Date: 	Fri, 21 Mar 1997 19:57:30 -0500
From: Kenneth MacKendrick <kenneth.mackendrick-AT-utoronto.ca>
Subject: Re: HAB: Habermas and Social Action




> In response to Ken's statement:
> 
> "We need to set up a lifestyle of conversation, based upon
> reciprocity and respect, rather than continously defering to the authority
> of a consensus because any consensus about a norm that is reached will
> inevitably be contradicted by the application of such a norm"
> 
> 	I don't see any difference here. Setting up a lifestyle as Ken
> describes would constitute the establishment of a norm, about which
> some manner of tacit consensus would have to be reached. 
> 	Does Habermas at any point conflate consensus with unitary
> thinking? My sense is that his concern is with establishing those 
> conditions which would allow for, and promote, a radical opening of
> discourse ("respect and reciprocity"). Discourse of the kind that many
> postmodern-modern, and dialectical thinkers (many of whom decry Habermas
> as retrograde) would call for. Perhaps I'm missing something, however.
> 	Now anarchy, that's another matter altogether...
> Thanks Ken,
> Anne  
> 
I think Habermas sets up a problematic rationalist formulation of language and 
consensus.  I prefer to examine the problem, in line with Benhabib, in terms of 
cognitive development.  This shift marks a shift away from a transcendental idea of 
reason (a unitary idea) - however intersubjectively constituted - to a more 
social anthropological understanding.  The effect is similar I admit but it recognizes 
that cognition and rationality are different moments.  This falls more in line with 
Gadamer's hermenutics in a way....  It also recognizes that human beings are 
linguistic beings with the capacity to reason (reflect, learn, experience etc.).  This 
formulation takes advantage of the insight that human beings learn through 
language and that anything that might be conceived of as being ethical or moral 
must be reasoned through conversation.  Language is not simply strategic in this 
understanding - words, images, actions are expressed to another.  When we 
address another person a certain logic is entailed - Habermas understands this as 
communicative presuppositions (this logic by the way entails that we don't kill the 
person we are talking to).  I'm skeptical of the strong notion of presuppositions that 
he argues for - but they are open to verification by theories of cognitive 
development and linguistics.  Even if perfectly clear understanding is not possible 
- this does not negate that fact that we address one another and learn from each 
other.  Our self understanding changes when we meet other human beings.  This 
process is important.  I'm not convinced that a moral principle is a work here.  This 
seems to me to be a description of human relationships.  habermas argues that 
these relationships can be understood through a theory of rationality that unites 
our actions, experiences, and expressions, with the idea of reason.  This isn't a 
bad hypothetical idea.  A guiding thread may well exist.  If we are going to use the 
idea of reason as a worthwhile idea then this must be explored.  I think Habermas 
has explored it in a fruitful and illuminating way.  The fact that Habermas relates 
this idea to ethics is also interesting.  How are ethical problems to be resolved? 
(provided the idea of ethics and morality are still worthwhile concepts).  It seems to 
me that only through language-expressions-experience-and reflection can this be 
examined.  Even if it isn't perfect.  Adorno once said that the "right thoughts in the 
wrong world are impossible."  He is probably right - but we try - and we attempt not 
to be terrified into surrender because these problems are difficult.

sorry this has gone on for so long,
i'm musing about the spiritual situation of our age and am looking for beacons of 
light in a world "run amuck"
ken




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