File spoon-archives/habermas.archive/habermas_1998/habermas.9802, message 23


Date: 	Thu, 26 Feb 1998 14:05:53 -0500
Subject: Re: HAB: Imagining deconstruction



On Thu, 26 Feb 1998 03:01:15 -0500  gedavis-AT-pacbell.net 
wrote:

> Structure, agency---system, lifeworld--metaphoricity, 
recursion--image, form--symbol, pattern, and invisible means 
that perpetuate blinders over reflection.... A sequence of 
postings this weeek that seem to move toward inwardness--or 
is it a =93spirit=94-calling toward deepened reflexivity?

> Whatever.  But quite obviously, a discussion here could go
> anywhere--anywhere, that is, that words can refer one.
> 
> But there=92s some non sequitors in the sequence of 
postings--some willful (maybe) misreadings of the previous 
post that foster the sense of topicalness of whatever the 
poster wants to say. Brian misreads me, in order to seque into 
some very interesting points. Steve overreads Brian, perhaps, 
in order to seque into some very, VERY interesting points. And
Antti!

Gary - you seem to be assuming here that there is a *natural* 
flow to an argument.  That a certain logic is "appropriate" for a 
debate.  Where does this logic come from?  Oddly enough 
there are two things at work here (at least): 1. you 
likely couldn't have anticipated this kind of response to your 
post and 2. this is part of a wider disagreement about 
Habermas.  Habermas does presuppose a logic within an 
argument - as if this *natural* logic is *natural.*  The problem I 
have with this is best articulated by Marcuse in 1 D Man - that 
when a ruthless analysis of definitions, logic, and 
language-use takes place the contexts and content is 
eliminated.  It is a mathmatical approach to language which 
strips it of its transitory and creative (emphatic) dynamic.  The 
accusation that someone is misreading something 
presupposes a *correct* (ie. objective, atemporal, acontextual) 
reading.  I'm not saying that logic is nonsense or any such 
thing - rather that the accusation of misreading represents 
specific, and often hidden, interest(s).  In order to have a 
debate about something that something must be defined.  This 
includes Habermas's comments about validity claims.  His 
entire defence of the procedure for the legitimation of validity 
claims is based on this logical mistake.  The discursive 
procedure cannot be vindicated itself because it must 
assume, a priori, that the object has been defined (in this 
case the pragmatic presuppositions of speech) - without 
recourse to this kind of procedurism because the procedure 
itself requires the object through which the procedure is 
structured to be defined.  It is a circular argument.  This is 
precisely why Habermas NEEDS to appeal to the 
reconstructive sciences which, in this sense, must stand 
OUTSIDE the discursive procedure - because they are 
required to provide an objective AUTHORITY in order to make 
good on his analysis of speech acts.  However this authority 
cannot be questioned, in Habermas, without obeying the rules 
that it says that it verifies.  You are damned if you do and 
damned if you don't.  But the context of the entire debate is an 
illusionary one based upon problematic and logically 
incoherent premises.

Benhabib's critique of this basically reveals the problem.  And 
she substitutes conversation for argumentation.  At least 
Benhabib admits that her theory of conversation is a version 
of the good life (one that trumps other visions of the good life) 
- Habermas does not admit that proceduralism is a vision of 
the good life (as Heller, correctly I think, charges).

> Ideally, though, one might wish for another to write in 
*accurate* response to oneself. And nothing prevents a 
person from asking for this--or pointing out a sense of having 
been misread, if that is perceived.

This presupposes an objective and *natural* state of affairs in 
language use and intention - something which can only be 
maintained and defended with recourse to a metaphysical 
level.  The precision required for such would, literally, alienate 
and estrange those involved in such a argument by making 
their comments particularly foreign.  Something, that in your 
response, you actually develop.  Since the object of the 
argument wasn't *totally* determined it does not seem to me 
that the range of comments are inappropriate or vexing at all.

> As interesting as the inarticulated force of images, is the 
impressive richness of language that can be brought to bear 
upon the image--or in framing the image. The power of the 
word vis-a-vis the image is a beautiful thing.

I agree - but while language can represent the effect of an 
image it cannot represent at all, the affect - which is precisely 
that which contributes to the formulation of language by way of 
the non-identical within language.

ken




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