Date: Sat, 10 Oct 1998 15:34:44 EDT
Subject: Re: HAB: Formalism


In a message dated 10/5/98 8:57:08 AM Eastern Daylight Time,
kenneth.mackendrick-AT-utoronto.ca writes:

<< >  Note that Habermas differentiates between communication 
 and discourse in that discourse refers to politics.  Universal 
 presuppositions at one level of discourse may change at other 
 levels and in other fields of discourse.  Of course, there is no
 generalization of U from argumentation to action although 
 action may be regulated by argumentation which requires its 
 own justification. And lastly, a person may throw off the U from 
 one situation when leaving that situation. How is continuity 
 and consistency to be explained?
 
 I'm not sure what you are asking.  I think we are talking about 
 the same Habermas here.  Is your concern with my summary 
 of Habermas or my proposed critique? >>

I am pointing out that discussions about U are not themselves necessarily
universal, that is, interlocutors can easily throw off the requirements of U
as they walk out the door or during the next conference.

Two points you made that I have to object to are: the notion that legitimacy
is only required by a democracy, and that a law requires its violation for its
own stability.  Both notions are very difficult to agree with.  Legitimacy is
required for any social order, even totalitarian ones.  Without legitimacy,
the social order would break down into various
forms of pandemonium, crime, illness, violence, etc...  There are no political
systems that are worlds apart, they are all ideological and coercive.  A
constitutional democracy may be the best we can make, but it is still a weak
structure.  Furthermore, any political system is inherently unstable.
Legitimacy is everpresent in all of them.

As for a law requiring its violation.  This sounds neat but historically and
socially it is not true. Humans in reflection, realize that the individual may
have certain capacities and competencies, as well as certain weakness and
deficiences.  The achievement of several competencies is accomplished by only
a very few humans, therefore, upon reflection, we realize that human nature is
susceptible to certain tendencies.  Laws are made to prevent as well as to
punish, as another form of prevention, in order to secure maximal freedom for
the most people, as well as to secure individual rights and liberties.  A law
that I agree with is not therefore rational, and a law that is broken does not
necessarily prove its necessity.  A law may be necessary and never be broken
and it may be that it was never broken, if such a case exists, because of the
law about it.  Likewise, laws are neither rational not irrational because
'agree' with them.  The rationality of the law is a matter of consensus, of
logic, or practicality.  Indeed, rationality takes on a social dimension, and
not merely a personal belief, interest orientation, or liking, as it must
defend itself with reasons under pragmatic conditions of public discourse.
The only exception would be private law, which is, as it happens, susceptible
to being required to legitimate itself.

Fred Welfare


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