File spoon-archives/habermas.archive/habermas_1998/habermas.9810, message 9


Date: Sun, 4 Oct 1998 19:21:35 EDT
Subject: Re: HAB: Formalism


In a message dated 10/4/98 9:37:46 AM Eastern Daylight Time,
kenneth.mackendrick-AT-utoronto.ca writes:

<< To put this another way - you have to 
 believe in a belief about law.  >>

Not necessarily, you have to work in a consequentialist view in your action
calculations otherwise you could end up in jail or a statistic of natural
justice, but you do not need to have a belief about law.  However, Habermas
addresses this aspect by claiming, implicitly, I believe, that the legitimacy
of the law is of paramount importance in any society.  What Habermas'
addresses is just this lack of belief, that is, the lack of legitimacy
accorded to the legal order.  He explores why this is the case in his analysis
in BFN.

<<Habermas's point is that (U) is the minimal 
moral content of any possible argument that attempts to 
coordinate actions based on mutual understanding.  (U) is the 
universal moral content of discourse ethics.>>

If you know where Habermas says this, let me know.  I have the impression that
U refers to Universal Pragmatics which is the notion that all speech
utterances contain claims to validity: to truth, rightness, truthfulness, and
comprehensibility (in "What is Universal Pragmatics).  The universal refers to
the preconditions of communicative interaction and I think that this refers to
any kind communication not to the distinction between strategic and
communicative action.  Of course, strategic communication makes false validity
claims but attempts to deceive the interlocutor into believing that the
validity claims are redeemable.  Not being redeemable leads to interdiction by
the legal order or by dictates of natural justice.  Habermas makes the
incisive point about universalization that it requires justification at
several levels and so is open to skeptical arguments.  He claims that U is a
rule of argumentation and hence a rule of discourse.  Note that Habermas
differentiates between communication and discourse in that discourse refers to
politics.  Universal presuppositions at one level of discourse may change at
other levels and in other fields of discourse.  Of course, there is no
generalization of U from argumentation to action although action may be
regulated by argumentation which requires its own justification.
And lastly, a person may throw off the U from one situation when leaving that
situation.
How is continuity and consistency to be explained?

The abstract appearance of the laws is just that, an appearance.  All formal
or universal laws are still anchored by precedents as their concrete
foundation, and to the extent that they are held as legitimate for this
reason, these laws will bring their consequences with them, whereas, when not
considered legitimate, their coercive force is practically lost.

The controversy about U can be found in S. Benhabib and F. Dallmayr, "The
Communicative Ethics Controversy," 1990).   

Fred Welfare


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