File spoon-archives/habermas.archive/habermas_1998/habermas.9803, message 2


Date: Mon, 02 Mar 1998 00:50:59 -0800
Subject: HAB: Re: Understanding


Matthew:

It would be useful to find that "somewhere in TCA" where Habermas
allegedly "muck[s] up Austin," for you will find that the difference
between illocutionary and perlocutionary isn't like a difference between
causing understanding and causing states of affairs. Rather, it has to
do with bringing about a relationship (illocutionary) and bringing about
an understanding through that relationship (perlocutionary). You can't
make yourself understood unless you create a communicative relationship
(rather than vice versa, as you indicated). Accordingly, it's a mistake
to conceive understanding as such as a means to any other end, though
obviously specific understandings can have instrumental functions in
actions that aren't basically geared to understanding. But in the latter
case, such actions presume a domain of understanding that is itself no
means to anything else except, perhaps, larger scale understanding. It
is finally the lifeworld itself which is fundamentally constituted of
understandings.

Indeed, "understanding is indispensable to our being able to use
language," but, more fundamentally, language is indispensable to our
being able to have understanding (since there is more to
understanding--and cognition--than merely linguistic representation).
'Language' is commonly a placeholder for "intelligence," and there is
clearly more to cognition or intelligence than linguistic intelligence
(and Habermas would agree, pointing out that this is irrelevant to a
theory of *communicative* action, properly so, perhaps). The axiality of
linguistic understanding is a function of the axiality of coordinated
action among persons. We are *communicative* beings; hence, the
fundamentality of language. But the instrumentality of language doesn't
imply a fundamental instrumentality of understanding, except (again)
within larger horizons of understanding or the lifeworld itself.

I concur with much of your response to Ken, though, especially regarding
his cynicism toward understanding others.

But I believe there is more difficulty to everyday understanding than
you suggest, hence more reason to understand hermeneutical points of
view than seems to be the case for you. Not only is misunderstanding a
great commonality of daily life, but making oneself understood in the
first place is as formidible, if not more so.  This list is testament to
how difficult it can be for a philosopher (Habermas) to be understood
(and your comments about his views attest this further, while your own
expressed views are quite interesting in themselves).

Anyway, I share your enthusiasm or optimism about interaction (while
finding Ken's attitude a bit heartrending).

Do be careful, though, of your apparent propensity to transpose notions
of relationship and understanding into strategical and instrumental
terms.

Best regards,

Gary



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