Subject: HAB: RE: Re: intersubjective constitution of identity and communicativ
Date: Thu, 5 Mar 1998 12:25:17 -0600


Bryce -

Thanks very much for your post & for making me think more carefully about what I
think I want to say.  On the one hand I agree entirely that communicative action
and the intersubjective constitution of identity are mutually implicative, as
you so nicely put it.  By implying that they might not have this relation, it is
clear that I did not choose my words (or organize my thoughts) as carefully as
would be desired.  At the same time, I think that the distinction can be
maintained and in the following way.  While it is true that adopting a
communicative attitude is the "fundamental prerequisite" for the development of
a sense of self, I think that it is also pretty much accepted that humans are
born with neither the ability to engage in communicative action (in Habermas's
sense) nor with a sense of self - at least, not with the sense of self necessary
for being a social or moral agent.  Of course, infants are not blank slates, or
autistic creatures a la Freud.  The social abilities of neonates have been well
documented.  But before they can engage in communicative action in Habermas's
sense (engaging in reciprocal role taking, using propositionally differentiated
speech, etc.) certain processes of cognitive and emotional development must
first take place.  The context in which this development should take place (but
does not always) is communicative.  And while it is only through engaging in
communicative relations that these developmental processes take place, these
processes must first be undergone before an individual becomes the self (agent
capable of speech and action) that engages (fully) in action oriented toward
reaching understanding.  

Maybe what would help is to distinguish between communicative action 'strictly
speaking' (action oriented toward reaching understanding, what Habermas is
mostly concerned with) and the kind of communicative interaction that takes
place between an infant or small child and its reference persons (interaction
that is marked by important asymmetries in power and competence, and which
cannot be constituted through propositionally differentiated speech).  Even
though the reference persons are (or ought to be) actors capable of speech and
action, the infant or small child is not (yet).  So the interaction taking place
between them contains important asymmetries and limits that cannot be true of
communicative action (strictly speaking).

So what I imagine is that the process of identity formation that the young one
is undergoing is not taking place through communicative action (strictly
speaking), since the young one is not yet capable of it.  But it is nonetheless
a thoroughly intersubjective and communicative process, and one that is firmly
rooted in communicative action (strictly speaking) because (presumably) the
child's reference persons are able to be responsible caretakers precisely (or at
least in part because) of their ability to engage in communicative action
(strictly speaking).

When you write that "the adoption of a communicative attitude is the fundamental
prerequisite for the development of a sense of self", I cannot but agree.  But I
think we must be more specific about what is meant by a "communicative
attitude".  It is certainly true that some kind of a communicative attitude is
necessary for any infant and child development to take place - some kind of
readiness to engage in communicative interaction (limited in certain ways).
Maybe we could even call it a readiness to adopt the performative orientation
(I'm not sure).  Again, such an orientation will indeed be a fundamental
prerequisite for the development of a sense of self (for any development at all,
other than physical maturation).  But that orientation is not the same thing as
communicative action (strictly speaking).  

Communicative action (strictly speaking) would indeed seem to be a fundamental
prerequisite for the development of a personal identity - but as a feature of
the environment into which the infant is born.  The infant's or child's
reference persons must themselves possess the capacity for communicative action
(strictly speaking) if the young one is to be able to develop them him- or
herself.  

So by the intersubjective constitution of identity, I mean the developmental
process that takes place when an infant or child engages (over time) in
asymmetrical relations of reciprocity and communicative interaction (limited in
certain ways) with primary (and later secondary) reference persons who are
agents capable of speech and action.  This process ought to terminate once the
developing individual reaches a certain stage of maturity (becomes an actor
capable of speech and action).  Once a person has reached the necessary level of
cognitive and emotional development, of course, then it does indeed make sense
to talk about communicative action (strictly speaking) as being coterminous with
the maintenance of an individual identity.        

	Does that make sense to you?


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