Date: Thu, 05 Mar 1998 10:32:39 +0800
Subject: HAB: Re: intersubjective constitution of identity and communicative


At 18:01 4/03/1998 -0600, C.Wright wrote:
>
>	Though Habermas does not address the issue explicitly...it seems that he
would 
>have to derive his idea of what these capacities ought to be from his
model of >communicative action, from his concept of action oriented toward
reaching >understanding...while there does indeed seem to be an implicit
philosophical 
>anthropology...its source would seem to be found not in his conception of
the 
>intersubjective constitution of identity, but in his conception of
communicative action. More specifically, the basis for this philosophical
anthropology would seem to 
>be his claim that action oriented toward reaching understanding is the
most fundamental 
>mode of language use, that it is a necessary condition for the possibility
of human 
>society, and that strategic action is parasitic upon (or a derivative of)
it.  That 
>claim, of course, is another argument altogether.
>

Charles:
	At the expense of interjecting a side-issue into your discussion with Ken
concerning the nature of Habermas's impartialism, I'd like to find out the
reasons you have for introducing the distinction you do between the
"intersubjective constitution of identity" and "communicative interaction." 

	I know that you're attempting to give an account of a basis for a
philosophical anthropology (it's interesting that you say that Habermas
sometimes tends in this direction, as I thought he had fairly definitively
abandoned this kind of approach after KHI), and that you think that such a
basis can be found in communicative action. What I don't understand,
however, is why you want to differentiate an intersubjective construction
of a sense of self from communicative action in the way you do. 

	The way I understand things is that communicative action, at an everyday
peformative level, presupposes certain basic moves in order to take place,
even if these operate in a taken-for-granted fashion. The most essential of
these moves is the adoption of a communicative attitude towards others.
This involves a kind of bracketing operation, a virtualization of sorts, of
one's own interests in order to be able to comprehend what the other person
is attempting to say on their own terms. 

	I'd want to argue that this "communicative move" is the basis for
intersubjectivity as such; that what is involved in this moment of
intersubjective recognition is a recognition of the other as Other to
oneself; and that it is on this basis that the moment of negativity
necessary for the develop of a sense of self is introduced into the
consciousness of the individual in question. Individuals develop a sense of
self only through coming to terms with the fact that there is a difference
between themselves and others. (Hegel; also Honneth "Autonomy after the
fall of the subject") This is a different way of giving an account for the
same thing that Habermas explains by means of his treatment of Mead's
theory of the Generalized Other.

	Consequently, while communicative action and the intersubjective
construction of identity may not be identical, I see them as so mutually
implicative that it doesn't make sense to me to differentiate them the way
that I think you have, since, for me, the adoption of a communicative
attitude is the fundamental prerequisite for the development of a sense of
self. It would seem to me as well that a philosophical anthropology could
be developed on this basis as long as one were willing to accept the
assumption that human beings have a need for a sense of self; that they
have identity needs that can be satisfied in more, and less, productive
ways. That might be a rather large assumption, but it's one that seems
plausible to me on the basis of how people act in everyday life. Moreover,
if this need for an identity were to be accepted, then it would seem to me
that there'd be room for the development of an account of morality on this
basis too.

	What I don't understand about your position, then, is why you want to
differentiate the intersubjective construction of identity from
communicative action, and exclude the former as a basis for developing a
philosophical anthropology.

Regards,


____________________________________________
Bryce Weber, Ph.D.
Lecturer
Department of Political Science
University of Western Australia
Nedlands, W.A.          6907
Tel.: 08 9380-3835   Fax.: 08 9380-1060 (N.B.change of area code)
email: bweber-AT-cyllene.uwa.edu.au


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