Date: Sun, 11 Apr 1999 01:31:25 EDT
Subject: Re: HAB: Justification, Motivation, and Logical Gaps


In a message dated 3/17/99 10:51:18 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
kenneth.mackendrick-AT-utoronto.ca writes:

> As it has been pointed out, Habermas argues that motivation 
>  undermines justification.
>  
>  What about the motivation behind justification?  What makes 
>  justification a worthwhile human activity.  Formal pragmatics 
>  aside, a procedure of justification *must* be motivated. 

Yes, the regressus presupposed in justificationist arguments can be cut-off 
by appeal to motivation either way you look at it, in terms of the argument 
or the one who uses justification arguments.
 
>  Simply appealing to the 'always already' (ie. enought already!) 
>   presuppositions of speech isn't adequate.  As it has been 
>  pointed out in the past, Habermas's formal pragmatics 
>  provides no help in an actual procedure of argumentation, in 
>  the same what that Hegel's ontological proof for the existence 
>  of God has no bearing on his Logic.  It simply makes explicit 
>  what Habermas assumes to be the case (this is another 
>  issue).

Can't abide with this.  Habermas' theory of communicative action which 
delineates the distinction with strategic communication, the forms of valid 
and invalid argument, and the problem with perlocutions, not to mention the 
requirements imposed upon speakers as distinct from those of hearers, is 
important for the actual procedure of argumentation.  And, this is a brief 
list!
>  
>  The question of motivation has been the one question dogging 
>  me throughout my study of Habermas.  If one does not already 
>  have the sense that communicative performance will do 
>  justice to ones enjoyment and ones interest then I just don't 
>  see how any kind of binding / bonding force exists.  In other 
>  words - you already have to believe in a democratic imaginary 
>  in order to gather the desire to participate in deliberative 
>  procedures.

Or, you have to be facing a problem in which other alternatives are either 
too costly or ethically unacceptable.  All possibilities are considered to be 
included in the distinction between comunicative action and strategic action!

>  Renata Salecl's critique of John Rawls, it seems to me, also 
>  applies to Habermas.  Salecl argues that Rawls' veil of 
>  ignorance liquidates all forms of prejudice and identity (ie. it is 
>  deontological) that would make the idea of justice of interest 
>  (ie. an object of desire) (see _The Spoils of Freedom_).
>  
>  A formal procedure of argumentation requires that one 
>  sacrifice certain non-universalizeable interests regarding the 
>  good life.  However - it is *only* these 'non-unversals' that 
>  make an idea of reason and justice desirable.  If these are 
>  eliminated in discourse, because they cannot be redeemed in 
>  a consensual manner, then the process of validation itself 
>  becomes completely meaningless.  A participant would have 
>  no alternative but to drop out and pursue their interests and 
>  desires strategically.

This doesn't sound right to me. Can you give some examples?  May I paraphrase?
'The non-universals of the good life do not make the ideas of reason and 
justice desireable?'  I can hardly believe that Habermas is eliminating 
reason and justice.
The reason why so-called participants drop out of communicative action is in 
order to compete to win against, to oppose, to enter into conflict, and in so 
doing reject the principles found in BFN and the 3 validity claims
>  
>  Next, and this is a separate issue, there is a logical gap in 
>  Habermas's understanding of speech acts (at least I see it as 
>  a logical gap, perhaps someone can persuade me otherwise). 
>   Habermas begins with an 'is' - the 'fact of reason.'  This is an 
>  ontological reading of language.  It images language as a 
>  given, a singularity.  Although Habermas acknolwedges many 
>  different kinds of communication, the communicative use of 
>  language is perceived of as having 'no alternative.'  However 
>  I think it is possible to see that this is, in fact, a retroactive 
>  analysis of language.  Habermas posits the 'fact of reason' as 
>  a cognitive certainty, and in doing so he constitues the 'is' of 
>  language.  Language *is* communicative.  However there is a 
>  logical gap between here, a tautology.  A 'historical fact' is 
>  only a 'fact' insofar as one constitutes it as such.  In other 
>  words, one picks something up, and then consitutes it for 
>  themself.  So language is understood to be communicative 
>  only insofar as the idea of language and communication are 
>  ontic, not contingent.  However in order for something be 
>  considered meaningful, it has to be contingent, ie. part of the 
>  ones identity.  So the gap here is between and unfortunate 
>  paradox that Habermas's theory upholds - pure description 
>  and meaning (B. Russell does this too - in his critique of set 
>  theory qua theory of logical types - which has been soundly 
>  refuted by theorists like Godel).  I would argue that the idea of 
>  pure description, the capacity to identify an *is* is completely 
>  incoherent, and objectivist illusion and a leftover from a 
>  positivist daze.  So this returns to my first point, that a 
>  deliberative democracy is possible and coherent only within a 
>  community which shares a procedural democratic imaginary.

I do not understand where you determined that Habermas' theory was either 
purely descriptive or dealt merely with contexts of meaning as if he was a 
hermeneuticist.
It seems to me that Habermas presents a critical social theory that combines 
philosophy and social science, thus, he has put forth an explanation and not 
simply
a description or understanding.

>  However this imaginary, which is a fantasy to be sure, is in 
>  possession of several irresolvable paradoxes.  So perhaps 
>  the critique of ideology continues... and dissent, as well as 
>  consensus, must be part of the 'unfinished project of 
>  enlightenment.'

It seems to me that you allude to the Hegel in Habermas.  Quite an 
interesting point.
In these terms, democracy is probably just another stage in the cycles of 
history.
However, I do not consider it to contain irresolvable paradoxes, not, that 
is, if you
will accept that dialectics is at work.
>  

>  ken
>  Bibliographical stuff
>  
>  Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialism Strategy
>  Renata Salecl, The Spoils of Freedom
>  Renata Salecl, Per(verions) of Love and Hate
>  Slavoj Zizek, The Plague of Fantasies
>  Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology
>  Slavoj Zizek, Tarrying with the Negative
>  Martin J. Beck Matusik, Specters of Liberation
>  
>  PS.  I was wondering if anyone else noticed this - Habermas 
>  entire theory of deliberative democracy virtually has an 
>  *identical* structure to Hegel's philosophy of religion.  So any 
>  critique of Hegel's thoughts on religion might also be applied 
>  to Habermas's deliberative democracy.

Can you give some examples?

Fred Welfare



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