Date: Mon, 02 Mar 1998 00:50:59 -0800 Subject: HAB: Re: Understanding Matthew: It would be useful to find that "somewhere in TCA" where Habermas allegedly "muck[s] up Austin," for you will find that the difference between illocutionary and perlocutionary isn't like a difference between causing understanding and causing states of affairs. Rather, it has to do with bringing about a relationship (illocutionary) and bringing about an understanding through that relationship (perlocutionary). You can't make yourself understood unless you create a communicative relationship (rather than vice versa, as you indicated). Accordingly, it's a mistake to conceive understanding as such as a means to any other end, though obviously specific understandings can have instrumental functions in actions that aren't basically geared to understanding. But in the latter case, such actions presume a domain of understanding that is itself no means to anything else except, perhaps, larger scale understanding. It is finally the lifeworld itself which is fundamentally constituted of understandings. Indeed, "understanding is indispensable to our being able to use language," but, more fundamentally, language is indispensable to our being able to have understanding (since there is more to understanding--and cognition--than merely linguistic representation). 'Language' is commonly a placeholder for "intelligence," and there is clearly more to cognition or intelligence than linguistic intelligence (and Habermas would agree, pointing out that this is irrelevant to a theory of *communicative* action, properly so, perhaps). The axiality of linguistic understanding is a function of the axiality of coordinated action among persons. We are *communicative* beings; hence, the fundamentality of language. But the instrumentality of language doesn't imply a fundamental instrumentality of understanding, except (again) within larger horizons of understanding or the lifeworld itself. I concur with much of your response to Ken, though, especially regarding his cynicism toward understanding others. But I believe there is more difficulty to everyday understanding than you suggest, hence more reason to understand hermeneutical points of view than seems to be the case for you. Not only is misunderstanding a great commonality of daily life, but making oneself understood in the first place is as formidible, if not more so. This list is testament to how difficult it can be for a philosopher (Habermas) to be understood (and your comments about his views attest this further, while your own expressed views are quite interesting in themselves). Anyway, I share your enthusiasm or optimism about interaction (while finding Ken's attitude a bit heartrending). Do be careful, though, of your apparent propensity to transpose notions of relationship and understanding into strategical and instrumental terms. Best regards, Gary --- from list habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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