Date: Sat, 3 Oct 1998 23:46:15 EDT
Subject: Re: HAB: Normativity


In a message dated 10/3/98 9:27:14 AM Eastern Daylight Time,
kenneth.mackendrick-AT-utoronto.ca writes:

<< Can it be demonstrated the formalism itself 
 is a particular moral value rather that a universal value?   >>

You should understand what 'formalism' means.  Habermas says in BFN that
formalisms are not merely abstract norms but rather must contain some content.
Principles and concepts that masquerade as formalisms are often without
content and do not refer to concrete situations or events.  The value of a
formalism depends on what state of affairs it refers to as well as the
consensus about its meaning.  Formalisms that refer to generalized individuals
or hypothetical possibles are certainly open to criticism.
However, this argument about formal relations or formal (systematically
analyzed events)
theories, does not address the tension between moral and universal values.
Moral values would be pretheoretical and probably emotivist but there are
several other theories about this.  Universal value has the burden of taking
on all possible theoretical interpretations.
But, that is not to say that universal values are invulnerable.  It would be
interesting to hear an argument that claims that communicative action is
susceptible to moral criticism.  I do not think that it is, but its obverse,
strategic action certainly is.  Anyway, the meaning of formal should include a
content and when it does not it is questionable.  For example, Kohlberg's
inclusion of formal operations (transcended by Basseches 'dialectical
operations) in moral reasoning (judgement, not action) is generalizable across
all possible moral issues but may demonstrate the pervasiveness of decalage
between types of moral problems in terms of reasoning within individuals.  It
is impossible to claim that a logical operation applies universally when you
do not know the problem (content) under deliberation.

Fred Welfare


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