Date: Mon, 31 Mar 1997 09:09:54 -0600
From: Nythamar de Oliveira <nythamar-AT-cfh.ufsc.br>
Subject: Re: HAB: Re: Habermas and Social Action


Re latest remarks on PDM and the querelle --as classical and (po)mo as it can be

1. Besides Steve's and Norma's remarks on hum=univ I would add a rather
obvious (almost too obvious from a philosophical standpoint) statement,
human nature seems to either follow or be presupposed in every discussion of
the ethics-political philosophy relation, particularly the moral foundations
of a political conception --e.g. a theory of justice in Kant, Rawls and
Habermas. The modernist (unvollendetes) project is indeed a huge one --even
if undertaken as an explicitly non-aesthetic one (another reason why
aestheticisms, Nietzschean- and Foucauldian-like alike, have found little
room in universalist audiences!) and Habermas does succeed in coming up with
a comprehensive theory that accounts for the normative foundations of social
life without resorting to a metaphysical conception of human nature. In this
sense, the moral / political condition is well taken. But Foucault's (and
Nietzsche's and Heidegger's for that matter) antihumanism does not stem from
a denial of universalizability or reconciliation per se but from his
skepticism regarding its self-referential normativity, substantialist,
essentialist, foundationalist. In F, as in N, the suspicion inevitably leads
to the question of subjectivity and its complicated process or forms of
constitution. So the W to P is a rather polemical question (as we think of
Heidegger's misreading of N --and Habermas's misreading of both, to be sure,
Habermas's account of Heidegger is quite readable), to say the least.    
2. I think what is also at stake, beyond the obvious opposition between
cognitivist (universalists vs communitarians) and noncog (aestheticist,
emotivist, skepticism) and a fortiori even more obvious mod vs po-mo
querelle ("dialogue de sourds", si vous voulez), is the conception of
rationality, and in part. "public reason". Rawls replied to Habermas that
his conception of public reason differed from H's comprehensive view of
(communicative) reason and his conception of "public sphere". How would we
relate the latter to a public political culture? To what extent shall we
draw the limits of public reason, right before the "rational"? (One wonders
here how R succeeds in maintaining the rational/reasonable distinction w/out
falling back into the very dualism he seeks to avoid--Kant's moral
constructivism, which R believes lies also in H's communicative ideal (the
problem is in H's procedure, as opposed to the original position). Well,
this problem of procedural representation, in epistemic terms, was precisely
what Foucault meant by the rapprochement between Kant's dualist conception
of a human nature (homo noumenon and homo phaenomenon) and modern humanism
(in contrast, say, to Quattrocento, classical, Cartesian) in his archaelogy
of the human sciences --and, overall, in his "genealogy of modernity" But
that would lead us too far astray...
PS: jesus, what did you (Steve) mean by "foucault as hitler?"?
Saludos a todos!

Prof. Nythamar Fernandes de Oliveira
Departamento de Filosofia
Centro de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
Brasil - www.cfh.ufsc.br/filosofia/
Fax: 5548 231-9751
Email: nythamar-AT-cfh.ufsc.br

 At 10:24 AM 3/25/97 -0600, you wrote:
>On Tue, 25 Mar 1997, Norma Romm wrote [among other things]:
>> 
>> Can you not be a humanist without being a universalist? Here again, the
>> meaning of the terms can be regarded as symbols that invite further
>> discussion.
>> 
>> I think perhaps it is too stereotypical to say that postmodernists are
>> oriented (only) to the will to power. I think many of them recognise that
>> communication can be threatened by power play  and that it would be better
>> to set up different kinds of communication (that are less prone to exclude
>> the styles of certain players). Their view of communication as conversation
>> might differ from Habermas's view. I think it does no harm to try and
>> engage seriously with their alternative view of "communication".
>
>If Rob's comments are "stereotypical", this is because of the
>position post-modernists inevitably find themselves in.  I don't
>think his comments refer to post-modernists' fundamental intentions
>(Foucault as Hitler?) but rather to the implications of their
>position.
>
>I am happy to engage seriously alternative views of communication as
>long as they recognize that at the end of the day, we have to have a
>way of coordinating action.  If we don't, then the actions actually
>taken can only be force of one form or another (deceit, cooptation,
>etc. all being included:  anything not arising out of free consent). 
>That's what makes it necessary for a humanist to be a universalist
>(committed not the universality of one's own opinion, of course, but
>rather to the need to recognize and reconcile all positions). Again,
>this doesn't refer to people's humanist intentions but rather to the
>implications of their position. 
>
>Hi to all,
>
>Steve
>
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