Date: 	Fri, 6 Mar 1998 11:33:49 -0500
Subject: Re: HAB: Critique of Moral Universalism


On Thu, 5 Mar 1998 05:58:31 -0500  Antti Kauppinen wrote:

> >As Benhabib notes the idea of impartiality relies upon a 
> >"generalized other" - a public persona (and, in fact, a 
> >monological retreat to the philosophy of the subject).

> (That'll be the same Benhabib who draws heat from other 
feminists for her defense of impartiality and universality, and 
who derives the core of her theory directly from Habermas.)

Same one.

> >Since an actual consensus regarding a specific issue could 
only determine its impartiality in retrospect (as Wellmer
> >carefully notes) - Habermas MUST posit the distinction 
 
> (What distinction???)

See my post of (U) for details regarding the contradiction.

> >So any resulting consensus will have taken place within a 
concrete community...

> Which is what Habermas has always argued for.

Which makes the charge of relativism relatively successful.  It 
is only the intention to be universal that remains....  However 
if Heller and Benhabib and Wellmer are correct then (U) 
places substantial limitations on what counts as moral 
struggle and moral debate (esp. see J Bernstein, Recovering 
Ethical Life, on this).

> >which is an ethical community and therefore the results 
ARE ostensibly partial.  

> "Therefore"? That logic doesn't work. You're using 
"impartiality" in  an absolutist sense, which is not Habermas's 
use, nor the everyday use of the word.

I agree with Charles on this.  I misused the term in a "strong" 
sense - however the criticism still applies even in the "weak" 
sense of impartial.

>For example, a decision can be impartial between two 
people, if the reasons they present for their case are taken 
into consideration equally, without privileging the other 
somehow.

No.  Their decision is VERY partial.  Why would someone 
want to surrender their identity in a debate.  Agreement is 
agreement about something.  Agreement about something is 
partial since it is exclusive.  Exclusive in the sense that you 
can only agree about something if you disagree about others. 
 Without REAL plurality a debate can't take place.  Impartiality 
becomes partiality.  As soon as a different person joins the 
conversation then the whole thing has to be reassessed.  
Consensus shouldn't be confused with impartiality.  The 
criteria are different.

> >In this sense agreement cannot be seen to confer 
> >rationality OR morality to a specific issue (only legal 
validity). 

> Rationality in what sense? What *else* do you base 
rationality on than agreement?

The capacity to will freely?  Noncontradiction?

> As new arguments are developed and discoveries made, the 
best solution changes, but agreement under conditions as 
ideal as possible remains what confers rationality to it.

And where exactly are these conditions?

> There may also be certain constraints on this agreement, 
and Habermas has his own, ie. that agreement is not reached 
by means that lead to a performative contradiction.)

Perhaps it is only through performative contradictions that one 
can come to an agreement about something with someone....

> > The idea of consensus is a LEGAL principle - not
> >essentially a moral one.  

> Consensus is a legal principle *only from the point of view 
of a particular theory of morality* - for example, Habermasian. 

Right - the same applies to Habermas.  Habermas's discourse 
ethics is ONLY a particular moral theory representing 
particular moral VALUES.  This goes against what he is 
actualy trying to do.

> Under postmetaphysical conditions, the demand for 
consensus is the reverse side of the coin of respect for 
autonomy (on a monological theory, the preservation of 
autonomy would not necessarily require consent). This
is primarily a moral principle.

Wellmer demonstrates why (U) fails as a moral principle 
(successfully I think).  See my comments on (U) and the ref's 
there.

> No. The non-relativistic part of discourse ethics is the 
*procedure* of solving problems ethically. The solutions 
themselves will be relative to the particular community. It is of 
course possible that the procedure itself is relative to a 
particular community (at best), but the above argument is 
irrelevant in that respect.

How do you know that a procedure isn't a particular vision of 
the good life?  (without appealing to the performative 
contradiction).  My critique of (U) and the perform cont. 
demonstrate this.

> >Habermas also  argues that the idea of the performative 
> >contradiction MIRRORS progressive cognitive 
development.  

> (Where?)

I'll get back to you next week regarding the rest - along with 
my continued response to Charles regarding the individual 
and morality (which will include comments about my mirror 
imagery).

ken





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