Date: Thu, 23 Oct 1997 23:14:07 -0800
From: Gary <gedavis-AT-pacbell.net>
Subject: HAB: Re: Morals and the Good Life


Michael S. suggests (10/23) Habermas' “Does Hegel’s critique of Kant
apply to discourse ethics” as a useful way of carrying forward a good
life vs. moral universalism line of questioning, which Ken reiterates
from the communitarian-universalism conflict that he mentioned in early
October, a conflict I took for granted when I began discussing
“Employments” a while ago (as that conflict was recalled by others in
responses to my questions in "HAB: Ethical life, moral interaction,"
late September). 

Habermas’ essay-- “Morality and ethical life: Does Hegel’s...,” in
_MCCA_ is an excellent resource. Not only throughout does the essay
address the context of what would, several years after its composition
(1982 or so), become the communitarian-universalism debate overtly (in
terms of special issues of a journal-or-two and an anthology-or -two),
but moreover, in the essay’s final two sections, it directly addresses
Ken’s humanitarian concerns.  

But I find no indication in Habermas’ essay of what Michael calls
Habermas’ “pretty depressing failure to offer a convincing reply to the
[Hegelian] critique.”  Indeed, it’s a very clearly written essay,
inasmuch as it does exactly what it sets out to do: affirms the Hegelian
critique of Kant, while distinguishing from Kant the discourse ethics
that Marxist Hegelians (among others) find to be basically Kantian.
Habermas makes this distinction between Kant and discourse ethics in
manifold ways (which I won't reiterate presently).  Not only was there
no “empty formalism” in Kant (contrary to Hegel’s presumptions), but the
untenable presumptions that *do* belong to Kant (in keeping with Hegel's
critique) are not constitutive aspects of discourse ethics. 

I could agree with Michael, though, that no one wants “‘practical
impotence’” (to quote Michael quoting whomever), and “illicit smuggling”
is most definitely a bad thing.  But Habermas’ essay has a very subtle
rendering of the relationship between “context-specific values” and an
impartiality that makes no claim to being “neutral” in any simple sense.

Michael writes: “If Habermas could give us a few instances in the field
of law where the Hegelian critique is demonstrably wrong, then I would
delighted to hear them.”

But why should Habermas? He claims that the Hegelian critique of Kant is
largely correct!  But anti-Kantist readings of Habermas are demonstrably
wrong (Habermas is a Kantian; Kant is wrong; therefore, Habermas is
wrong), because Habermas' inspiration and influence by Kant's *project*
is of the order of science's inspiration and influence by its history. 

And an instance from law where Habermas' post-Kantian character is
demonstrated is his dependence on *the* dependence of argument on
*intersubjective* standards of evidence, intersubjective standards of
relevance, intersubjective standards of meaning, and intersubjective
notions of justice.

However, Habermas does show where the Hegelian *reading* of reality is
wrong. Habermas shows this in _Knowledge and Human Interests_, to say
the least. Habermas’ reliance on a notion of critique that is informed
by cognitivist and clinical dynamics of emancipatory reflection is much
beyond a Hegelian conception of so-called “dialectic”.

So, I guess, I’m unable to be delightful for Michael, but I believe I’m
being demonstrable, which is basic to law.

Gary


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