Date: Wed, 21 Apr 1999 23:41:12 +1000
Subject: HAB: Communicative Competence


G'day all,

Habermas says this about imperatives and intersubjectivity:

"But from the perspective of participants in communication, if only their
lifeworlds are sufficiently interwoven, it is possible to understand all
imperatives against the background of this intersubjectively shared
lifeworld in terms of the paradigm of normatively authorised imperatives." 
pp83/84 of *Postmetaphysical Thinking*

Fair enough, but when it comes to the business of the best argument being
arrived at on a matter of collective interest, such that consequent action
may be voluntarily entered into on a coordinated basis, universally shared
imperatives alone don't do the trick, do they?  Communicative competence,
upon which so much of Habermas's work seems to depend, is obviously more
than that.

This, from Rick Roderick's *Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory*
(1986 - p77).

"For H., what is needed is =8Ca frame of reference=B9 for the =8Canalysis of all
possible global interpretations of nature and society=B9 developed
systematically =8Cfrom the general theory of language itself=B9.  Such a =8Cframe
of reference=B9 comes into view once we see that the competence of the speaker
of a language does not involve simply the mastery of rules for the
production of grammatical sentences, but also the capacity to communicate. 
The ability to produce =8Ca situation of potential ordinary-language
communication is itself part of the general competence of the ideal
speaker=B9.  To be a participant in communication, the speaker must have (in
addition to linguistic competence) =8Cbasic qualifications of speech and
symbolic interaction (role-behaviour), which we may call communicative
competence=B9."

I guess I'm asking us to test the efficacy and limits of 'the ideal speaker'
as we approach the world we actually inhabit.  Is Habermas's 'citizen' the
bearer of communicative competence - one who is able to produce the
grammatical sentences, invite discourse, and recognise the necessary norms -
*for, in and of a communicative episode such as would occur if held within
the lifeworld that has constituted that person*.

Is a citizen one who shares a lifeworld?  I'm sure there are people in Togo
or Bhutan (and probably on Habermas lists) who do not share mine - how would
we negotiate truth claims , behave appropriately to each others'
expectations in the circumstances, and assess sincerity, for instance? 
Whether we view language as tool, as semantics, or as action, we hit a big
wall here.

And I innocently thought that might be why Habermas introduces us to a
'citizen' (a term that implies a common lifeworld - although nit-picking
materialists might argue even with that, especially in these times of ever
more shifting people, light-pulse communications and blurring boundaries)
instead of 'human' (ie. the person we shall actually meet on the way to work
tomorrow - and the one with whom we actually share common interests).

How dumb is that?

Cheers,
Rob.




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