Subject: Re: HAB: The ethic of discussion and the problem of time
Date: Wed, 04 Mar 1998 17:26:44 PST


Sorry, people, I've been unable to follow all the postings, but I would 
very much appreciate hearing Ken's elaboration of the below.

Also, it's great that Ken has elsewhere pointed out Habermas's 
preoccupations in "Communicative versus Subject-Centered Reason" with 
the embodied character of communication; this is an important point, and 
I had been re-reading the same article recently; the question seems to 
be whether Habermas has ever dealt with these confessions.  (I am also 
very fond of the feminists, who informed much of my earlier post.)  

It seems evasive to move from the content of speech to the performative 
contradiction, because the latter does not take into account the problem 
at hand--namely, the question of what EMPIRICAL "purpose" or MOTIVATION 
does any instance of communication serve?  If we say that it merely 
serves the "need" for communication, that avoids the question while 
suggesting that we really don't ever need strategic-instrumental action 
(or anything other than communication itself) after all--which is not 
very easy to "stomach"--or to take to bed, for that matter. . . .

I can hear friends in Eastern Europe saying, when are we going to get 
around to talking about what we REALLY NEED?  (Of course, they will be 
saying this to me at the local Irish pub ;-)

Well, as far as Habermas in TCA, vol. 2, is concerned, it appears that 
this has been ruled out from the start.  Why?  Because it's "empirically 
motivated".

Thanks,

Erik Davis
Masters Candidate, Economics
CSU, Hayward
daviserik-AT-hotmail.com


>On Tue, 3 Mar 1998 08:21:11 -0500  Stephen Chilton wrote:
>
>> I think this does not take heed of H's specific, direct 
>argument (in MCCA) for discourse ethics:  the argument based 
>on performativecontradiction.
>
>I think Habermas's idea of the performative contradiction is a 
>logical fallacy (begging the question).  It has no credibility.
>
>>  That argument has no essentialist features;  or
>> rather, one has to demonstrate that H's one of the 
>presuppositions of speech itself is essentialist.  H's 
>anthropological speculations, however essentialist they are, 
>don't seem to me to falsify his claims about the 
>presuppositions of speech. 
>
>But Habermas's anthropology is prescriptive and his analysis 
>is not objective rather it is evaluative (following Horkheimer 
>and Adorno I think it is possible to demonstrate that 
>impartiality is a specific kind of partiality).  So his judgements 
>about what it is to be human are based on what he thinks 
>human beings should be - in contradiction to what human 
>beings might actually be OR what human beings might want to 
>be.  What if I don't want to be a vulcan?  Agnes Heller has 
>done one of the best jobs looking at this.  I'll pull out the 
>critique of both the perform contra and Hab's anthropology if 
>you or Dag what to pursue the issue further.
>
>cheers,
>ken
>
>
>
>
>     --- from list habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
>

______________________________________________________
Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com


     --- from list habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---