Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2000 09:37:26 -0800 (PST)
From: Gary <gedavis1-AT-yahoo.com>
Subject: RE: HAB: Habermas, realism, and Lafont


I fully agree with this. I agree that your comments
here accord with Habermas's views, and I agree with
this view.

Yet, there comes a point in the reflection on
discourse where questions of worldness are
unavoidable, regarding Habermas' three worlds of
formal pragmatics AS worlds OF THE world of life, in
an holistic, epistemic sense, which an existential
lifeworld tacitly implies. In tracing the assumptions
of discourse (be it theoretical-objective,
practical-social or reflective-subjective) back into
our communicative lifeworld bases, we unavoidably
imply an ontogenesis which is at least a
moral-cognitive development having real implications
for the formation of practices and theorization of
those practices. 

Even as one may avoid assimilating practical discourse
to theoretical discourse, it remains unavoidable that
reflection within each reaches a shared context where
the difference between theorization of practice and
practice of theory beg questions of the boundaries
between worlds and the worldness that differentiates
itself ontogenetically AS 3-fold in the first place.

What is the nature of this internality that is real?
What is this self-differentiation that is always
latent in each speech act's difference between
illocutionary and locutionary aspect, between *speech*
act and intentionality?

Indeed, this involves more than this medium is
probably suited to focus. But an interest in "internal
realism" in relation to "moral" understanding is not
obviously an assimilation of practical discourse to
theoretical discourse.

And so, even if Lafont gets her arguments wrong, I'm
confident that her problematic is real.

Best regards,

Gary


--- FFiorenza <francis_fiorenza-AT-harvard.edu> wrote:
> I think it is quite clear that Habermas does not
> think and in fact explictly
> argues that biological anthropology, while advancing
> legitimate claims, does
> not adequately deal the cultural aspect of interests
> and with the
> constructive character of justice and the claims of
> justice. It does not
> suffice that there are some general biological
> interests, but these have to
> be convincing interpreted and argued in moral
> discourse that takes into
> account the self and world undersanding of the
> other. To carry out that
> argument would be entail  more than I can suggest in
> an e-mail before I run
> off to class.  Francis
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
> [mailto:owner-habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu]On
> Behalf Of Gary
> Davis
> Sent: Monday, January 31, 2000 2:59 AM
> To: habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
> Subject: Re: HAB: Habermas, realism, and Lafont
> 
> 
> In any case, it's the issue that matters.
> 
> On the one hand, if Lafont's argument is validly
> motivated--that there are
> antirealist assumptions implied by Habermas's formal
> pragmatics--then one
> would
> expect Habermas to take issue with this. And,
> inasmuch as there may be a
> valid
> issue at stake, a resolution to it might appear
> invalid to Habermas. That he
> takes issue with her argument is not itself an
> argument, of course (rather:
> a
> contest of her claims). I would like to know more
> about his objection, which
> can be useful for assessing her recent arguments.
> 
> On the other hand, it would be invalid to assimilate
> practical discourses to
> theoretical discourses, and readers will assess this
> for themselves from her
> arguments. I haven't looked at her details yet. One
> could feel that it's
> prima
> facie implausible that a concern with realism vs.
> antirealism is relevant to
> the validity claim of 'moral rightness', but this
> would be contrary to
> disputes
> of the past decade in anthropology, regarding
> evolutionary explanations of
> altruism, which presumes that the concern is cogent.
> To say, if indeed
> Habermas
> does, that a concern with this of itself assimilates
> practical to
> theoretical
> discourse might just mean that Habermas takes sides
> in a theoretical
> discourse,
> against the claims of the biological anthropologists
> and for the claims of
> the
> cultural anthropologists.
> 
> In any case, there is the question of what Habermas
> means by "innate" when
> he
> asserts, in _TCA_ at least, that our communicative
> "form of life" evolves
> from
> a "biological" background. There is much to be said
> from recent research in
> the
> evolution of language that gives real entailments
> and implications to this
> anthropological commonplace. In his Meadian
> understanding of individuation
> (which is contrary to a cognitivst approach to role
> competence), Habermas
> relies on research that is contested other
> researchers--a normal state of
> affairs, but certainly a "theoretical" issue about
> the bases of practices.
> There are innatist aspects of his formal pragmatics
> which suggest a
> "language
> instinct" (Pinker), and evolutionary linguists have
> much to say about this.
> 
> So, it's not prima facie implausible that one would
> dwell theoretically with
> the real implications of a practical THEORY.
> 
> Anyway, much to consider....
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Gary Davis
> 
> ------------------------
> 
> FFiorenza wrote:
> 
> > I am not sure about that.  Though he had in
> previous essays in the book
> > referred to her German book, in the eessay I
> referred to he refers to an
> > 1997 Pluralism and Universalism in Discourse
> Ethics article that she
> wrote.
> > (I don't know to what extent this is included in
> the English version of
> her
> > book.) His own essay Richtigkeit versus Wahrheit I
> believe was originally
> > published in 1999 in DZfPh and perhaps too late
> for the English edition of
> > her book. Since I have the German and not English
> version, I do know
> whether
> > she has taken this essay into account.   Francis
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: owner-habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
> >
> [mailto:owner-habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu]On
> Behalf Of Gary
> > Davis
> > Sent: Saturday, January 29, 2000 9:07 PM
> > To: habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu
> > Subject: Re: HAB: Habermas, realism, and Lafont
> >
> > Interesting. Thank you very much for this.
> >
> > However, inasmuch as Lafont's argument is made
> only in the English
> > edition--which adds an entire part to the text
> that has been
> translated--and
> > has presumably had much opportunity to "test" her
> argument with Habermas
> at
> > Northwestern, I would imagine that his objections
> are part of the
> background
> > to
> > her argument in the recent MIT book. No?
> >
> > FFiorenza wrote:
> >
> > > With reference to the contributions of Gary and
> Martin,
> > >
> > > I have recently been reading Habermas's recent
> collection  Wahrheit und
> > > Rechtfertigung.  In the final essay, section vii
> (though there are
> > scattered
> > > references throughout the collection), Habermas
> takes issue with
> Lafont's
> > > interpretation of the cognitive claim of
> discourse ethics (and
> > consequently
> > > of Habermas's own postion) insofor as she
> assimilates practical
> discourses
> > > to empirical and theoretical discourse. He
> argues against her for the
> > > specific constructive character and epistemic
> role of practical
> discourse.
> > > In his view she ontologizes the domain of
> generalizable interests in
> order
> > > to argue for such an assimilation.
> > >
> > > Francis Schussler Fiorenza
> > > Harvard University
> > >
> > >      --- from list
> habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> >
> >      --- from list
> habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> >
> >      --- from list
> habermas-AT-lists.village.virginia.edu ---
> 
> 
> 
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> 
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> 


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