File spoon-archives/habermas.archive/habermas_2000/habermas.0006, message 53


Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2000 14:50:31 -0700
From: Kevin Olson <olsonke-AT-uci.edu>
Subject: Re: HAB: Colonisation or Autopoesis - What is so Critical About


Hi Eduardo and Gary,

Gary, let me preempt the charge of intellectual Leninism:  I agree with
your assessment of both the flexibility and continuity of Habermas's work.
I see the relation between the various strands I outlined as a harmonious
one, one that has developed in interesting ways continuously since the
1960s, but also one that has responded to new social conditions.  (Which I
think is also Eduardo's point about globalization and _Postnationale
Konstellation_.) I must admit, though, that I'm curious to see where you're
headed with the remark about "leading the revolution"...

Eduardo, let me restate a couple of things I said in my message.  First of
all, a word about "perspectives of analysis."  As I think you suggest in
your response, the one thing Habermas wouldn't want to do is to hypostatize
analytic categories into ontological descriptions of social reality.  This
would make "system" and "lifeworld" into qualitatively distinct forms or
realms of life, rather than different theoretical perspectives.  This is
why I emphasize looking at the same social reality from different
perspectives, rather than viewing it as an unbridgeable differentiation of
actually-existing systems and lifeworlds.  It's important to remember that
the same social actors inhabit both realms and that the two are only
distinguished from one another by forms of rationality and steering media;
thus I'm careful that my language reminds us that "system" and "lifeworld"
are theoretical/analytical constructs, not ontology.

This kind of caution shows us why Habermas's analysis is different from
Luhmann's, why critical theory is still critical, and why we shouldn't
assume that the limits of autopoetic action are limitless.  That is
because, unlike Luhmann, Habermas sees "system" as a critical-analytic
category (which I have called a "perspective"), rather than as a
social-theoretic description.  In other words, if you look at society
through the lens of functional integration, you will understand better how
administrative institutions and the economy process information and make
subjectless decisions.  However, if you look at it from the perspective of
face-to-face communicative interactions, you will understand that
democratic societies place limits on the spread of functional integration.
These limitations are governed not by autopoetic criteria, but by the
(democratic) aggregation of opinions into legal limits on bureaucracies and
markets.  These two very different forms of social activity coexist and
overlap, so we are much better off if we can shift perspectives to
understand each in its own terms.  This critical distance from
systems-theory is what saves Habermas, I believe:  he has "bought into"
systems theory in a much different way from Luhmann--he leases it when he
needs to go somewhere, but it's not his only mode of transportation.  (So
to speak.)  Thus he doesn't really need to worry about being overcome by
its "iron logic."

Now, let me turn to the question that you very ably posed, whether I have
described two lifeworld perspectives rather than one system and one
lifeworld.  First, let me say that the descriptions of the two normative
positions are what is important here, not the names I tagged on them.  And
I think that they are really quite distinct.  But second, this brings out a
very interesting ambiguity in the colonization thesis--the nature of its
normative basis.  Habermas assesses the dangerous impacts of mediatization
in functional terms:  specifically, in the ability of the lifeworld to
reproduce itself and coordinate action.  So while my references in
describing the "system perspective" may be to the lifeworld, what really
matters is that the critical criteria being employed are systems-functional
ones.  This analysis is not conducted from the perspective of the lifeworld
itself (i.e. whether implicit norms of communication are being observed),
but whether something like a "communicative system" is functioning
properly.  Here, I agree that Habermas has bought into systems theory in a
somewhat unhelpful way.

So my point is really this:  the normative question of where the border
between system and lifeworld ought to be is here evaluated in
systems-functional terms, not in communication-theoretic ones.  Let me
return, then, to my original point:  there are two ways of cashing out the
idea of systematically distorted communication, one from a
systems-functional perspective (i.e. are there distortions that damage the
function of the lifeworld, seen [in some way] as an autopoetic entity?),
and the other from a "lifeworld perspective,"--the perspective of
communicative actors inhabiting the lifeworld (i.e. are there distortions
that imply asymetries in communicative competency amongst us?).

There's a lot in your message, Eduardo, but I hope I've responded to the
big points anyway.  By the way, I agree with your remark that the
colonization thesis "didn't just slip into the background"--I was being a
bit imprecise.  I wouldn't say that the reasons were philosophical, though,
so much as pragmatic  (and I apologize in advance to all of the pragmatists
out there who are about to howl in protest at the distinction!).  I mean
that Habermas hasn't disowned the colonization thesis so much as realized
that the communication-theoretic part of his work is more useful.  So I
think you and I both agree that the colonization thesis is still very much
in play; but perhaps you see it both as more useful than I do and as more
in tension with other strands of Habermas's work?

Thanks very much for your close reading, Eduardo.  I really appreciate
being taken to task on this.

Best,

Kevin Olson
UC Irvine




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