Date: Tue, 3 Mar 1998 05:21:11 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Re: HAB: The ethic of discussion and the problem of time


On Mon, 2 Mar 1998, Kenneth MacKendrick wrote (in reply to Reginald
CHEVILLON):

> Habermas does argue this [that there's a primitive or instinctive
> knowledge of justice, etc.] in his anthropological work.  See
> Communicative Action and the Evolution of Society or see pg. 199
> of MCCA - "In anthropological terms, morality is a safety device
> compensating for a vulnerability built into the sociocultural form
> of life...."  I think it could be argued that Habermas's model
> DEPENDS on a specific understanding or interpretation of what it
> means to be human.  His work on reason and morality stands (and/or
> falls) squarely on the shoulders of this anthropological reading. 
> For Habermas human beings are essentially rational and essentially
> moral... with all of the problems that tag along with essentialist
> readings.... 

I think this does not take heed of H's specific, direct argument (in
MCCA) for discourse ethics:  the argument based on performativecontradiction.  That argument has no essentialist features;  or
rather, one has to demonstrate that H's one of the presuppositions
of speech itself is essentialist.  H's anthropological speculations,
however essentialist they are, don't seem to me to falsify his
claims about the presuppositions of speech. 

Best,

Steve



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