File spoon-archives/habermas.archive/habermas_1998/habermas.9803, message 95


Subject: HAB: Re: Re: An Open Letter
Date: Sat, 28 Mar 1998 17:24:05 -0000


I'm one of those new to the list. So far, discussions have stroke me as
totally *academic,* i.e. what exactly is meant by Habermas by *performative
contradiction*? Do I think theoretical discussions of this sort are
important? Yes, I do. Do I think coming to terms with our respective
readings of Habermas' texts is important? Absolutely. Do I think anybody in
this list has *the* view of Habermas' himself? Absolutely NOT. Such thinking
would, in my opinion, deny the very spirit and letter of many of Habermas'
texts.

So what about this debate that's now going about about our *narcissistic,*
*grammatically challenged,* and *unreasonable* friend from the University of
Toronto in Ontario, Canada (also my country, btw)? Well, I do agree with
some comments that have been made about the *difficulty* of convincing Ken
with pure theoretical responses, precise quotations from the canon,
intelligent arguments, and so on. But that's just it! This debate
instantiates, better than anything else that has been said or argued in this
list so far (since I subscribed, anyway), the profound problems afflicting
any process of *reaching understanding* which is, I dare say, empirically
riddled with impossibilities. However embedded in language *reaching
undersanding* may be, as an empirical exercise in cultural and political
communication it is neither a given nor something to be taken for granted.

In the *real world* of cultural and political struggles -and what's going on
right now right here in this list is an example of it- no amount of precise
quotation and careful argumentation will necessarily do the job. Perhaps Ken
is correct in reminding us, those of us who do agree with many of Habermas'
key conjectures, that the way one *feels* about a given object, the way one
intimately relates to it, the way in which others react emotionally to our
engagements, the way communication is empirically such a messy undertaking,
is a fundamental dimension of all and every cultural and political struggle
that aims at even minimal forms of recognition. Thus, I wonder what has not
been recognized in Ken's *stubborn* positions? I also wonder what is not
being recognized in the *intimate* positions of Ken's critics by those
critics themselves?

I seem to recall -and this may be totally out of context- how in the course
of his complex narrative Habermas wants to point out for the benefit of us
his readers that one of the greatest insights of G.H. Mead was *taking the
attitude of the other.* True, the context in which Habermas brings this up
is not that of a listserv debating his own ideas in the academic-cyber
culture of the late 20th-century, but rather in some remote past when
*humanity* is supposed to have gone from one stage dominated by
gesture-mediated communication to another where symbols play a greater role
(TCA 2:9ff). Nonetheless, putting momentarily aside Habermas's own critical
notes on how many of Mead's ideas are still *tied to the subject-object
model* (10), how he only vaguely spoke about *the evolutionary point at
which symbolically mediated interaction appears* (22),  Habermas cannot but
recognize that Mead's basic insight, tied to his notions of the *social
constitution of the self,* is fundamental even at the *stage* where humanity
has finally learned the tools of *linguistically mediated and normatively
mediated interaction.*

In theory, Habermas presents us with the abstract problem of *how can an ego
bind alter by a speech act in such a way that alter's actions can be linked,
without conflict, to ego's so as to constitute a cooperative interrelation?*
(26). Habermas seems convinced, at this stage of his career anyway, that in
the *general* process of communication (forget cultural and political stuff
for now) people *raise claims to the validity of what is being uttered... in
the expectation that they can achieve a rationally motivated agreement and
can coordinate their plans and actions on this basis -without having to
influence the empirical motives of the others through force or the prospect
of reward...* (27). Habermas seems convinced that in our historical stage of
*moral development,* *the linguistic medium of reaching understanding gains
power to bind the will of responsible actors* (27). Yet, although this makes
some sense in the abstract world of theory, in the real world in which we
live, all processes of understanding occur only through the real mediation
of culture and politics (and a thousand other factors, of course) and here
another world of conformity is the norm, a world social discipline and order
seem to dominate, a world where *difference* and *otherness* are not
tolerated still (these views, btw, are also expressed by *impure
Habermasian* Axel Honneth). Here, Habermas' preliminary conclusion on TCA 2:
42 is no where to be found. What he calls *non-conforming actions* are every
bit as common in our world as *communicative self-presentation* (Please,
let's not get into a debate about the precision of this particular and
limited reading. It's the *spirit* that matters.)

So what's the point? Ken is behaving the way in which anybody, involved in
processes of communication mediated by culture and politics, would behave.
The lack of *understanding* that others think he displays does not
necessarily come (sorry for sounding like a clinical expert!) from his
*youthfulness* (although this is probably a factor) but from a profound and
perhaps totally justified need to be *non-conforming* in the face of
people's self-assured vision of the world which -let us recognize- is helped
quite a bit by the systematicity and wholeness we can certainly find in
Habermas' work. Ken finds many validity claims offered to him in this list,
directly or indirectly, simply *unbinding* -not just at the theoretical
level of discourse, but also at the level of language itself- for the simple
reason (among many others, I'm sure) that they appear to him as expression
of self-deception and false reassurance. This is perfectly reasonable. But
more than that, he exercises his capacity for *communicative
self-presentation* -which expresses his non-conformity viz-a-viz the
seemingly perfectly conformed world of his critics- through his conformity
with different standards of what is reasonable and so on.

The funny thing is, people are very irritated with Ken. Maybe that should be
the starting point of an *enlightened* discussion about self-criticism a la
Habermas.

Marco Fonseca
PhD Candidate
Graduate Programme in Social and Political Thought
York University, Toronto, Ontario
Canada

Visiting Part-time Lecturer (1996-1998)
Latin American Studies and Spanish
Middlesex University, London
UK



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