is valuable. It emphasises that the
'technical' mode exists, and is valuable and important, but that it is not
the sole mode of human action and expression. This extends and expands
Marx's project, emancipation,  in entirely new ways. Perhaps to some extent
this movement beyond purposive rational science was, like every theory,
historically grounded. Marx lived before the development of nuclear
warfare, Habermas after. The development of the bomb gave a salutary jolt
to scientism - science was seen to be potentially a nemesis as well as a
saviour. Thus Marx sought to validate his theories through appeal to
science, Habermas sought to validate his through critique of science.

>Habermas, in the same vein as the  Early Frankfurt School, sees that the
>only way to effectively transend into a more democratic and just society is
>through objective reason.  And as objective reason has normative components, it
>can only be realized through language.  So, Habermas sees Marxism as providing
>a technical understanding of society (along with Weber), however it is only
>through communicative action that a substantive change in society can occur.

This is an interesting point: could it be that Marx's work is valuable in
pointing out injustice and making us aware of inequity, but that the
mechanisms it provides for developing solutions are flawed? Habermas,
having seen attempts to implement these mechanisms fail, and understood
some of the reasons, proposes new mechanisms which take into account the
meaning-making imperative of humanity, and which have greater potential for
solving social problems. One of the things that's been intriguing in the
discussion is the extent to which people have assumed that Habermas'
normative statements are fixed and inflexible. My reading, on the contrary,
is that he describes a dynamic interaction between philosophy and social
science so that norms will be generated by contexts and understood through
the development of grounded theories for action. Do others concur with this
interpretation? (It arises mainly from "The Theory of Communicative
Action".)

>The second point is that Marx falls into this trap because he collapses
>philosophy and science, thereby combining "normal" and "adnormal" discourses.
>Habermas sees that the two need to be separated, with each being able to
>contribute to human knowledge, but that each must be kept in its appropriate
>place with science subservient to philosophy.  In this way a truly human
>society, based upon an essentially normative basis, can occur.

I'm not sure about Habermas' view on the relationship of physical science
to philosophy: others will be better qualified to comment on this. But as
indicated above, the relationship with social science was not to be one  of
domination and subservience (in either direction), but a positive, active
and mutually informative dynamic interaction.

>This may seen nit-picking but ... it is not so much our "level" but rather
>the type of our "mode of discourse" (by this I presume you are alluding to the
>two types of action-system rationality, akin to the idea of "mode of
>production".)  Our society has chosen, for various reasons, a
>scientized-subjective/instrumental mode of discourse which is alienating and
> we must institute a mode of discourse which privileges our innate
>normative values.
>To be fair Marxists believe that their analysis is complete and from a
>technical point of view they have much to offer.  But, Habermas's concern is
>that they fail to appreciate that by simply focusing upon technical/scientific
>approaches they remain embedded in subjective reason.

Is it just me, or are your definitions of subjective and objective reversed
as compared to mine? I see subjective as centred in the individual, unable
to be directly measured by others, personal, and objective as centred in
society (or in 'the real world' if you believe in that), shared by others,
impersonal. The way you are using the terms seems opposite to this, but I
am not familiar enough with Horkheimer's work to know if there's a special
technical usage.

Again, thanks for a most interesting and thought-provoking posting,

Regards, David.