Date: 	Fri, 21 Mar 1997 11:39:46 -0500
From: Kenneth MacKendrick <kenneth.mackendrick-AT-utoronto.ca>
Subject: Re: HAB: Habermas and Social Action


rob writes:
> The 'getting laid' example is problematic because there are so many
> different ways such an event might come about (even if, seemingly, there
> are very few occasions upon which it might actually come about).
> 
> Understanding and agreement (as interwoven in H.'s communicative ideal) are
> not quite the same as goal-oriented persuasion here.  If the other is the
> means to your end (as it were), then we're talking
> strategy/instrumentalism.  If the congress that ensues is mutually
> recognised from the outset as, at least in part, a communicative act
> whereby an understanding of what it might be like to be lovers in the
> longer term, then an agreement to be so in that light is conceivably the
> outcome of a truly communicative act (ideal speech situation indeed!).

"Getting laid" is an interesting example - since, I think, it illustrates the blur 
between justification and application quite well.  The norm here is consensus 
(hollowed of content) and certain guidelines about what one will do and what one 
will not do are often set up ahead of time (condoms please).  During the erotic 
encounter both participants may change their mind - in the midst of practice.  then 
the process of justification needs to be renewed because the application 
demonstrated itself to be inadequate - even though a prior consensus was reached 
(one of the partners, or both of them, may decide that biting is ok, or a blindfold....). 
 This is why, i think, Benhabib's critique of consequentialism in Habermas is 
persuasive.  We need to set up a lifestyle of conversation, based upon reciprocity 
and respect, rather than continously defering to the authority of a consensus 
because any consensus about a norm that is reached will inevitably be 
contradicted by the application of such a norm (with the awareness that reciprocity 
and respect MAY be structurally impossible).  Hoffe's, Wellmer's, Benhabib's, and 
Gadamer's critique of Habermas one this point helps illuminate the tension of 
just/app in his approach.  Oddly enough Derrida's idea of undecidability enters 
here as well.  The structural conditions for a consensus might not exist - but we try. 
 I'm not a deconstructionist - but Derrida has demonstrated the problems of such a 
strong theory of consensus.  Unfortunately Derrida steps of the enlightenment boat 
against dialectics - but even if dialectics is a teleology aimed at reconciliation 
(which needs to be discussed as well) this is something that a good anarchist like 
me is unwilling to simply let go of (maybe when reality and thought are reconciled 
i'll become postmodern).

To continue my ramblings - i don't know about anyone else but i'm a bit tired of 
theorists attempting to demonstrate differance or diversity BEFORE a conversation 
takes place.  How do you know that someone holds a different perspective before 
talking to them???!?  We come to know people through conversation not a priori 
statements.  This is precisely why Habermas's work is so interesting.  Norms are 
established AFTER conversation.  In derrida's case diversity is assumed and all 
else leaks from there (the ship is sinking he cries).  How does derrida KNOW this 
without coming to know people.  Habermas's model of communicative action is an 
attempt to outline a theory of language that describes how these interactions occur 
- loading it with what he sees as the minimal criteria (communication, 
argumentation, reason, language etc.).

thats all for now,
ken




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