From: BKorth-AT-aol.com
Date: Wed, 5 Mar 1997 19:12:54 -0500 (EST)
Subject: HAB: horizon metaphor and BFN


Hi Hab fans, especially Debbie!

Nice discussion on the use of horizon. I appreciated Michael pointing out the
connection with Husserl. I want to piggy back onto Michael's comments only to
illustrate the potential for using this concept of horizon as an analytical
tool useful with reconstructive analysis.

For phenomenologists the horizon metaphor is used to describe how perceptual
phenomena are intelligible (understandable) given backgrounded and
foregrounded relations. That is, the background helps to make what is in the
foreground "recognizable." When this metaphor is applied to meaning
structures as Habermas intends, and as Carspecken (1996) situates
methodologically, background validity structures help to constitute the more
explicit features of meaning. As the more implicit structures of the horizon
are made explicit, horizons shift. But always there is play between the
foreground and background of the horizon. One cannot fully explicate the
horizon, for reasons probably made most clear by Derrida. One can find some
background structures, revealed through pragmatic horizon analysis
(Carspecken, 1996), which are more context-transcending than some of those
meaning structures found in the foreground. However this isn't always the
case. Making something explicit doesn't mean that it is MORE
context-dependent and vice versa. Even in the case that the background
structures of the horizon are more context-transcending, they are still
brought forth (reconstituted) within the lifeworld. They are a part of
constituting the situated, contextualized activities of everyday actors.
Furthermore, an horizon is only accessible through the context. That is, it
must be initially gotten at through the activities of actors.

According to Phil Carspecken, there are virtual (paradigmatic) structures to
the horizon and temporal structures. He calls these axes. These work together
to form a pragmatic meaning horizon within which activities make sense. They
differ with respect to their dependence/independence on space and time
contexts. The temporal axis of an horizon will be brought into interpretation
when an act is understood as part of the flow of an interaction through time
and space. On the other hand, the paradigmatic axis involves constituting
structures which are free of space/time interpretive constraints on their
meaning-imparting capacity.  Validity claims are part of this paradigmatic
axis. However, "being free of time and space constraints" does not make these
paradigmatic structures free of context. When Phil talks of time and space
constraints here he is talking about the actors' awareness of time and space,
an imediate time and space consiousness. 

Sometimes, there is more than one horizon at play. Gadamer speaks of this in
interpreting texts. You might read of fusing horizons. In this sense
negotiations, at least tacitly, regarding backgrounded assumptions/claims get
worked out. That is, in order to work out varying interpretations of the
foreground, actors must at time get clearer on backgrounded assumptions. They
"fuse."

Let me use some data to provide an example of using the horizon metaphor as
an analytical tool.

A group of long-time friends are eating lunch together and they are talking
about another friend, Bob, who has been feeling depressed because he recently
lost his job. Jim had promised to call Bob and then got busy. This group of
friends (Jim, Helen, Peter, and me) were talking explicitly about Bob and
less explicitly about our responsibility to him and how we feel abou this
situation. Jim asked how Bob was doing and Peter said that Bob was doing
nothing, "Just sitting around getting depressed. An-and, uh, apparently he's
just got a real bad case of depression."

Jim responds:  [Shakes head. Looks down.] "I feel guilty now 'cause I didn't
call him, but" [pause]

The range of possible meanings of Jim's act might include:

"I feel guilty because I didn't do what I knew he needed." AND "I should have
called him." AND "I don't really have a good reason for not calling." AND/OR
"I wonder if he feels  bad because I didn't call him." AND "I wonder how much
of his depression could have been alleviated if I would have called him."
AND/OR "I am worried that I might have let him down." OR "I should have
called him, but I couldn't."

Further analysis would also reveal validity claims oriented toward the
objective, normative and subjective worlds. These claims can be articulated
according to whether they are foregrounded, backgrounded or quite remote for
the actor. Horizons and lifeworlds are implicated and actualized through the
activities of actors. As Michael suggested, it is not possible to fully,
wholly, delimit AN or THE horizon because whatever you are delimiting
implicates a new or shifted horizon. 

Some validity claims fanned out as in an horizon from foregrounded to remote
might look something like this (remember these are fallible and must be
subjected to further scrutiny and analysis before accepted with a higher
degree of certainty):

Foregrounded
     Subjective claims--
"I feel guilty."
"I desire what is best for Bob."
"I am disappointed in my own behavior."
"I want to help my friends."
"I want my friends to be able to count on me; I don't want to let my friends
down"

     Normative Claims--
"Friends should help each other out during rough times."
"Friends should do what they say they will do."
"Friends should be trustworthy."
"It's not good to feel depressed."
"It is right for friends to call each other and go to lunch together."

Less Foregrounded
     Subjective Claims--
"I like Bob."
"I am worried about Bob's depression."

     Identitiy Claims (A claim Carspecken has defined as a synthesis of
normative and subjective references)--

"I am not a good friend."

Backgrounded:

     Subjective Claims--
"I feel powerless to help Bob."
"I feel selfish and useless."

     Normative Claims--
"Friendships should not be squandered."
"Friends should prioritize each others' needs over other interests."
"It is good to be trustworthy."
"People shouldn't behave in ways that make their friends feel crummy."
"Friends should encourage one another."

     Objective--
"Talking with friends is therapeutic."

Remote:

     Subjective Claim--
" I wish I could change Bob's siutation."
"I would feel better if I could help Bob feel less depressed."

     Normative--
"Friends should spend time together."
"Eating is an appropriate way to spend time with friends."

     Objective--
"There are places to go for lunch."
"Jim can call Bob."
"Jim, Helen, Peter, Bob and I eat lunch."

What if Peter then said, "Well, Jim, you know, maybe we could all be more
supportive of Bob. Why don't you call him and see if he wants to go to lunch
with all of us? After all, we are all friends. We should help each other
through this despressing time. You don't have need to feel completely
responsible for taking care of him. He knows you are good friend. He won't
think you've deserted him. Let's all get together."

Peter articulated some of the backgrounded normative features of the meaning
horizon that were impliated through Jim's act. In doing that, the horizon
shifted. Some remote or backgrounded references included now in the horizon
(that weren't there before) have to do with sharing responsibility of caring
for friends, helping Jim feel better about himself andhis reationship with
Bob, and making a plan to address the need to call Bob rather than just
lamenting about it. 

There will be some consistency to background or remote claims, at times:
consistency across settings or sites or modes of interacting or so on. This
would suggest that such references are less context-dependent. And, yet, they
are not ever completely divorced of context, as Michael suggested in his
note. And they are certainly never recognized, never come into being, without
context.
 
Horizon is a dynamic metaphor meant to describe a very dynamic, interactive
interpretive process. Much of what we do intuit is in the background. Much of
that we cannot easily articulate. But it is still contextual. 

I have been confused also by Habermas's use of "horizon" and how to
distinguish between (1) a extremely tacit part of a lifeworld horizon and (2)
system imperatives working behind the backs of actors. If the implicit,
background structures of an horizon are pulled forth for reflection are they
intuitively recognizable by actors? Habermas suggests that they should be. 

It is really exciting to notice how people on this line surface to help each
other out! It feels good!

About BFN:

I have not been able to keep up so easily with the line because I have lost
access to it and have to rely on friends to forward messages to me. I am
wondering if I should add some comments on chapter two. I had only summarized
the first part of the chapter. I could go on to write about Rawls and
Habermas integrated approach. I know that Michael has been posting some
related work which I have profited from. Someone else could take up the last
two sections of chapter two. Michael's work certainly has addressed the
issues found in that chapter. Maybe we're ready to move on to chapter three.
Because my access has been limited, it is highly likely that I missed
messages and am completely out of the loop. If so, maybe someone could drop
me aline here (bkorth-AT-aol.com) and bring me up to speed. I would really
appreciate it.

Take care everyone.

Barbara Korth
Houston




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