Date: Sat, 4 Apr 1998 18:46:12 -0500 Subject: Re: HAB: Fairness in language-centric understanding On Wed, 1 Apr 1998 00:54:40 -0500 Gary wrote: > It's also good to keep in mind that understanding precedes critique. If you don't understand what a writer is *intending* to do, your critique is likely a "straw man" critique. This is an interesting statement. To understand something one must *know* the intention of the speaker *know* the particular circumstance of the statement (Albrecht's Wellmer's essay, "What is a Pragmatic Theory of Meaning?" discusses this nicely in Phil Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment). To understand, one must know the conditions under which such a statement are valid. To understand a statement is to understand what the statement means. So understanding is both a comprehension of the validity (the reasons for) and a comprehension of meaning. Mutual understanding would be an agreement on both - the validity of a statement and the meaning of a statement. Which is to say that the statement must have an affective element. Mutual argeement, in this sense, must have an affective tug. The statement in question must speak to us - and, in the agreement, one must adopt such a statement as part of their narrative - in an autobiographical way. Oddly enough this presents a challenge to Habermas's articulation of the reconstructive sciences (as Jay Bernstein aruges in Chptr 3 of Recovering Ethical Life). For Habermas the reconstructive science, through self-reflection, demonstrate and bring to light intuititive know-how (see Reconstruction and Interpretation in the Social Sciences, MCCA). For Habermas the reconstructive sciences discover or illuminate knowledge about the dynamics of something (language, etc.). However to agree about something, for instance - to agree about the intuitive know-how of language use - is to incorporate it within a specific self-identity or personal story. In other words - the reconstructive sciences do not discover theoretical knowledge - rather they contribute to self-interpretation - knowledge about the self - ie. they contribute to the self-creation. So the depth hermeneutic of the reconstructive sciences does not actually reach behind reality or reflect itself out of history - rather the reconstructive sciences provide understanding about the self. As such they are therapeutic and clinical. A depth hermeneutic of this sort provides understanding beyond grammar - since, at the root, the affective dimension of understanding also entails an incorporation of grammar *with* images, narratives, and scenes that constitute a personal idenity. Depth hermeneutics never leaves the perspective of a participant in dialogue, and insofar as agreement is possible, it renders and agreement about something which speaks to the self and shapes ones' personal identity. To bring this back to the discussion about performative contradictions - a performative contradiction is a form of self-understanding and, in this way, cannot be used as a criticism of one form of life - rather a mechanism for illuminating the narrative characteristics of a specific form of life. To relate this to Gary's comment - critique cannot precede understanding. Understanding something is akin to agreement about something, in other words - if you understand something - you can not longer critique it because you are in agreement with it. Criticism is based upon disagreement (a lack of understanding), a place where understanding does not exist - where a statement or validity claim is *not* considered valid or meaningful. So, to reformulate Gary's interesting comment: criticism exists in the absence of understanding. All criticism is, in this respect, is a staw person. Because the object of the critique is precisely what is in question - that which is not understood. ken, who cannot critique what is understood "True thoughts are those alone which do not understand themselves." - T. W. Adorno --- from list habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
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