Subject: HAB: Re: Citizens and Communication, Honneth article pt1
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 1999 14:28:26 -0400


Hi:

A few remarks on the Honneth essay just to get the ball rolling.  More when
my back wrist and eyes function closer to  normal.

The first problem is what Honneth is trying to get at. I think he wants to
address some persistent problems in Habermas and forward his own theoretical
agenda which differs in some important ways from Habermas Here I'm trying
to see if I (or maybe someone else on the list) can frame the problem. I
only hint at a direction for inquiry.

 I don't think the problem that Honneth addresses  is identical to the list
discussion thread on the universalization principle. It 's not  a question
of whether agreement is possible. in discourse of even the nature of the
universalization principle. Let's assume for the sake of discussion, that a
solution to this problem is possible, and that we can
agree in discussion on some basic rights that might elaborate a sense of
justice. I think the question that Honneth raises is a different one, and
its one that Habermas has addressed on a couple of occasions. does
agreement about principles of justice provide sufficient binding force to
hold a society or a community together. I think this is problem of social
theory, not just of the logic of discourse. Given the conditions of modern
society Habermas has to ask what kind of community or society is
possible.

Certainly there is some ambiguity in Habermas' arguments. When Habermas
is working through a problem he often gives a number of formulations. maybe
some
of you on the list have some other interpretations. And I don't think we
have his final word on the issues yet. .

Habermas gives a couple of arguments about the nature of modern societies.
first of all they are no longer totalities.Thus we can't integrate all
members of a society through any religious or metaphysical conception of the
world. I think Habermas accepts the idea that notions of the good are
irreducibly plural. second he argues that given the emergence of systemic
imperatives that a are divorced from the life world. They aren't regulated
by any communal norms. ( Honneth I think would take issue with the second
point) The upshot of this argument is that the notion of the general will
developed in modern political thought isn't sufficient to depict the
political realm. Political life isn't a single will or a metsubject. It can
only be understood through a deliberative or a discursive model. The aspects
of political life on which we can agree universally  are highly abstract.
and sometimes seem removed form our social identities. That latter require
prepoltical forms of respect and recognition that Habermas isn't sure are
carries over into deliberation. (compare however his later formulations in
the essay struggles for recognition in inclusion of the other -- that's one
place we could look for an alternative) Of course Habermas doesn't want to
fall back on an atomistic liberalism either. He doesn't think we can
understand politics as an association of interests. it has to generate some
solidarity even if weak. At this point the argument starts to waver. In one
formulation at least (specifically in his responses to critics in the public
sphere volume) Habermas seems to say that the transition form the model of
the general will to the deliberative model leads to a loss of and maybe even
a deficit of solidarity. he argues that "the solidarity generating energies
of those fabrics of life do not carry over into democratic procedures for
settling of empirical interests" (if I copied the quote correctly).  it also
seems to me that there are some ambiguous formulation in BFN.  Sometimes he
seems to say that solidarity generated through deliberation or discourse
needs some buttressing from processes of socialization.  Only these
processes can provide the motivation that participants need.. Again we might
find other formulations that point toward a solution. But I think critics of
Habermas will light more on the ambiguities.

I think that Honneth wants to address this weak point.  however, he goes on
to link it to some broader criticisms. While I think he locates an important
issue I am not sure his broader criticisms hit the mark. Honneth follows
Habermas to the extent that he doesn't think the problem of solidarity in
modern societies can be resolved using the republican models of the good
life. he doesn't think that the virtue of the citizens (with its elitist
implications) is a satisfactory basis., nor do I think he want to base
solidarity on a common sense of the good. On the other hand he thinks
Habermas conception is flawed because it is excessively political as well.
he seems to want to argue that Habermas' specific notion of communicative
action is essentially juridical and based on "communicative consultation.'
Because this deliberative rationality supposes no specific notion of the
good or  community,  it can't account for solidarity. Honneth's alternative
communicative model stress social cooperation. while not a general will is
it a communal sense of justice that precedes deliberation and that may be
elaborated in deliberation. So Honneth is making a couple of significant
objections to habermas social theory. mostly that he does not and can not
articulate the connection between the social and the political. and that the
model of deliberation is not appropriate to the social world.

 Here the argument starts to get slippery. Has Honneth located the source of
Habermas problem? This leads to a question for Honneth Are the notions of
deliberation primarily juridical or are they based on a broader notion of
mutual accountability that is coextensive with social interaction?


comments? alternative formulations.

More later

Brian Caterino







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