Date: 	Thu, 5 Mar 1998 19:08:07 -0500
Subject: HAB: On the Legality of (U)



This is in response to Charles:

Habermas writes:

Thus every valid norm has to fulfill the following condition: 

(U) All affected can accept the consequences and the side 
effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for 
the satisfaction of everyone's interests (MCCA, 65).

Habermas claims this is a universal moral principle.

However (U) can only be a moral principle if the criteria for 
moral principles are predetermined in an a priori way.  (U) 
cannot be used to justify itself.  It is the equivalent of saying 
that (U) is a morally valid norm if (U) passes the test of (U).  
(U) cannot be justified with an appeal to itself.  (U) may very 
well be able to test the legitimacy of moral norms but it cannot 
test the validity of its own validity.  This is why (U) is a legal 
principle and not a moral principle.

So in and of itself (U) cannot confer morality or truth or 
rationality to specific claims.  (U) simply does not possess the 
substance to determine or exhaust the appropriate criteria for 
rationality, truth, or morality - it can only confer widespread 
legitimacy for such claims.  The criteria for truth is not limited 
or exhausted by consensus.  In the same way the citeria for 
rightness is not limited or exhausted by consensus.  Likewise 
the criteria for rationality is not limited or exhausted by 
consensus.

See Wellmer, The Persistence of Modenity, 145-159 or 
Benhabib or Heller.  All three of them make this point, in 
different ways.

ken




     --- from list habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---