Date: Sat, 29 Mar 1997 19:20:13 -0600
From: Scott Johnson <sjohn-AT-cp.duluth.mn.us>
Subject: Re: HAB: Re: Habermas and Social Action


Ken wrote:

> The notion of a common idea of freedom relies on a metaphysical 
> conception of freedom that EVERYONE has.  Nice to know Hegel 
> figured it out for EVERYBODY EVERYWHERE at EVERYTIME.  Scott - 
> i'm deliberately being sarcastic here since i know we've done a bit of 
> this before - and i appreciated it then as i do now - so pardon the 
> sarcasm (its easter) - i just don't see how we could all possibily be 
> committed to a common idea of freedom.  Where does it come from? 
   
It is, believe it or not, HISTORICAL, TRADITIONAL. Liberalism, and all
it has spawned (including postmodernism), is a historical tradition
which needs to be--criticized! Your very own insistence on individuality
and particularity is traditional; this doesn't mean it is worthless, but
that it is not an unshakeable, ahistorical, "transcendental" ground from
which to criticize. In fact, I was arguing, Liberalism denies its own
character as traditional. Justice, the ideal of liberalism, is itself a
substantive conception of the good life, but one that--I would argue--is
contradictory. You say:

> A consensus could only ever be reached by force or bargaining.  
> Please - show me consensus.  Put it in my hand.  Please.  Just one 
> example.

This is my example. Liberalism and offshoots, its associated commitments
to the individual and his "irrational", "incommensurable" valuations.
You are wrong that consensus can only be "reached by force or
bargaining," because in fact it can be a traditional ground as well.
This ground must criticize ITSELF, because there is no point outside
>from which to criticize. How would this work? When individuality and
particularity--the good life, seen as individual and subjective--instead
of being protected by the separation of the good life from morality, are
trodden by the "objective" criteria which replace them as guidelines for
collective action. The collective life commited to individuality and
particularity would in fact produce a world that is the opposite of its
intentions. When this happens, what is the proper course? To push the
same conceptions further yet ("Universalism leaves out particularity!"),
or to reflect on them and see where they are limited ("Gosh, I guess
there IS something we all share. Our commitment to morality and justice
is the other side of the same coin which is on its other face our
rejection of universalism and "justice" because of its indifference to
particularity, individuality, and ones identity as an orientation to the
good life. There IS no radical separation of good life and morality.)
   But then you yourself said this, didn't you?

> both need to be 
> democratized - issues of the good and the just are entwined - and our 
> social debates reflect this.  our identity is caught up with who we are 
> and what we see to be good.

But in this case what would justification have to be like to be
acceptable to someone who has reached this point of reflection? That is
the real problem, one which I don't pretend to have solved. My belief is
that here an encounter between Hegel and Habermas would be very
fruitful. You wrote:

> The notion of a common idea of freedom relies on a metaphysical 
> conception of freedom that EVERYONE has.  Nice to know Hegel 
> figured it out for EVERYBODY EVERYWHERE at EVERYTIME.

What I mean by "common idea of freedom" is just what we both mean by
"orientation to the good life". Yes, these are criticizable, and have in
fact been criticized--to the point where there is dispair at a morality
which has any content in this respect. Hegel meant to put the two
(morality and the good life) back together, and part of his claim is
that he has in fact discovered something about freedom that is true for
"EVERYBODY EVERYWHERE at EVERYTIME." (You will probably balk at this.
But you called yourself a proceduralist in your last post; is it out of
order to ask what is valid for your procedure for "EVERYBODY EVERYWHERE
at EVERYTIME?") Hegel is saying that freedom is the realization of a
"metaphysical conception of freedom"/"vision of the good life" WHATEVER
ITS CONTENT. The attempted realization of these will, he says, result in
reversals, in the realization of the opposite of what was intended, due
to the reflective inadequacies of those conceptions. Thus the
justification of the CONTENT of morality (the conception of the "good
life" which it presupposes and is oriented to) happens IN HISTORY. Once
we know what Hegel says he has discovered about freedom, we can see
those reversals--for the first time--FOR WHAT THEY ARE.
   I'd better stop here. This is all rather off-the-cuff, and I don't
want to go too far....

-- 
*****************************************************
* Scott Johnson        e-mail sjohn-AT-cp.duluth.mn.us * 
* 105 W. 1st St. #214      phone # (218) 722-1351   *
* Duluth, MN  55802                                 *
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"...How can Quine expect universal consent on anything 
in any language-using community that allows for the 
existence of philosophers?" --Victor Scheff



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