Date: 	Mon, 14 Apr 1997 21:04:40 -0400
From: "kenneth.mackendrick" <kenneth.mackendrick-AT-utoronto.ca>
Subject: Re: HAB: Re: Derida, Habermas, and the Other



>I'm very interested to see if it is possible to argue against this
without falling into a performative contradiction.

If one argues that language cannot be used in a manner in which it can be 
translated transparently then Habermas's reading of languages' idealizations go 
out the window.  Idealizations of language don't come into play if language does 
not entertain the possibility of mutual understanding - since the logic of language 
itself as Habermas interprets it would be negated.  In other words - if language is 
not translatable then the notion of idealization is reified.  Habermas's arguments 
about systematically distorted communication hark on this point.  Languages are 
untranslatable if they are deformed.  Habermas then must presuppose that in the 
genesis of language - there exists a logic of communication which is undistorted - 
otherwise all language games end up in an incoherent play of gibberish (from a 
reading of language oriented toward consensus and understanding).  I am 
interested in contesting this origin of language as pure transparency, ripe with its 
own logic - without disengaging communicative ethics, the critique of ideology, or 
the possibility of understanding.  Maybe language is relational not representational 
- perhaps it is both - a mixture of truth and solidarity.  Maye i'm not reading all of 
this right....


>>Theorists like Derrida argue that language is too laden with
>meaning to derive any one specific meaning for everyone.  For
>Derrida - language is charged with history, identity,  etc.  These
>issues make language fundamentally unstable - a person will find
>a meaning - but the meaning and understanding of a word, or
>language, will be different from the interpretation of others.

>Without commenting on whether or not Derrida in fact makes this
claims, I have to say that if there weren't relatively stable
interpretations of certain signs, there would be no such thing as
language. (Indeed, this is what Rorty takes Davidson to be saying in
'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs'.)

I was refering to derrida's idea of trace and the reply here expands on this notion of 
trace with derrida's idea of iterability.  Language must be repeatable but this 
doesn't imply understanding or sameness.

>This is like an ontology of difference.  If we take difference
>seriously, for Derrida, this means that mutual understanding - total
>self-transparency - is not possible.

>How do you go from "mutual understanding" to "self-transparency"?
Habermas, for one, does not see there a necessary connection. And
do you have a reference to where Derrida claims or implies that
mutual understanding is not possible? (Sure, if by "mutual
understanding" one understands pure presence to one
another, I can find a quote myself in _Of Grammatology?_, but I
don't think Habermas is saying that or in any way advocating that as
an ideal.)

If language is transparent - it is understood.  Transparency and mutual 
understanding go hand in hand.  Understanding is not possible without knowing 
what language is and what it means.  Understanding is knowledge about something 
and what that thing means to us.  Since language is intersubjective its' 
transparency is its' understanding.  Gadamer links these two things but doesn't 
use such terms.  i'm not reading derrida here - i'm trying to anticipate a derridean 
critique of habermas.

>So Habermas's theory of communicative
>actions ends up being mostly nonsense in Derrida's eyes.

>>Do you have a quote on that? Only references I have seen in Derrida
to Habermas have been self-defense after PDM.

No, sorry, i'm not sure derrrida addresses habermas much  - but the implications of 
deconstruction clearly points to the idea that language cannot be understood 
wholly - i should have said derridean eyes.   this is why he elaborates the notion of 
trace.  language is not translatable completely and in this way the understanding 
we have of a text must be understood in a different light.  i can't expand much on 
this because my readings of derrida are limited (inc?).  i would appreciate any 
derridean insights on this matter though.

[snip]

>>Language, in the understanding of deconstuction, is always
>metaphysical.

>What do you mean by "metaphysical" here? (See, I'm being
sensitive to possible differences in the way we use words - but in
the hope that we could reach a better understanding of each other
;))

Metaphysical in the sense language is used to connotate a truth claim that is 
uncontested by the term itself.  a road refers to a road which is assumed to exist 
metaphysically.  this is my understanding of the debate between 
representationalists (like habermas) and anti-representationalists (like rorty and 
derrida).

>> The task of deconstruction is to demonstrate the instability of such
> metaphysical frameworks - in order to illuminate the wholly Other.

>The "wholly other"-business is a bit of a problem in Derrida. Reading
with 'Violence and Metaphysics', one could take him to be saying
(against Levinas) that something wholly other could not be spoken
about, could not appear at all, could not be "illuminated". But then,
25 years later, the final chapter of _Gift of Death_ is 'Tout autre est
tout autre', "every other is wholly other'...

sorry - i really don't know.  the wholly other is a bit of a mystery to me.  sounds like 
theology or phenomenology - both of which i find fairly... ummm...  hard to swallow.

thanks for the clarifications and reponses and questions,
hope more is to follow,
ken




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