Date: Mon, 12 Apr 1999 15:01:38 -0500
Subject: Re: HAB: (U) and (D)



>
Vic, I hope you won't mind having a small portion of your recent post
quoted back to the list so that I might add to it.

The crucial thing to realize
>here, I think, is that to say certain competences, values, "virtues"
>and the like are necessary IF PARTICIPANTS ARE GOING TO SUCCEED IN
>REACHING AGREEMENT IN DISCOURSE (and if such agreements are going to be
>implemented successfully) is NOT to require people to possess these
>characteristics in order to enter into discourse.  The latter would be
>arbitrarily exclusionary, but the former is merely a PREDICTION that
>discursive success is not likely to be achieved without these
>characteristics, although even then it's still possible.  A practical
>problem is how to foster these characteristics often needed for actual
>discursive success without privileging them--my answer (again) is that
>these values would have to hold their own in discursive testing (and I
>don't think the circularity here is vicious, since we have to start from
>where we are and with what we've got).  I say that some (minimal) shared
>values are needed, but I do not presume they are always available.
>Insofar as they are not extant, we're in serious trouble.
>

	I don't see much difference, practically speaking, between building
a critical theory around a type of interaction which demands certain
competencies and values for success, (competencies that many of those whom
the theorist might  view as in need of emancipation do not possess in
sufficient quantities) on the one hand, and simply telling the same people
that they cannot participate on the other hand. Perhaps there is a world of
difference.

	More importantly, what do we we mean by values, virtues, and
competencies?  How are they produced?  How they are distributed?  How can
they be damaged or destroyed?  It might be helpful to have a little
discussion of the class character of these competencies and values.

	A substantial amount of work has been done on class differences in
education, for example. This work suggests that a working class education
is one which teaches obedience, docility, and acceptance of authority.
(Bourdieu and Passeron, Bowles and Gintis)

	An equally substantial body of research has been done on 'work'.
One focus of this research has been on the way that certain types of labor,
especially highly de-skilled, routinized, 'managed' work routines, affect
the propensity and the capacity to debate and discuss. (Schooler and Kohn,
Ollman, Braverman).

	Furthermore, there is certainly a link between possessing power
(social, economic, and political) and developing good debate skills. One
thinks of Bourdieu's work here, but also some fascinating work by Michael
Mann and Karl Deutsch on this and also Claus Offe's, "Two Logics of
Collective Action" - in "Disorganzied Capitalism".

	Finally, the idea of validating the values necessary for discursive
consensus via a discourse (in order to avoid charges of elitism) is great
in spirit and follows nicely from Habermas's approach. However, if the
social system is structured in such a way to privilege a certain way of
talking, thinking, feeling, etc. In the first place, then, there is a more
vicious circle than the relatively unproblematic argumentative loop you
describe above - and this would be the circle of social reproduction which
creates and reproduces competencies and INcompetencies at the level of
social structure and 'matches' them to individuals.

	I have said this stuff before on this list, by now it may be
boring.  However, I have always found it odd that a critical theorist
should locate an emancipatory impulse so 'in tune' with the ethos of
established power. Perhaps that is a strength of this theory and not a
weakness.     ?

Tony Lack


Ps. I can provide more accurate citations if anyone is interested. I might
also mention, somewhat irresponsibly because I have not read it all, Mark
Kingwell has written a book called , "A Civil tongue: Justice, dialogue,
and the politics of pluralism," (pennstate 1995) and in this book he
discusses the role of values, civility, rationality, tradition, etc. as
they relate to dialogue. I am not finished with the book, but  the topic
seems to parallel this recent discussion on the list. see especially, p.
198-204 - "is it rational to be polite"?


>

Vic, I hope you won't mind having a small portion of your recent post
quoted back to the list so that I might add to it.


The crucial thing to realize

>here, I think, is that to say certain competences, values, "virtues"

>and the like are necessary IF PARTICIPANTS ARE GOING TO SUCCEED IN

>REACHING AGREEMENT IN DISCOURSE (and if such agreements are going to
be

>implemented successfully) is NOT to require people to possess these

>characteristics in order to enter into discourse.  The latter would
be

>arbitrarily exclusionary, but the former is merely a PREDICTION that

>discursive success is not likely to be achieved without these

>characteristics, although even then it's still possible.  A practical

>problem is how to foster these characteristics often needed for
actual

>discursive success without privileging them--my answer (again) is
that

>these values would have to hold their own in discursive testing (and
I

>don't think the circularity here is vicious, since we have to start
from

>where we are and with what we've got).  I say that some (minimal)
shared

>values are needed, but I do not presume they are always available.

>Insofar as they are not extant, we're in serious trouble.

>


	I don't see much difference, <underline>practically</underline>
speaking, between building a critical theory around a type of
interaction which demands certain competencies and values for success,
(competencies that many of those whom the theorist might  view as in
need of emancipation do not possess in sufficient quantities) on the
one hand, and simply telling the same people that they cannot
participate on the other hand. Perhaps there is a world of difference.


	More importantly, what do we we mean by values, virtues, and
competencies?  How are they produced?  How they are distributed?  How
can they be damaged or destroyed?  It might be helpful to have a little
discussion of the class character of these competencies and values.


	A substantial amount of work has been done on class differences in
education, for example. This work suggests that a working class
education is one which teaches obedience, docility, and acceptance of
authority. (Bourdieu and Passeron, Bowles and Gintis)


	An equally substantial body of research has been done on 'work'. One
focus of this research has been on the way that certain types of labor,
especially highly de-skilled, routinized, 'managed' work routines,
affect the propensity and the capacity to debate and discuss. (Schooler
and Kohn, Ollman, Braverman). 


	Furthermore, there is certainly a link between possessing power
(social, economic, and political) and developing good debate skills.
One thinks of Bourdieu's work here, but also some fascinating work by
Michael Mann and Karl Deutsch on this and also Claus Offe's, "Two
Logics of Collective Action" - in "Disorganzied Capitalism".


	Finally, the idea of validating the values necessary for discursive
consensus via a discourse (in order to avoid charges of elitism) is
great in spirit and follows nicely from Habermas's approach. However,
if the social system is structured in such a way to privilege a certain
way of talking, thinking, feeling, etc. In the first place, then, there
is a more vicious circle than the relatively unproblematic
argumentative loop you describe above - and this would be the circle of
social reproduction which creates and reproduces competencies and
INcompetencies at the level of social structure and 'matches' them to
individuals.


	I have said this stuff before on this list, by now it may be boring. 
However, I have always found it odd that a critical theorist should
locate an emancipatory impulse so 'in tune' with the ethos of
established power. Perhaps that is a strength of this theory and not a
weakness.     ? 


Tony Lack


  

Ps. I can provide more accurate citations if anyone is interested. I
might also mention, somewhat irresponsibly because I have not read it
all, Mark Kingwell has written a book called , "A Civil tongue:
Justice, dialogue, and the politics of pluralism," (pennstate 1995) and
in this book he discusses the role of values, civility, rationality,
tradition, etc. as they relate to dialogue. I am not finished with the
book, but  the topic seems to parallel this recent discussion on the
list. see especially, p. 198-204 - "is it rational to be polite"?     

 



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