Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2000 17:14:24 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: HAB: re: colonization (part 2 of 2) 


Well, gee: In view of Educardo's elaborate, superbly articulated
response to Kevin's posting (which wasn't received when I posted my
"part 1 of 2" a few minutes ago), I don't think I can usefully add
much. So, I'll focus my free afternoon instead on your
thought-provoking comments, Eduardo--but respond to Kevin as well,
further on (and let me say up front that I haven't yet read your most
recent posting, Kevin, beyond your hereby acknowledged disavowal of
Leninism :} But you don't escape altogether!). 

I'm glad to not have ever felt any "sort of Habermasian
schizophrenia" (Eduardo's allusion to other 1991 readers). For quite
some time, I've found Habermas' work "coherent" and "unified" (while
necessarily incomplete, as any fallibilist openness has to be--seeing
incompleteness as a tacit invitation or challenge that I might
imagine meeting--in my dreams!) 

Eduardo:  Notwithstanding the apparent consistency of certain
Habermasian themes: communication, understanding, validity claims,
etc. etc, there are ruptures, shifts of emphasis, adoption of
unforseen philosophical perspectives. 

Gary: One would hope! in fallibalist, open-mined, evolving work. 

E: The more noticeable rupture, and not necessarily the first one, is
that between the Habermas of _Knowledge and Human Interests_ and the
Habermas of TCA. 

G: Yet, communication, understanding and validity claims, "etc.,
etc." (?) are not just themes in Habermas' work; they are fundamental
or guiding concepts, which exhibit continuity between the very
different projects of KHI vis-a-vis TCA. I don't see a philosophical
rupture in the decade between these projects; rather an evolution of
discourse (and greater articulation of the validity basis of speech,
both cognitively and socioculturally) from a focus on key theorists
for him in philosophy of science generally (Peirce, Dilthey,
Freud--after Kant, Hegel and Marx) to a theory of social evolution
*relatived* to key theorists in contemporary social theory. It seems
to me that ascribable rupture is between audiences (as projects
*are*), not a rupture in thinking (which exhibits the learning
processes that have been thematized). 

E: The colonization theory is essentially a neo-Marxist category, an
extension if you will of the reification and alienation theories of
the Western Marxism that you find in Lukacs, Marcuse, Adorno, et. al.


G: What is it to be "essentially a neo-Marxist" by extension? His
critique of Marxist materialst epistemology is not forgotten in his
post-Weberian, neo-Parsonian explication of the colonization model in
TCA. I was drawn to Habermas in the first place inasmuch as he was
clearly (to me) *post*-Marxist (post-Marcusean, in particular), and
I've seen very often how misconception of Habermas' analyses (turning
Habermas into a "Habermas" straw man or foil of the critic's own self
formation) happens precisely in terms of neo-Marxist and
Hegelian-Marxist assurances about Habermas' basic affiliations
(perhaps confusing solidarity in metapractice with kindredness in
metatheory; after all, isn't anticipations about "radical" practice
that very often brings new readers to Habermas' metatheoretical
entwinements?). I've found it essential for understanding Habermas
that (1) the theory of social evolution is fundamental to his sense
of philosophy as reconstructive interdisciplinarity, which is
inconceivable from a neo-Hegelian, pre-Darwinian point of view, (2)
the analysis of system differentiation is relativized to the
communicative theory of lifeworld interaction, which is inconceivable
as a mere distinction between symbolic and social interaction or
interaction and labor, and (3) the colonization model is a critical,
fallibilistic perspective which is a derived mode of (or supervenient
on) the metatheoretical background, (1) and (2), which would
understand reification and alienation as aspects of or attributes of
colonization, not colonization as essentially alienation or/and
reification enriched, *because*: Relations of background embodiment
and interactivity is essential to the notion of colonization, which
the notions of alienation and reification cannot basically serve to
clarify. 

E: Habermas, in my view, wanted to retain the critical impetus of the
thought figure, but he was also aware of the theoretical prize [GD:
Hey, I like that!...price] to be paid: something like a
self-eviscerating theoretical reflexivity. 

G: Yikes.

E: Habermas was aware, and this has been one of his major
contributiotins, that the critical age [! edge?] of something like a
"colonisation" thesis makes sense if you are able to render the
theoretical standpoint from which you make such a pronouncement
inmune to the very reification and objectification that drives
colonization. This is the question of normativity. 

G: It seems to me that this is the question of method, which of
course is a procedural normativity (in critical social
science--regulated by metanormative discourse "ethics" or a
discursive metaethic of reconstructive science), but normativity of
procedure is a special, systemic sense of normativity in
communicative interaction.

E: To put it in the Hegelianes, if colonization is an extension of
the logic of rationalization as reification (Lukacs and Adorno) that
drives history, then all cows are black in such a dark night of
reification. There must be some standards that allows us to
differentiate between what is pathology, and simply "emancipatory"
rationalization and functional differentiation.

G: But such a dilemma doesn't arise, given that the "Hegelianes" (?)
is a mistaken putting. 

E: Let me put it differently. How do we criticize the present without
being consumed by that criticism? 

G: Communicative /reflective openness to "the Other", thematization,
testable hypotheticals, fallibilism, evidentiary testing, discursive
interpretion, peer review, and interminable openness to probable
changes in the environment. 

E: How do we pluck the rose from the cross of the present, to use
that Marxist expression, which Habermas echoes in his essay "From
Kant and Hegel and Back Again" (European Journal of Philosophy, 153)?

G: Appreciate that the rose will flower fine and leave the cross in
its own time without being plucked--by being granted its own
potential for bearing? {later Heidegger]. 

E: To do so, Habermas has wanted to see the process of
rationalization of social systems and structures as a processes of
learning. 

G: I agree.

E: Social differentiation, sytem differentiation and
especiallization, are mechanisms that incorporate the lessons learned
from social conflicts and tensions. 

G: I agree, but believe that Habermas doesn't believe that social
conflicts and tensions are fundamental. Rather, developmental
processes are fundamental. After all, with *absence* of conflict and
tension, desire to learn is most awakened! Desire to learn doesn't
need conflict and tension to enact itself. Play, interest, appeal,
mystery, fascination, etc., are the bases of learning.
Problem-solving is supervenient on the deeper, innate appeal of
learning in play. Inasmuch as conflict and tension *is* the
motivation for learning, an emancipatory interest is in play,
prevailing. But what motivates emancipation? An interest in self
formation, which is reflected in isomorphisms between developmental
and evolutionary processes in Habermas' work, 1973-1990 at least. 

E: Such processes of learning are guided by rational standards. 

G: So, I would disagree: Such processes of learning are guided by
developmental interests, which may be theorized and evaluated
according to rational standards of reconstructive inquiry. 

E: Systems theory and functionalism allowed Habermas to talk about
social development as learning processes without having to take
recourse to a Hegelian-marxist theory of history. 

G: I agree.

E: But, buying into functionalism and systems theory means having to
accept that the logic of system differentiation obeys laws,
imperatives, and rules...

G: I agree.

E:... that purportedly are not open to human manipulation or
tampering. 

G: Purportedly (?) by whom? Habermas? Certainly not: TCA-2
relativizes systems to lifeworld imperatives. 

E: One of the central ideas of systems theory, is the idea of
autopoesis -hierachical, or functional differentiation are catalyzed
by internal processe of having to cope with sytem complexity. 

G: And reflective learning processes catalyze cognitive development,
in the way that ontogeny goes (which is an active research area in
cognitive science.

H: But if something, like systems differentiation, is driven by
internal logics, in which the will, dreams and utopias of men, are
superflous and without consequences, ...

G: But are they? One should distinguish two kinds of themes: system
differentiation as (1) a theme in the reconstructive of evolutionary
processes, which is not systems-theoretical; and (2) as
systems-theoretical formulation or description of lifeworld
processes, which Habermas doesn't suggest as a way for understanding
(1). 

E: ...then why would we be able at all to say that a certain system
differentation is pathological or "healthy." 

G: Because we can differentiate (in principle) systems-theoretical
reductionism from thematization of system differentiation *OF* the
social-evolutionary lifeworld in reconstructive inquiry (which is
hermeneutical, discursive, and reflective-critical, rather than
functionalist).

E: Now, this is the point I am getting at. Habermas has gotten closer
and closer to systems theory in order to be able to preserve the
notion of rationalization, and possibly reification, of social
systems as learning processes. 

G: At this point, you can see that I, respectfully, don't find "the
point" plausible. 

E: But once you give autonomy to such processes,...

G: As you should *not* (as Habermas does not).

E: ...what is to grant us the license to call this or that system
differentiation pathological or emancipatory?

G: An example which is considered importantly problematic would be
useful. 

E: ....Kevin has talked about a bi-perspectival analysis, but .... A
truly dual vision would have to account for the autonomy,
self-referentiality of the systems world. 

G: A truly dual vision, it seems to me, would be *truly* dual more
than truly *dual*; that is: working to relativize systems to
lifeworld processes-- and relativize functionalist processes of
systems in communicative systems of interaction. Accordingly, the
*apparent* self-referentiality of the systems world is merely that:
apparent--and where this self-referentiality *is* autonomous, it
should be made (or remade) to serve social systems *validly* (which
are only relatively autonomous, relative to social-evolutionary /
historical, institutional, and ontogenic processes and activity). A
*truly* dual vision relativizes system to lifeworld. 

To suppose, then, that...

E: .... Habermas never really bought into these [autopoietic]
theories but only used their language in order to point to something
much more fundamental and normative: something like an emancipatory
logic of history that works itself out through the rationalization of
social structures (Hegel, but now lingustified).

G: would be an implausible supposition, as the theory of social
evolution cannot be comprehended as linguistified Hegel. 

E: As a way to respond to my formulation, let me quote from Habermas,
from "From Kant to Hegel and Back Again..."

G: And let me insert some bracketed commentary in Habermas' words:

"A constitutional state which has become reflexive institutionalizes
the constitution as project. Through the medium of law it
internalizes the tension between the subjective consciousness of the
citizens and the objective spirit of the institutions...."

G: But Habermas would not suggest that the *social* "spirit" (lacking
in Hegel), as elaborated in BFN, is an Hegelian synthesis of an
Absolute, even though:

H: ...It is this tension which Hegel sought to relieve by
subordinating both to the absolute spirit. A democratic practice of
self-determination [  which Hegel's was not, but which BFN is  ] does
not entirely dissolve this tension, but makes it the dirving force
behind the dynamics of public communication structured by
constitutional norms..." 153

G: Now this is an ascription about the activity of social *systems*
which is not to absorb the lifeworld into system (as BFN clearly does
not do either). 

H: "But Hegel's problem returns in a different form [  in
contemporary efforts to fabricate "constitutional" statism?  ],  when
we consider those societies where the immaculate wording of the
constitution provdies no more than a symbolic facade for a highly
selective legal order [as an Hegelian paradigm *would*--and all
"Marxist" states *did*]. In such countries social reality controverts
the validity of norms which cannot be implemented for lack of the
material conditions, and the necessary political will. A similar
tendency towards 'Brazilization' could even grip the established
democracies of the West. For even here the normative substance of the
consitutional order could be hollowed out. This will happen if __we
do not__ [my emphasis] produce a new balance between globalized
markets and a politics which can extend beyond the limits of the
national state, and yet still retain democratic legitimacy." 153

G: So, going back to Hegel is not an option. 

E: It seems, if we read carefully these words, and similar ones in
_Inclusion of the Other__, that there is an element of voluntarism
that is anathema to systems theory. 

G: For Hegelian constitutionalism, yes. For Habermas, no. 

E: WE can, should, or ought to intervene, lest we let the forces of
totalitarianism and anarchy take over.

G: Ergo: BFN.

E: I do think that the new _postnationale Konstellation_ has
determined the way Habermas thinks, and rethinks,  his theory of
action, theory of law and democracy; and most importantly, how he
rethinks the normative foundations of a theory of rationality that
was too closely wedded to the Occidental self-affirmation and
self-presentation as Modernity incarnate.

G: I bet that a post-nationalist thinking has been a part of
Habermas' work all along, which finds its ultimate political
expression as BFN, which the essays in the book called _Postnationale
Konstellation_ APPLY.


In any event, thanks Eduardo for an immensely thought-provoking
posting.

=================================================
Kevin writes:

K:... consider "distorted communication" from a systems-functional
perspective.  This angle of view diagnoses social pathologies brought
about when linguistic forms of social integration are replaced by
other media [...and..] the lifeworld ceases to function properly. The
resulting problems are things like anomie or "losses of meaning" (TCA
II,143).  This is the familiar thesis of colonization.  It is based
on the normative weight of a notion of social dysfunction or damaged
social integration. Mediatization is bad when the lifeworld cannot
properly reproduce itself. This is also its problem, however.  Such a
normative standard is kind of a blunt instrument.  

G: I believe, though, Habermas does not suggest that the lifeworld
healthily reproduces itself relative to the same norms that
reconstructive inquiry uses to describe its reproduction. That is:
The lifeworld reproduces itself in accord with or relative to its
ownmost meaningfulness, which has a normative dimension. But one of
those norms is not proper-reproduction or good social function or
social integration (which are evaluative standards that inquiry
applies to *aspects* of the holistically meaningful lifeworld--and
conventional standards at that!--among other evaluative standards
like developmental growth rate, effective developmental level,
develomental regression). 

K: "Dysfunction" is difficult and clumsy to operationalize because it
relies on macrolevel social phenomena...

G: This is false. Dysfunctionality is always model-specific, but
actual research is always domain-specific as well, involving any
range of operationalization, according to the parameters of an
evaluative model. Macrolevel phenomena may be assessed (e.g., in
econometrics); but Habermas' colonization thesis is directly
fallibilistic at the ethnographic level (and quite strongly
corroborated by social science at this level), indirectly
(statistically) at the macro level, I would argue. Good science is
difficult to do, but it's not clumsy.

K: ... which then must be operationalized and causally connected with
some specific, institutional instances of systematically distorted
communication.  

G: Consider a typical Health Maintenance Organization. Or a local
school. Examples are readily available. 

K: If you look at distorted communication from a lifeworld
perspective, however, things are much simpler and more exact.  Here
Habermas can delineate implicit norms of reciprocity within
actually-existing practices of communication.  He can hook them up
with implicit norms of social interaction within actually-existing
(democratic) societies, producing a normative conception of
communicative/democratic political interaction. 

G: I agree, more or less. 

K: This provides a preliminary standpoint for criticizing and
correcting public opinion and will formation: institutions must be
properly structured to promote fair, balanced formation of public
opinion.  

G: This is where my anti-Leninist antenna gets stimulated. They'll
love you in today's Russia. 

K: This critique of the "form" of the institutions then makes
possible an "autochthonous," on-the-ground, contextualized critique
from the perspective of actual participants.  

G: Good. *This* I can see in the good classroom or truly journalistic
article or public television talkshow.
 
K: In other words, it describes a critique of colonization from a
lifeworld perspective, in which citizens would themselves enunciate
what they see wrong with the invasive tendencies of the government
and/or economy.

G: Yes!

K: It seems to me (again, tentatively) that Habermas has realized how
much more weight the lifeworld view can pull than the systems view.
In BFN, he's really switched over to the second kind of theory,
diagnosing distortions in the public use of reason rather than
distortions in the communicatively reproduced fabric of society.  

G: I concur (though I'd question the "rather than").

K: Because he can do the former without reference to the thesis of
colonization, and because it turns out that the former is more
incisive and useful, colonization (I submit) has slipped into the
background.  

G: Plausible. But critical social-scientific theorization of
evolutionary (and devolutionary) processes---TCA--is a different
project from discursive theorization of deliberative democracy: BFN.
It's more appropriate, I think, to say that the social-scientific
project of the early 1980s is no longer his central interest in the
early 1990s. But the two projects are complementary. Both social
science and political jurisprudence are necessary to a truly
rational, good society. Just as only one validity claim is thematic
in a managely contested speech act (while the others are effective in
the shared scene), so too a metanormative discourse (BFN) is not
itself a scientific discourse. I'm oversimplifying to make a kind of
point about holistic complementarity in types of discourses.

K: Note, though, that I have laid this out as a bi-perspectival
analysis.  That means that the systems perspective is not less valid;
only less useful.

G: Less useful for normative discourse, not less useful for
discursive inquiry altogether. 

Well. This was fun.


Gary




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