Date: 	Tue, 10 Mar 1998 14:26:32 -0500
Subject: Re: HAB: The Blind Baseball Player


On Mon, 9 Mar 1998 07:19:11 -0500  Antti Kauppinen wrote:

> At 21.40 9.3.1998 -0500, Ken wrote:
> >Ok - this is where I stand, everything else is just window 
> >dressing:

> >*** Every time Habermas accuses someone of committing 
a performative contradiction he commits a performative 
contradiction himself because his justification of the charge 
begs the question.  *** 

> And what is the status of *your* charge of performative 
contradiction?

Right - I still need to PROVE that the idea of a performative 
contradiction *could* be justified without begging the question. 
 For now I will point out that the reconstructive sciences hold 
the possibility, the possibility of performative contradiction, 
open.  More later after I read Horowitz article (which attempts 
to do exactly this).

> >> (K)  At SOME point the conclusion, God exists, MUST be 
> >used as a premise in order to say God produces real 
effects.

> ...yes, but only if...

> >(K) In order for God 
> >to produce effects God must exist.

> It's not that I'm disputing this claim, only the logical
> status you give to it. It is not *logic* that says so; rather,
> it follows from one definition of "existence".

ok.
 
> >(A) I don't know if we can get any further with this....
> >
> >(K's R) Because I'm right about this. 
> 
> Well, I was thinking more along the lines that I'm not
> competent to justify the basic axioms of logic, I can only
> use them...

ok.

> >Yeah yeah I haven't 
> >spelled it all out but the premise that "God produces real 
> >effects" *MUST* define what it means by God AND it 
*MUST* presuppose that God exists.  If I get hit by a baseball 
bat this *necessarily* means that baseball bats exist. 

> As a matter of fact, yes. As a logical necessity, no.

It seems that we are using to different ideas of logic here - 
formal and informal?

> >P1. God exists.  Baseball bats exist.
> >  2.  Therefore it is possible for God to hit me with a 
baseball bat.

> (With some unproblematic premises left out, to be exact.)

Of course - I didn't mean to violate the criterion of 
acceptability.

> >P3.  Being hit with a baseball bat hurts - it produces an 
effect.

> We're doing fine so far.

> >P4.  I was hit by a baseball bat by God.

> Jaysus, you're not doing so fine anymore!

> >  5.  By hitting me with a baseball bat God produced an 
effect.

> Confused your logic circuitry?

> >Therefore

> >C.  God exists.

> >P4 requires P1.

> a) Only with the hidden premise "God simply *must* exist in 
order to produce an effect".
> b) So? Inferential relationships between premises are not 
problematic as such. What you want to say is that C requires 
P1 because it requires P4.
> However, you don't say at all, and it can't easily be read off 
from the above, what  C requires in the first place. Indeed, in 
the above C follows only from P1 and the rest of the premises 
are completely irrelevant to the conclusion. On the other hand, 
if your hidden premise, say P0, was included, you could
> deduce C from P4 and P0, without the circular premise P1.

ok.  i suspect that skipping premises is unavoidable in a real 
conversation - something must be presupposed.  but yes, I 
see your point.

> Think of it this way: if the only things you know are the 
premises above and the rules of logic, you will be able to 
deduce the conclusion. You don't have to presuppose 
anything else; for example, you don't have to know the 
conclusion beforehand. Therefore, the inference is  not 
circular. (And I do think your charge againt Habermas relies
on the same fallacious logic.)

So it is completely logical to say that God exists because God 
produces real effects.  There is no contradiction here.

> Reasoning in the real world proceeds from an argument to 
another; the conclusion of one is used as a premise for 
another. There is no ultimate ground, not even a circle 
(although Hegel would like that); in the end everything hangs 
on practice.

Right - because the world is not static.

> >(K's R) Chess is a good example.  You need a rulebook to 
> >place chess.  You cannot deduce the rules of chess from 
> >playing chess... you must have a rulebook a priori. 
> 
> But you can deduce the rules of chess from watching and 
from asking the people who play. That's the difference 
between chess and language games: we are thrown into a 
world where the latter are always already being played (as is 
chess, come to think of it). We learn the rules as we grow; we 
learn to  differentiate between objective, subjective and social 
worlds in talk and in thought and so on.

But we do so only in reflection after the fact.  Rhetoric and 
validity are tied together and it is only after the fact that one 
can discern what is going on.  One cannot go into a situation 
with a priori assumptions about objectivity, subjectivity, and 
the social - since these distinctions would simply be too rigid 
to permit the possibility of understanding.  The combination of 
rhetoric and validity in the present prevents the charge of a 
performative contradiction from having much weight.
 
> >  But where did the rulebookcome from?  For Habermas it is 
a fact of reason, a development of nature.  

> The task of the philosopher is not to explain why we pray or
> promise or argue. She can help us understand ourselves 
better, and she can give us reasons to change.

^A^ task of the philosopher...

> >(K's R) Sure sure - but you slipped in the principle of 
> >noncontradiction as a moral guideline. 

> I could accept "a normative guideline", but not moral. All
> norms are not moral - for example logical and scientific 
ones.

And on what basis is this guideline justified?

> >But.... I don't see at all how this moves beyond a 
(Habermasian) ethic into the realm of the universal.  

> I don't think it should. I've tried to clarify the sense of
> universality in Habermas in an earlier posting called "Three
> Kinds of Universality". The above argument features two of 
those kinds and the I think Habermas should drop the demand 
for the third.

ok.  But what are the implications of dropping the third outside 
of ethics... (i'll reread your post, thanks). 

> >(K's R) But no contradictions.
 
> How typical - I defend Derrida in front of logicians and the 
> next thing I know I have to stand up for the principle of 
non-contradiction.

Hey - I think it is invaluable - as a matter of fact I have tried to 
be fairly consistent here myself (all sarcasm aside).

> >From the point of view of rationality and argumentation, it 
seems quite indispensable to me. If I let you hold 
contradictory positions on the same issue, I'm hardly holding 
you accountable at all. (Ie. if I can't criticize you for holding 
both that refugees should have the vote and that they 
shouldn't, what can I say?)

I would say that a certain degree of contradiction is a good 
thing.  I doubt the total assimilation of behaviour to 
noncontradiciton would be good - but certainly total 
contradiction isn't good either.  It is a fine line put it renews a 
focus upon the particular.

ken




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